

Croatian International Relations Review

Struggling for the Future, Burdened by the Past: Croatia's Relations with the United Kingdom from Independence to Brexit / *Josip Glaurdić*

Slovenia's Foreign Policy Opportunities and Constraints: The Analysis of an Interplay of Foreign Policy Environments / *Ana Bojinić Fenko, Zlatko Šabič*

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Struggling for the Future, Burdened by the Past: Croatia's Relations with the United Kingdom from Independence to Brexit

Josip Glaurdić

Abstract

Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia's relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to Zagreb's democratic shortcomings, but partly also due to competing visions of post-Cold War Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases rooted in Croatia's and Britain's conflicting policies during Yugoslavia's breakup and wars. Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity for the two countries to leave the burdens of their past behind, since Zagreb and London had similar preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Brexit changed everything. Croatia's future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration.

KEY WORDS:

Croatia, United Kingdom, foreign relations, European Union

The contrast between Croatia's standing in the international system today and its position in January 1992, when it was finally recognised by the member states of the European Community, could not be starker. Two and a half decades ago Croatia won its independence after barely surviving a brutal war that left thousands of its citizens dead, several hundred thousand homeless, and a third of its territory under occupation. Although internationally recognised, its territorial integrity was far from secured. Moreover, its relations with most European and world powers – partly on account of its pursuit of independence, and partly on account of these powers' policies during the war – were troublingly acrimonious. Twenty-five years ago, Croatia was attempting to ride the wave of international system changes in order to extricate itself from a troublesome regional status quo. Today, in the midst of a new round of tectonic shifts in the international system, Croatia is hardly keen to alter the regional or larger European status quo. It is a country at peace with its neighbours (despite frequent, though comparatively minor, tensions), desperate to maintain the protection it receives through the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU).

Over the course of the same two and a half decades, the United Kingdom (UK) went through a completely opposite transformation of its standing in the international system. At the time of the end of the Cold War, Britain was engaged in a profound debate regarding its foreign policy strategy and the shift in its geopolitical position. The end of the Soviet threat, the reunification of Germany, and the process of deepening of European integration left Britain's political class torn over the redefinition of Britain's international priorities. Was Britain supposed to jump behind the steering wheel of European integration – to be “at the heart of Europe”, as the newly installed Prime Minister John Major exclaimed in November 1990 (Smith, G. 1992: 155) – or was it to remain on its side-lines? What role was Britain's “special relationship” with the United States (US) to play in its positioning in the budding EU? Considering the change in America's perception of Europe and the geopolitical transformation of the continent, was Britain on the verge of losing to a reunited Germany the position of the “pivot of the West” and a bridge between the US and Europe, and instead turning into “England under Henry VIII: a kingdom on the edge of a European system, attempting both to play a part in continental politics and to assert its independence of continental constraints” (Wallace 1992: 424)?

Although the British political class welcomed these questions with trepidation, a new status quo in Europe – that was highly beneficial to the UK – developed rather quickly. London was at the forefront of shaping new European political and security structures, all the while building on its special relationship with Washington, and maintaining its connections throughout its former Empire (Jović 2007). Then, however, came Brexit. Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, Sir Percy Cradock, thought that one of the greatest errors of modern British foreign policy was treating Europe “[not] as if it was truly our future, rather as if it was a threat, or an adversary” (Cradock 1997: 207). That error, simmering on and under the surface of British politics for five decades, materialised in the summer of 2016 into a de facto capture of the ruling Conservative Party by its Eurosceptic wing and the consequent departure of the UK from the EU after a bitterly fought and extremely divisive referendum campaign. From one of the pillars of European political and economic security, Britain suddenly turned into one of the largest threats to Europe’s geopolitical status quo. The role reversal between Britain and Croatia, if one compares their positions toward Europe’s present and future, was complete.

Such a clear disparity in the direction and nature of change in the international positions of Croatia and Britain over the past twenty-five years, coupled with Britain’s traditionally low interest in Eastern Europe, could lead us to conclude that relations between the two countries during this period were at best inconsequential. The obvious disproportion in their power capabilities may also lead us to conclude that their relations could only have been unidirectional: i.e. that is, Croatia could only have been an object of British foreign policy, never a truly independent subject in the interaction between the two countries, no matter the obvious power imbalance. Both of those conclusions, however, would be incorrect. The story of relations between Croatia and Britain is by no means a thin volume depicting the powerless simply adjusting to the wishes of the powerful. In the two and a half decades of its independence, Croatia faced many foreign policy challenges: from securing its territorial integrity to establishing functional relations with its neighbours and positioning itself firmly within the political, economic, and security structures of the EU and NATO. Arguably no other country outside of Southeast Europe (SEE) created more obstacles for Croatia in the completion of those foreign

policy challenges than Britain. Considering the extraordinary changes in Europe's political architecture that we are currently witnessing, it is time to take stock of the evolution of the relations between these two countries. This article traces Croatia's relations with the UK from its struggle for independence in the early 1990s until the present day, with particular attention devoted to the one intervening variable without which those relations could not be properly understood: the European Union. The article does that in the hope of better understanding the future of not only relations between these two countries, but also of the European project and the UK's policies toward its continued development.

The "original sin": Britain, Croatia and the breakup of Yugoslavia

Britain's policy toward the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, later labelled by Brendan Simms (2002) as Britain's "unfinest hour", was founded upon two closely related dynamics from the late 1980s: 1) London's devotion to the continuing existence of the Yugoslav federation, and 2) the consequent blind spot for the campaign of Slobodan Milošević's Serbia for control over a recentralized Yugoslavia. The response of the Foreign Office to Ambassador Peter Hall's distressed 1989 and 1990 reports about the harmful consequences of Milošević's campaign was that "they really would much prefer it not to be happening" and that Yugoslavia simply had to remain united (Hall 2005). This position of the Foreign Office was in no way exceptional. During this period, all Western powers – including (West) Germany which did not deviate from the mainstream until real war began in the summer of 1991 – strongly believed not only that the Yugoslav republics had to stick together, but also that they would politically and economically benefit from steady centralisation. This policy preference essentially implied that the Western powers supported Milošević and not Yugoslavia's northwest republics in the constitutional debates which consumed the federation's political landscape in the years leading up to war. It also matched the West's larger policy preference regarding the preservation of stability in Eastern Europe. As the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd later put it, "We had no strategic interest in the Balkans, no

commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet should return" (Hurd 2005).

Hurd's image of Britain simply wishing for "quiet" to return to a region in which it had no particular strategic interests is, of course, only one part of the story. The larger and by far the more interesting part was Britain's strong policy activism in pursuit of that "quiet" once real war came to Slovenia and – to a far greater extent – Croatia: Whitehall's rejection of Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence; its equivocation in condemning the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) use of force; its dogged opposition to any form of international military intervention – even in the most benign form of ceasefire monitors; its support for an arms embargo which cemented the vast military supremacy of Serbia and its allies for years to come; its determined efforts to halt the recognition of the Yugoslav republics; its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Croatia for months after its recognition; and, last but not least, the neo-colonial abuse of historical imagery by a number of its diplomats and foreign policy makers who argued that the Yugoslav conflicts were steeped in the region's "ancient hatreds" (Glaurdić 2011). Contemporary perceptions of Croatia among British foreign policy makers and of Britain among their Croatian counterparts were decisively shaped during those first months of Croatia's struggle for independence – and neither country came out looking good. Croatia, largely due to its president Franjo Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was seen in Whitehall as the nationalist-run destroyer of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain was seen in Zagreb not only as the country protective of Milošević's Serbia and hostile to Croatia's independence, but also blind to the plight of a series of Croatian towns and villages falling prey to the onslaught of Belgrade's military machinery.

What could explain the content of Britain's activism during this period? More than a century ago Lord Salisbury remarked that "the commonest error in politics [is] sticking to the carcasses of dead policies" (Hill 1988: 26). London's decision to stick to the policy of keeping Yugoslavia united even after the troubled federation's descent into mayhem does have some explanatory power, though probably only when it comes to the earlier stages of the war in Croatia. The fact that a different approach was eventually advocated by a recently reunited Germany also did not help. To say that Britain was wary of a new European order dominated by

Germany would be an understatement (Glaudić 2011). Although London (as well as Paris) to a great extent based its policy toward Yugoslavia on the considerations of larger European developments at the time, this line of argumentation also has its limits. A more useful interpretation may be the one offered by James Gow who saw Britain's "pusillanimous realism" decisively contributing to the Western "triumph of the lack of will" to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav conflicts (Gow 1997: 174-183). According to this view, London (and, to varying levels, other Western capitals) accepted the (im)balance of power on the ground in former Yugoslavia because it did not wish to jeopardise its own post-Cold War "peace dividend" by getting embroiled in a Balkan war.

This argument certainly does have its logical appeal. Nevertheless, it is flawed for several reasons. First, it implicitly suggests that Britain was little more than a troubled observer of what was happening in Yugoslavia when, in fact, it was a highly proactive participant with direct and indirect influence on the decisions of the Yugoslav protagonists. Second, the "lack of will" argument also serves to mask the serious clash of wills among the Western powers to which Britain made a decisive contribution, particularly when it comes to its relations with reunited Germany, but later also with the US under the Clinton administration. This clash of wills was not only centred on the question of military intervention, but was concerned with virtually every aspect of the West's policy – military or diplomatic. And third, the "lack of will" argument fails to reveal the extent to which British policy makers were committed to actively warping the interpretation of what was happening on the ground to build a case for their preferred policies. In order to dissuade the various members of the international community – as well as many in the British public, press, and politics – who were calling for a forceful intervention against Serbian aggression, the case had to be made not only that the origins of the Yugoslav conflict were "ancient", but also that all parties were equally guilty. Indeed, no one contributed more to the distorting campaign of moral relativism and the equivalence of guilt in Western perceptions of Yugoslav conflicts than British foreign policy makers and diplomats (Conversi 1996). As the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia and the former foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, succinctly put it, the Yugoslavs were "all impossible people... all as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs" (Simms 2002: 17). This was realism alright, but it was realism which was fully aware of its

consequences for the situation on the ground, and which found those consequences acceptable. As one British journalist observed at the time of the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995, “Ministers don’t say so in public, but the fundamental British view remains that only a strong Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans” (ibid.: 12). If there was a carcass of dead policies that London stuck to over the years in the region of former Yugoslavia – then this was it.

The triumph of realism: Britain, Croatia and the Bosnian war

British *realpolitik* reached its climax during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In spite of the obvious escalation of preparations for war by the Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsors, the European Community – decisively led by Britain – did nothing to halt the aggression before it happened. Instead, it withheld the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992 and used the Serb military threats to force the BiH government to accept a deal for the de facto ethnic partition of its country. What is worst, this approach did not change even once the Serb military threats materialised in the form of ethnic cleansing and genocide throughout the summer of 1992. Lord Carrington continued to insist that “Peace will not come to Bosnia until there is a de facto partition”. The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hogg, told the BiH government, “There is no cavalry over the hill. There is no international force coming to stop this” (ibid.: 20, 30). And Douglas Hurd argued against the repeal of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina by suggesting that the West should not be creating a “level killing field”. The obvious implication was that an uneven killing field was preferable (Almond 1994: 321).

Western foreign policy makers actively worked to limit their involvement and publicly recast the conflict as an unfortunate but intractable civil war. In this effort, they were determinedly led by the administration of John Major in London which, together with the administration of François Mitterrand in

Paris, took the reins of the Western military and diplomatic effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Britain was, thus, instrumental in framing the UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina only in humanitarian terms – first as assistance in opening the Sarajevo airport for flights carrying humanitarian aid, then as protection for UNHCR convoys throughout the country, and finally (and extremely reluctantly) as ceasefire monitors and a quasi-protective force in Bosnia's five “safe areas”. Britain also maintained strong influence on the shape of the various peace plans which were negotiated during the war – first through Lord Carrington; then through another former Foreign Secretary, David Owen, who in August 1992 succeeded Carrington as the EU co-chairman of the Conference for the Former Yugoslavia; and finally, through the work of the Contact Group (the UK, the US, France, Russia, Germany). Unsurprisingly, all of these peace plans were based on the deeply flawed principle of ethnic territorialisation which ultimately rewarded land grab through violence and ethnic cleansing (Toal and Dahlman 2011), and which formed the crux of Britain's policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Douglas Hogg explained in his 1994 contribution to the *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina “have to recognize defeat when it stares them in the face, that land has been seized by force, and that there has to be a degree of acceptance of that fact... The other thing that they must accept is that the military option has to be abandoned”. This, he wrote, was a “major objective” of British policy (Hogg 1994: 16).

The interaction between Britain and Croatia when it comes to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a subject of great controversy – which is perhaps not a great surprise, considering that the policies of both countries during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain extremely controversial as well. Britain's preference for ethnic territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina closely mirrored the preferences of Croatia's president Franjo Tuđman and his proxies in the leadership of the BiH Croats; and the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans of 1993 were arguably territorially favourable to the Croats (Hodge 2008: 412-413). The perverse incentives of these plans for exclusionary policies by the parties on the ground, as well as the huge influx of Bosniak refugees into Croat-controlled areas in Central Bosnia, however, directly led to the Croat-Bosniak conflict of 1993-1994 which resulted in a near catastrophe for the BiH Croats and

Croatia itself. Significant territories were lost to the numerically superior and Bosniak-dominated Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the efforts of British foreign policy makers and diplomats to equalise Croatia's and Serbia's roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified. London also led the calls for sanctions on Croatia (Hodge 2006: 66-67). Zagreb managed to avoid such a fate by consenting to the US-brokered 1994 Washington Agreement which led to the formation of a Bosniak-Croat federation, but Britain's policy saw little change in the last year and a half of the Bosnian war. Its foreign policy makers succeeded in suppressing mounting calls for international intervention, and its diplomats were instrumental in making sure that the Contact Group's peace plan, as well as the Dayton Agreement which finally ended the war awarded 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Serbs (ibid.: 106-126). Even after it became clear that the fall of Srebrenica was followed by a genocidal massacre of thousands of Bosniak men and boys, and that a similar fate likely awaited the "safe area" of Bihać which was surrounded and under heavy attack, Britain was adamant there would be no international action to prevent that from happening (Freedland 1995).

The "new original sin": Operation Storm and the end of the Croatian war

Bihać, however, avoided Srebrenica's fate, largely thanks to Croatia's forces whose Operation Storm in August 1995 not only succeeded in ending the blockade of this "safe area", but also in regaining nearly all of Croatia's previously occupied territory by defeating the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina". Operation Storm was a militarily successful four-day campaign which practically ended the war in Croatia and caused a complete shift of balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly led to the end of the war there as well. The exodus of 150,000-200,000 Krajina Serbs, and the crimes of looting, arson, and murder of several hundred civilians who remained, also, however, sullied Croatia's international image and proved an enormous political and economic burden for years to come.

Britain's response to Operation Storm was extremely negative even before the crimes – which took place over the course of several weeks of lawless interregnum after the operation – became public. The reaction of Defence Secretary Michael Portillo on 7 August 1995 – the last day of the operation – was a perfect case in point. He labelled Operation Storm “ethnic cleansing” and expressed the view that “a conclusion which is based on shifting hundreds of thousands of people and in the process killing tens of thousands more is just not an acceptable way of moving towards a peace settlement.” Aside from grossly inflating the numbers of victims, Portillo also shed a revealing light on Britain's view of Croatia's internationally recognized borders: “The difficulty with this conflict has always been to try and get more than one party to agree that it is in their interests to negotiate a peace rather than just to seize more and more territory.” His opinion on the aims of the international community was no less illuminating: “The object of international efforts must be to bring the parties to the negotiating table, to establish a map, to establish a ceasefire and then allow the UN to police that ceasefire and continue its humanitarian work” (Wintour 1995). Croatia was chastised for allegedly “killing tens of thousands” of people and trying “to seize more and more territory”. Meanwhile, the preferred actions of the international community were in fact supposed to reinforce exactly such behaviour because Croatia's shape on the map – despite its internationally recognised borders – was apparently still to be established.

To say that Operation Storm and the nature of the end of the war in Croatia became a bone of contention between London and Zagreb would be an understatement. Whereas Croatia's pursuit of independence and Britain's strong opposition to it were the two countries' “original sins” in their mutual perceptions of each other, the character of Croatia's victory in its war for independence and Britain's strong insistence on criminalising that victory over the course of the next decade and a half became the “new original sins” in the relations between the two countries. Britain's foreign policy makers and diplomats insisted not only on Croatia's judicial prosecution of those guilty of crimes against Serb civilians and on the enforcement of the Serb refugees' right to return; but also on the *de facto* revision of Croatia's perception of its victory into an element of a “joint criminal enterprise” of its highest civilian and military leadership whose supposed aim was an ethnically pure state.

Postwar acrimony: Tuđman and regional integration

Tuđman's basking in the glow of victory over the Krajina Serbs was short-lived. Within months his government was placed under strong international pressure which was decisively shaped and driven by London. One of the first causes of that pressure concerned the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords which were agreed to in November 1995. In many ways, Dayton was an extension of the Contact Group peace plan which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb entity with the ratio 51:49. As was the case throughout the Bosnian war and with the various earlier iterations of Western peace plans, Tuđman was cooperative at Dayton and accepted the agreement's principal tenets without much fuss. Soon after the Accords were signed, however, he realised that his strategic goals were not going to be fulfilled on the ground. Rather than a loosely organised collection of ethnically defined cantons with significant self-rule that Tuđman believed it to be, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to become an entity with strong central prerogatives and thus inevitably dominated by the numerically superior Bosniak community. This led to a serious conflict between the BiH Croats and Tuđman on one side, and the international mediators in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other – conflict which ensued, with varying levels of intensity, throughout the rest of Tuđman's presidency.

The principal bone of contention and arena of conflict was the city of Mostar, split during the Bosniak-Croat conflict into two ethnically defined halves. The Dayton Agreement gave a new impetus to the EU efforts of unifying the city, but the local Croats strongly objected to a series of provisions for administrative reorganisation, joint policing, return of refugees, and freedom of movement between the two parts. Tuđman and his government supported their obstinacy, but with serious repercussions for Croatia's international position. As one EU diplomat told the *Guardian* in January 1996, "At one time Tuđman had friends in high places in some member states. There was talk of Croatia eventually joining the EU. That is completely out of the question now" (Palmer 1996). Throughout the first half of 1996, Tuđman remained dismissive of the EU's Mostar efforts, but by early August of that year he had to relent. What seemed to seal the deal was the US insistence that, if the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to

fall apart because of Tuđman, Croatia was to become an international pariah, as well as calls by UK officials in London and Mostar for possible economic sanctions on Croatia (Barber 1996; Borger 1996).

This pattern of interaction between the West and post-war Croatia, with strenuous conflicts and threats of sanctions, was not limited to the issue of implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The domestic policies of the Tuđman government garnered even more criticism from international circles: from Tuđman's unwillingness to accept the opposition victory in the local elections in Zagreb to his regime's treatment of the media. In May 1996, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe delayed Croatia's accession to that organisation despite previous approval by the Council's Parliamentary Assembly – the first time this happened in the organization's history. Croatia was also asked to lift its barriers to the return of Serb refugees and to improve its cooperation with the newly proactive International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Guardian 1996). Although Croatia was officially admitted to the Council of Europe later that autumn, very little progress was made on any of those fronts. Its internal political environment and its relations with the international community thus continued to be dominated by public protests against the government, international threats and reprimands, and increasing obstinacy by Tuđman and the HDZ throughout 1996 and 1997. Relations turned particularly sour with London, as the British officials once again called for sanctions on Zagreb and the British media had a field day equalising Tuđman with Slobodan Milošević (Glenny 1996; Traynor 1996).

Croatia's hopes for a change in Britain's approach got a boost in May 1997, with the electoral victory of Tony Blair and the Labour Party. The pro-Serb bias of the Conservatives was a broadly accepted fact of Britain's political life, repeatedly confirmed during the war and once again in the summer of 1996 when the former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and the former Foreign Office Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones, in their capacities as high-ranking officials of NatWest Markets, concluded a highly lucrative business deal with the Milošević regime for the sale of Serbian Telecom (Hodge 2006: 127-128). This Conservative establishment, which decisively crafted Britain's and Europe's policy toward the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was decimated at the

polls, with both the Defense Secretary Michael Portillo and the Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind – two prominent voices in favour of a tough line against Zagreb – losing their parliamentary seats. Hopes for a new approach increased further when the British Special Air Service (SAS) units made arrests of two Bosnian Serbs under sealed ICTY indictment that July, thus signalling London's shift away from Britain's earlier policy in the region.

Zagreb's hopes were, however, very soon dashed. The visit of the new Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the region in late July 1997 made it clear that nothing substantive really changed in London's view of the situation on the ground. Cook reserved equal blame for all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the failure to implement the Dayton Agreement – although the Serbian entity was unanimously identified by the international organisations in BiH as the overwhelming violator of the Agreement. He also endorsed Biljana Plavšić – one of the chief ideologues and leaders of the Bosnian Serb war effort – in her local power struggles and he publicly promised there would be no more arrests for war crimes in the British-controlled sector of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*ibid.*: 140-143). More importantly, during his visit to Zagreb, Cook announced that Britain had blocked an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Croatia and he rebuffed Tuđman's request for support of Croatia's closer association with the EU. According to press reports, Cook told Tuđman that "Britain saw 'no prospect' of Croatia becoming a member of the EU in the foreseeable future" (Binyon 1997).

Such a rigid stance by the Foreign Secretary came as somewhat of a surprise to Zagreb not only because of hopes that Labour would bring a different approach to Britain's policy in Southeast Europe, but also because of the new government's more proactive stance regarding EU eastward expansion. Tony Blair came to office believing that "We cannot shape Europe unless we matter in Europe" (Smith, J. 2005: 708). And one way of mattering in Europe was pushing forward a real agenda for enlargement. Crucially, this agenda for enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was to be based on the principle of individual evaluation of each candidate country's own merits. Britain was against the across-the-board beginning of negotiations with all CEE prospective candidates and strongly believed in bilateralism as the guiding principle in relations between the EU and the CEE states (Lippert 2001: 11). This raised Croatia's expectations of London's support because of Zagreb's extreme irritation with the EU's

Regional Approach policy toward Southeast Europe which bundled Croatia together with FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania, and which was introduced in 1996.

The implication of this policy was that the EU was in Southeast Europe making regional cooperation into an element of its conditionality for future membership (Bechev 2006: 31). Tuđman's reaction to such a policy was obviously very negative. He opposed it partly on pragmatic grounds that the rest of the region – far less economically developed – was to hold Croatia back on its road to the EU. Even more so, he opposed it on political (or even ideological) grounds because he saw the EU Regional Approach as an attempt to rebuild some form of a regional superstructure akin to former Yugoslavia. To Tuđman's disappointment, the new British government not only rebuffed his request for support of Croatia's closer integration with the EU, but it also – in contrast to its policy toward CEE – backed the EU Regional Approach for Southeast Europe. Tuđman's response was characteristically defiant. He initiated the process of constitutional changes in Croatia and had an amendment inserted prohibiting “the initiation of a process of association of the Republic of Croatia into unions with other states which could lead to the restoration of the Yugoslav state community or the formation of a Balkan state community in any form” (Zastupnički dom 1997).

The last two years of Tuđman's presidency were thus marked by tense relations with the international community; pressures and threats regarding Croatia's record on human rights, refugee return, implementation of the Dayton Agreement, cooperation with the ICTY, and regional integration; and, as a result, little or no progress on association with the EU. Although many authors suggest that what truly changed this acrimonious malaise was Tuđman's death in December 1999 and the subsequent electoral defeat of his HDZ in January 2000, what changed the EU's – and Britain's – approach to SEE and Croatia was the Kosovo war in the summer of 1999. The Western alliance needed regional support for its intervention against the Milošević regime and it bought that support by redesigning the EU's policies toward the region. With the end of NATO operations against Belgrade in June 1999, the EU initiated the launch of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. The Pact's Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach famously labeled it as “the fast track to full EU membership” (Bechev 2006: 35). And Romania and Bulgaria

– whose EU accession process had stalled until their cooperation helped NATO in its intervention against Belgrade – received a pledge from Tony Blair: “You stood by us, we’ll stand by you” (Binyon 1999).

More importantly, the EU abandoned its Regional Approach in favour of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which was supposed to deepen contractual relations with *individual* SEE states based on EU criteria of democratisation and market reform (Bechev 2006: 35). In one of his last public speeches before passing away, at the summit launching the Stability Pact on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo, Franjo Tuđman stayed true to himself and pledged Croatia’s opposition to any form of regional integration which would repeat the historical errors of Yugoslavia. He also, however, called for a clear path to European and international integration for all states of the region, to be determined on their own individual merit (Tuđman 2009: 219-221). He did not live long enough to see that his view prevailed – not that Western diplomats and foreign policy makers would have ever admitted that anyway. Their distaste for the Croatian president was such that no head of any EU member state or its government came to his funeral. As for Britain, Tuđman’s obituaries in the London press labeled him “just as ruthless and corrupt, and as guilty of precipitating appalling slaughter as his notorious contemporary in Belgrade, the Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic” (Times 1999). And British politicians, like the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, remembered Tuđman – former member of Tito’s WWII resistance movement who maintained a rather generous view of Tito until the very end – as “the closest I would ever get to talking to a real-life European fascist, full of bombast and national superiority” (MacShane 2011: 27).

Old policies and new beginnings: EU accession and cooperation with the ICTY

At the turn of the century all conditions for a dramatic improvement in Croatia’s relations with Britain and the EU seemed to be met. Croatia was ruled by a coalition government of six parties under Prime Minister

Ivica Račan of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with the HDZ firmly in opposition. Tuđman's successor as the president of Croatia became the HDZ dissident Stjepan Mesić who campaigned on the platform of a radical departure from his predecessor's policies. The new government announced its clear commitment to a speedy accession into the EU, a reversal of Tuđman's policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as full support for the work of The Hague Tribunal. What was equally important, the Labour government in London was still riding the wave of its proactive European agenda, particularly when it came to foreign policy and security. British diplomats were placed into highest international foreign policy offices. In October 1999, for example, George Robertson became the Secretary General of NATO, and Chris Patten took the post of the European Commissioner for External Relations.

When it came to enlargement, there was firm political consensus on the need for its real progress among all major UK parties. For Tony Blair, Britain supported enlargement because it was not only stabilising the whole continent, but also crucial in turning the EU into a global "superpower, but not a superstate" (Blair 2000). And for the Shadow Foreign Secretary Francis Maude, enlargement was Britain's "moral imperative" (Crowson 2007: 104). Once Slobodan Milošević was ousted from power in early October 2000, the whole Southeast Europe seemed to be catching up with the train of Eastern European enlargement. At a summit in Zagreb on 24 November 2000, EU member states confirmed the membership perspective of SEE states which, in turn, endorsed the principles of the Stabilisation and Association Process. At this summit, Croatia started negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) – a new form of EU association agreement reserved for SEE countries. The optimism in Zagreb was such that there was widespread belief Croatia could catch up with other Eastern European candidate countries and join the EU within several years. This optimism, however, soon proved to be unfounded, largely due to Croatia's steadily deteriorating relations with Britain on account of Zagreb's (lack of) cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.

Relations between the Račan government in Zagreb and the Blair government in London, however, seemed to get off to a flying start. Already during the electoral campaign in October 1999, Račan and his principal coalition partner Dražen Budiša travelled to London to present

their post-election platform. In May 2000, Račan chose London as the destination of one of his first international visits, where he and his ministers met with their British counterparts. And in September of the same year, in his role of the president of the Croatian Social Democrats, he travelled to the convention of the Labour Party where he again met with Prime Minister Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and gave a speech on Croatia's foreign policy. Behind those courteous and encouraging interactions, however, there was very little of substance for Račan and his government to hold on to. Faced with an extremely dire economic situation – which was one of the main reasons why the HDZ lost the elections – Račan needed real aid to push through the needed economic reforms. But apart from support for Croatia's membership in the WTO, which finally materialised in November 2000, he received nothing of the sort. What he instead did receive were enormous pressures which often crossed the boundaries of normal diplomatic practice regarding the extremely challenging and politically toxic issue of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.

Although Croatia under Tuđman strongly supported the formation of the ICTY, Zagreb's cooperation with The Hague was at best strained during the second half of the 1990s. Tuđman relatively easily succumbed to international pressures when it came to extraditing Bosnian Croats indicted by the Tribunal, but his government refused to accept the Tribunal's jurisdiction over Operations Flash and Storm which ended the war in Croatia in 1995 (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1124). Primarily due to international pressures, the government of Ivica Račan reversed that position with a parliamentary Declaration of 14 April 2000 (Zastupnički dom 2000) and thus entered into open conflict with the extremely vocal coalition of the recently defeated political right and the various veterans' associations. As the Tribunal made progress in its investigations, a politically debilitating pattern emerged of recurring media speculation, followed by public protests, government defensiveness and internal division, and ultimately international pressure. The brittle government stayed united and managed to fend off the challenge from the right in February 2001 after the indictment of General Mirko Norac by a local court for war crimes committed against Serb civilians. Five months later, however, when the ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte brought sealed indictments against generals Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, the governing coalition nearly fell apart (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1126-1131).

Unlike the indictment against General Norac by the Croatian court, these indictments presented a far greater problem for the government for several reasons. Most obviously, they came from the ICTY, which meant that they were part of Croatia's international obligations and that they thus placed the government under the EU's magnifying glass. Since the government of FR Yugoslavia just days earlier extradited Slobodan Milošević to The Hague, Zagreb had very little manoeuvring space. More importantly, the indictment against General Gotovina carried far more serious charges than the indictment against General Norac. In the Gotovina indictment, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor suggested the very nature of Croatia's military operations in the summer of 1995 was not only criminal, but also possibly genocidal. Gotovina was alleged to have been part of a criminal effort involving President Franjo Tuđman, whose aim was the purging of the Krajina region of its Serb population (ICTY 2001). These allegations led to a serious cabinet crisis during which four ministers from the SDP's principal coalition partner, Budiša's Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLP), tendered their resignations. Prime Minister Račan, however, managed to hold on to power by winning the parliamentary vote of confidence with the argument that Croatia could address the indictment's allegations only through the judicial process at the Tribunal. The outcome of this affair, however, was to haunt Croatian politics for more than a decade to come. In an act of either incompetence or political short-sightedness, Croatian authorities failed to capture General Gotovina who, instead of turning himself over to the ICTY, chose to go on the run.

With The Hague albatross around its neck, Croatia continued to make slow progress on its road to EU membership. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed on 29 October 2001, but its ratification was protracted, particularly in Britain which used this process as a form of additional pressure on Croatia, ostensibly regarding cooperation with the ICTY. When the Croatian government decided to file a legal challenge against another ICTY indictment – this time of the former Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, General Janko Bobetko – in the fall of 2002, London suspended the SAA ratification process. The Bobetko affair ultimately ended in the spring of 2003 with the death of the 84-year-old general, but relations between the two countries dipped to a new acrimonious low, to some extent also due to particularly vocal critique of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by some Croatian politicians, most notably president Stjepan Mešić

(Jović 2007). Britain, now backed by the displeased Bush administration in Washington, further intensified its campaign of pressure on Croatia.

According to a series of media reports in Croatia and the UK, in February 2003 London compelled the Račan government to consent to an intelligence operation led by the British Secret Service 'MI6' on Croatian territory with the purpose of capturing General Gotovina (Traynor 2005b). Although that month Croatia submitted its official application for EU membership, its accession was bound to make little progress because the SAA ratification was still blocked on account of the ICTY. By agreeing to let the MI6 conduct its operation on Croatian territory, Račan hoped to persuade London and its like-minded EU partners not only that Gotovina was out of the country, but also that Croatia was fully cooperating with the Tribunal. This turned out to be a mistake. The operation disturbed the whole political and intelligence apparatus in Zagreb, with accusations and counteraccusations dominating the media coverage on a daily basis. More importantly, MI6 seemed to feed the ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte with information that Gotovina was hiding in Croatia and that he was protected by nationalist elements in the state administration.

The British government also continued its effort of equalising Croatia's standing vis-à-vis The Hague with that of Serbia. Even though out of 20 ICTY indictees still at large in the summer of 2003 only one (Gotovina) was from Croatia and the other 19 were Serbs, British diplomats at the UN Security Council insisted that the UNSC resolution 1503 from 28 August of that year names Gotovina together with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić as the remaining indictees deserving particular attention of the authorities (Hodge 2006: 195; Hartmann 2007: 289). The implication of this strategy was clear: the alleged crimes of Gotovina were on par with those of Karadžić and Mladić, and Croatia was equally culpable as Serbia for the lack of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal (Hodge 2008: 418). This campaign reached such a level that Prime Minister Račan decided to visit London in the midst of electoral campaign in September 2003 to lobby his British counterpart Tony Blair for some respite. The Hague Tribunal issue "has taken over the relationship with Great Britain," Račan told the media before leaving for London. "Croatia cannot be punished because it should have done something that it has not been able to do" (Traynor 2003). Blair, however, gave him little more than a polite hearing. As Denis

MacShane, his minister for Europe, said at the time, Croatia's "road to Brussels leads through The Hague" (Castle 2003). Several weeks later, Račan lost the election to the reformed HDZ under the leadership of Ivo Sanader, partly due to his government's policy toward the ICTY.

As expected, the return of the HDZ did not lead to a shift in Britain's position toward Croatia, even though Croatia's cooperation with The Hague Tribunal improved markedly. The perfect case in point came in April 2004 after Croatia extradited to the Tribunal two Croatian generals – Mladen Markač and Ivan Čermak – accused of crimes associated with Operation Storm, as well as six Bosnian Croats accused of crimes associated with the Croat wartime entity in BiH, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. The extraditions came concurrently with the decisions by the European Commission and the European Council regarding Croatia's status as an official EU candidate country. On 14 April, the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was asked by the EU to comment on the level of Croatia's cooperation and her report was positive. According to the Tribunal's spokesperson and Del Ponte's advisor Florence Hartmann, however, within twenty minutes of Del Ponte's report becoming public, the British ambassador in The Hague came to her office to express his government's displeasure. Shortly thereafter he was followed by an official of the American embassy who chastised the Chief Prosecutor for supposedly alienating Serbia by praising Croatia. It is important to note that both the United States and Britain were at the time placing significant pressure on Del Ponte to refrain from issuing new indictments of Serbian officials, supposedly due to fears that the Serbian government after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 was too weak to sustain the resulting pressures (Hartmann 2007: 288-291). Britain was at the forefront of efforts to shore up Belgrade – as the director of the East Adriatic Unit at the Foreign Office, Karen Pierce, said at the time – by "fast-track[ing] Serbia through some of the EU and NATO mechanisms" (Hodge 2006: 198).

Due to Del Ponte's positive report, however, Britain did not block Croatia from acquiring the European Commission's endorsement of candidacy in April 2004 and the European Council's official confirmation of its candidate status later that June, likely because it deemed such a move to be diplomatically too costly. In December of that year, Britain also failed to

fend off Croatia's supporters on the European Council from giving Croatia the provisional date of 17 March 2005 for the beginning of accession negotiations (Traynor 2004). In a repeat of the clash regarding Croatia's recognition in 1991, the conflict was once again primarily between Britain and Germany. But by March 2005, things changed dramatically. The full nature of the MI6 operation in Croatia was exposed by the media and one of the surveillance vans its agents were using was burned, probably by their local detractors. As a result, Del Ponte's rhetoric turned strongly negative and she reported to the European Council that Croatia was actually shielding Gotovina. On the eve of Croatia's start of accession negotiations, its foreign minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović travelled to London with evidence of her government's efforts to locate Gotovina and to curb the activities of his local associates, but her British interlocutors were unconvinced (Traynor 2005a). London managed to persuade enough of its partners on the European Council that Croatia's accession negotiations should be postponed. The British government even advised Croatia to suspend its membership application, supposedly to avoid the humiliation of postponement, and to resubmit it once there was progress on the Gotovina front.

Croatia rejected this advice and six months later the issue of its accession negotiations was once again on the agenda of the European Council. Britain favoured further delay of Croatia's negotiations, but its problem was that it also wanted the Council to approve the start of negotiations with Turkey. The Council was in a heated debate for several days with the dividing lines on the status of both countries nearly perfectly overlapped – Britain, for example, being the strongest opponent of Croatia and proponent of Turkey, and Austria being the strongest proponent of Croatia and opponent of Turkey. In a last-minute compromise, however, both Croatia and Turkey got what they were hoping for: the official start of accession negotiations. With the Council members (especially Britain and Austria which publicly announced their seemingly uncompromising positions) now facing humiliation themselves, Carla Del Ponte helped break the deadlock. She surprisingly submitted a report suggesting Croatia was doing everything possible regarding the capture of General Gotovina (Browne 2005a). Two months later, in part thanks to the work of Croatia's intelligence services, Gotovina indeed was arrested on the Canary Islands and extradited to The Hague. It soon transpired that he

had not been in Croatia since his flight in 2001, but had instead travelled to many other countries, including Argentina, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Italy, Russia, Mauritius, and Tahiti (Guardian 2005). "Those who believed us when we were saying that Gotovina was not in Croatia today received the final and complete confirmation," Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader told the media, while welcoming the arrest (Browne 2005b). Neither Carla Del Ponte nor the British government addressed the issue of Gotovina's actual whereabouts during his escape.

Why did Britain pursue Gotovina so vigilantly and why did it place such extraordinary pressure on Croatia, brazenly infringing on its sovereignty by insisting that it allow a foreign intelligence service to operate freely within its borders? According to various press reports, it is possible that the British intelligence service took the Gotovina case personally due to his alleged connections with the IRA and its attack on the MI6 headquarters in 2000 (Rufford and Walker 2004). For some British officials, like the former minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, the whole affair also seems to have been personal. In his part-memoir, part-diary, part-policy booklet published in 2011, MacShane exposed a rather undiplomatic distaste for both Gotovina and the late President Tuđman: Tuđman was a "latter-day mini-Mussolini", whereas Gotovina was a "thug" and a "war criminal" who had supposedly "awarded himself the rank of 'General' in Tuđman's war of ethnic cleansing in Croatia" (MacShane 2011: 27, 71, 82). After Gotovina's first-degree verdict of guilty in April 2011, MacShane took an unprecedented step and wrote a statement for the Croatian media in which he compared Gotovina both to the Nazis and to Stalin's executioners at Katyn (Trkanjec and Muhar 2011). In November 2012, after Gotovina's appeal was successful and he was found not guilty, the former British minister remained silent.

Personal animosities aside, however, it is undeniable that the Gotovina case and the issue of Croatia's cooperation with The Hague Tribunal had larger strategic implications for Britain's policy in the region. Putting pressure on Zagreb served as a form of legitimation of the process of transitional justice in Belgrade, as well as a tool of pressure control on the Serbian government. Placing emphasis on Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY in international forums had the potential of at the same time removing the spotlight off Serbia, and compelling its government to boost its own efforts

in extraditing the remaining indictees. More importantly, however, the issue of Croatia's cooperation with The Hague was obviously an extremely powerful tool in shaping the future of the region vis-à-vis its relations with the EU. This "regionalized" nature of the transitional justice process and the strategic give-and-take Britain and other Western powers have employed in their relations with Yugoslavia's successor states are often neglected by the literature which tends to present international players as rather unidimensional actors largely interested in justice and democratic progress in the region (e.g. Subotić 2009; Freyburg and Richter 2010). To quote Florence Hartmann, who witnessed the interaction of the Tribunal and British diplomats first-hand: "The obvious inconsistency in the policy of London, which is ready to make back-room deals for other indictees and is less determined to stop the impunity of Karadžić and Mladić than Gotovina,...[has] given Britain the chance to slow down Croatia's entry into the EU and to thus give Serbia the chance to make up for its own delay, in order to enable Europe to consider the possibility of joint entry of the two neighboring countries from the former Yugoslavia into the EU" (Hartmann 2007: 291). Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that Croatia lost several crucial years on its path toward EU accession due to the Gotovina case. As the former EU commissioner for enlargement Günter Verheugen said in an interview in September 2008, "Croatia would have already been in the EU had one intelligence service of one EU member state not driven all of us mad with the stories" of Croatia harbouring Gotovina (Palokaj 2008).

True allies at last? Croatia and Britain in the EU

The arrest of Ante Gotovina and the start of Croatia's EU accession negotiations seemed to suggest that relations between Croatia and Britain would finally acquire some semblance of normalcy. Behind the scenes, however, Britain's efforts to slow down Croatia's accession to the EU continued. Documents of the US government uncovered in the WikiLeaks affair in 2010 give us a glimpse of the extent to which the British government was intent on delaying Croatia's accession by refusing to accept the opening of negotiations on the Judiciary and Fundamental

Rights chapter of the EU's *Acquis Communautaire* on account of Croatia's alleged lack of effort to turn over to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor artillery documentation from Operation Storm. According to the report of the US Embassy in Zagreb from November 2009, British ambassador to Croatia, David Blunt, told his American colleague that "some key officials in London regard Croatia as virtually unchanged since the Tadjman era and are inclined to assume GOC bad faith in its dealings with the ICTY." He also suggested that a visit from the US officials to London "to acquaint senior officials with these realities might offer the only hope for a reassessment of the entrenched UK position" (Guardian 2010; Traynor 2010). While much media attention was given to the blockade of Croatia's negotiations by its north-western neighbour Slovenia because of their maritime border dispute, it was exactly the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights chapter that was the last to be opened and the last to be closed in Croatia's negotiations with the EU – chiefly due to Britain's influence on the negotiating process. Negotiations were, however, finally completed in June 2011 and the Accession Treaty was signed in December of the same year. Britain was one of the last countries to ratify it in January 2013, though it should be noted that it did so before Croatia's supposed EU ally and protector, Germany.

With Croatia's EU accession, relations between the two countries entered a phase of relative calm. Unfortunately, this phase proved to be rather brief. This time the sources of turbulence, however, did not come from Croatia or Southeast Europe, but from the UK. The first challenge was presented by the Scottish independence referendum held in September 2014. Although the prospect of an independent Scotland was welcomed among some political commentators in Croatia who saw the demise of the United Kingdom as karmic punishment for London's policies, Croatian government led by the Social Democrats took a more muted approach. In the run-up to the referendum, the Scottish government of Alex Salmond was eager to secure support for Scotland's automatic EU membership in case its voters opted for independence. The response from the Croatian government of Zoran Milanović – which did not substantively differ from the responses of other EU member states – brought a dose of hard reality to Edinburgh: "Negotiations with the EU are a process based on consensus. All member states have to agree to all decisions related to enlargement. Croatia knows all too well the numerous obstacles that could present

themselves in each individual case. Croatia stands firmly on the position that all states which wish to become members must go through a detailed, all-encompassing, carefully thought out, and just process of negotiations" (Veljković 2013). As sympathetic as the Croats may have been for the cause of independent Scotland, their government did not wish to rock neither the UK nor the EU boat.

Referendum fever in the UK, however, soon continued with the Brexit campaign. It would be generous to say that the short-lived coalition government of Tihomir Orešković had any real position toward the two possible outcomes of the Brexit referendum. How could it have had, considering how divided and weak it was, and considering how little its opinion would have mattered to both the UK voters and the remaining EU partners? It greeted the shocking referendum result with regret, labelling it as the "greatest strike against the unity of Europe from the very beginning of its integration, and for us a particularly sensitive issue at a time when enlargement to our neighbouring nations is worked on" (Vlada 2016a). Prime Minister Orešković's statements were a bit more revealing. Orešković invoked the "globalization trilemma" proposed by the economist Dani Rodrik (2000) (which states one cannot have a completely integrated common market, national sovereignty, and democracy) to argue against deeper integrative efforts. "A change is necessary," Orešković stated. "The Union needs to change to be able to resolve the issues which are driving discontent and scepticism, like the issue of transparency of decision making in Brussels" (Vlada 2016b).

Of course, if one wanted to get a real feel for the pulse of Croatia's political class regarding Brexit, one did not have to listen to Orešković. His government suffered a resounding vote of no confidence just days prior to the UK referendum. Three weeks after the Brexit vote, the senior coalition partner HDZ ousted its unpopular president Tomislav Karamarko and installed a new leadership under Andrej Plenković. Plenković, who was a career diplomat before joining the HDZ in 2011, was a member of the European Parliament at the time. His view of Brexit was substantively different from Orešković's. Gone were the calls for change and recognition of the EU's democratic deficit. Instead, Plenković focused on David Cameron's strategic error of succumbing to the populists and calling for an "unnecessary" referendum which turned a crisis within his own party

into a crisis of national, European, and global significance (Hina 2016). Plenković's statements were particularly interesting since he was already in campaign mode for the leadership of his own party. He was signalling a clear break with his more nationalist predecessor who found role-models in Orbán's Hungary or Kaczyński's Poland.

Indeed, as Plenković stated to the Croatian Television in response to a question regarding whether Croatia should get closer to the Visegrád Group in post-Brexit EU, "I believe we must be strongly pro-European because that is a project which will last despite the current crisis. If we give way to the forces that wish to water it down, I think that will make the whole continent much less relevant globally, and that would be a step back for us in terms of both economic performance and values" (HRT 2016). For Plenković and his government sworn in on 16 October 2016, Brexit could easily become Britain's new "original sin" if it jeopardizes the future of the EU. In that they probably differ little from a whole generation of pro-EU politicians on the continent. Whether Brexit does jeopardise the future of the EU, however, is still anybody's guess. UK Prime Minister Theresa May in her 17 January 2017 speech announcing her government's plans for hard Brexit wanted to assuage Europe's fears: "The decision to leave the EU represents no desire to become more distant to you, our friends and neighbors. It was no attempt to do harm to the EU itself or to any of its remaining member states" (Independent 2017). Brexit negotiations will, however, present the real test of this claim, as will Britain's relations with the Trump administration in Washington whose commitment to European integration is suspect at best. These issues will determine the near future of Britain's relations not only with Croatia, but also with the rest of the EU.

Conclusions

Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia's relations with Britain were undoubtedly its greatest foreign policy challenge since independence. Despite their clear power disparity, however, relations between the two countries were not driven by Britain's preferences and Croatia's adaptation to them – on the contrary. Croatia pushed for and achieved

independence – against Britain's wishes. It secured its territorial integrity and ultimate victory in the war for independence – against Britain's wishes. It successfully navigated through the Scylla and Charybdis of EU negotiations and became a full member state before the rest of the region – also against Britain's wishes. A relatively small European state defied one of the greatest European powers and managed to achieve virtually all of its foreign policy aims. This is a cautionary tale for many scholars of international relations and EU politics committed to theoretical approaches which privilege state power capabilities over all other factors. Small states are not simply the objects of great power politics, but can shape their own and their regions' destinies independently. However, how do we explain Britain's policy activism when it comes to Croatia and its region? Why did a small and seemingly inconsequential country in Southeast Europe generate such interest and policy commitment from one of Europe's great powers?

Judging by Ambassador Blunt's candid comment regarding his superiors in Whitehall, perhaps the root of it all was in historical oversimplification – one error British policy makers have a strong tendency to make (Hill 1988: 24). Foreign Office, for example, in its online profile for Croatia until recently claimed that, "The roots of Croatia's traumatic emergence as an independent state in the 1990s date back to the Second World War (and even further). Its more recent history was strongly influenced by Slobodan Milošević, who came to power in the former Yugoslavia in 1989. Slovenia and Croatia, both then federal states within Yugoslavia, became disillusioned with the speed of economic and political reforms under his leadership. By January 1990 they had set themselves on the path to independence" (FCO 2012). Setting aside the highly problematic first sentence of that passage and its clumsy wording, the factual and interpretational absurdity that Milošević was a reformer who came to power in Yugoslavia in 1989 and that Yugoslavia apparently fell apart because Slovenia and Croatia were not comfortable with the speed of his reforms clearly suggests that the Foreign Office does not have a merely oversimplified view of what happened in former Yugoslavia – it seems to have no clue.

Foreign Office's historically inaccurate view of the breakup of Yugoslavia is, however, more important for another reason. It reveals that Whitehall still

lays the bulk of blame for Yugoslavia's dissolution on the federation's north-western republics and not on Serbia. In the eyes of London, the breakup of Yugoslavia – the starting point for the two countries' discordant relations – was Croatia's "original sin". This is not to say that Britain's policy toward Croatia over the past two decades has been some sort of vendetta for the demise of what British diplomats were in 1991 calling "our baby" (Glaudić 2011: 374). London's actions were obviously guided by the events on the ground, Croatia's own democratic deficit, the limitations of diplomacy in a multilateral environment, the perception of British interests in the region, and by the general reluctance of the UK public to support EU enlargement. In a national survey conducted on the eve of Croatia's EU accession, for example, only 10% of UK respondents stated they wished to see Croatia join the EU, with overwhelming majorities opposing further enlargement on account of its supposed negative effect on unemployment, immigration, terrorism, and EU decision making (YouGov 2012). Britain's actions toward Croatia were also, however, embedded in a particular kind of "historical thinking" about Southeast Europe and in a long tradition of thought about British policy in this region. British historical biases regarding Croatia were likely reinforced with that realist conception that "only a strong Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans."

These factors were important determinants of Britain's relations with Croatia until Croatia's entry into the EU. Recent events, however, have profoundly altered the game, making it difficult to predict how the relations between the two countries will develop in the years to come. Ironically, the failures of EU policies – to a significant extent crafted by Britain – during the Yugoslav wars, and Britain's use of the EU accession process as a tool of pressure on Croatia, have made the Croatian public and political elite less Europhile and more Atlanticist, which would have meant that Zagreb and London could have become true allies within the EU on a number of crucial policy fronts – from the Union's relations with the United States to the EU eastward enlargement or even the process of deepening of economic integration.

Rather than future collaboration on the pace of EU reforms or enlargement in Southeast Europe, however, they will now be preoccupied with questions of Britain's exit from the EU. Croatia is unlikely to have great influence on that negotiating process, although consensus within the EU will be needed.

Croatia, and all other remaining EU member states, will however shape their relations with the UK based on the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of future EU integration. Prime Minister May was eager to reassure its EU partners that Britain will remain a friend of the European Union and a pillar of European security. It remains to be seen whether those words will translate into actual policy, or if London will be swayed toward who knows what kind of destabilising policy coming from Washington and/or Moscow in the near future. In other words, challenges to Europe's geopolitical status quo might once again be the principal bone of contention between Croatia and Britain, though this time with one crucial difference: Croatia will be in, and Britain out.

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Slovenia's Foreign Policy Opportunities and Constraints: The Analysis of an Interplay of Foreign Policy Environments

Ana Bojinović Fenko, Zlatko Šabič

Abstract

The article focuses on the interconnectedness of foreign policy environments to explain Slovenia's opportunities and constraints for foreign policy action. During the period of pre-independence para-diplomacy, the building of an internal and external domestic environment successfully turned constraints (no international recognition) into opportunities (applying for membership of European and global intergovernmental organizations). In the second period — post-recognition — considering the absence of a strategic foreign policy document, the Slovenian internal foreign policy environment became a major constraint to seize foreign environment opportunities. This affected Slovenia's accomplishments, notably after NATO and EU memberships were achieved in 2004. Although the Slovenian internal environment matured during the following period to adopt, in 2015, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy the recent turn in world politics (especially the European financial and economic crisis and the migration crisis) created for the first time a foreign environment for Slovenia that offered many fewer opportunities and far more constraints.

KEY WORDS:

foreign policy, foreign policy environments, opportunities, constraints, Slovenia

Introduction

Slovenian foreign policy has received a lot of attention in literature. Studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence of various aspects of foreign policy analysis — for example, the organization and conduct of the foreign policy process and its individual instruments, mainly diplomacy (Brglez 1996; Udovič and Brglez 2011; Jazbec 2012), Europeanization of foreign policy (Kajnc 2011; Šabič and Bunič 2013; Bojinović Fenko and Lovec 2015), analyses of foreign policy content (decisions) (Bojinović 2005), and strategy in bilateral (neighbouring), regional (European) and relevant global issues (Bučar 1994, 1995; Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014; Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014). The least systematically researched area remains the foreign policy environment. So far, it has been addressed mostly through the prisms of 'smallness' and the 'youth' of the Slovenian state.¹ Consequently, there has been limited research around the presupposition that — like for all small states — the foreign environment in terms of limitations from the international system automatically prevails by decisively determining constraints for Slovenian foreign policy (Hey 2003). In this respect, we propose to broaden the research agenda by focusing on the interplay between foreign and domestic foreign policy environments. To do so, we first provide a definition of the foreign policy environment. The term is widely used in foreign policy analysis and rests on two different classifications: factor analysis of the internal-external foreign policy environment (Hill 2016) and the levels of analysis of the domestic-foreign dichotomy of the foreign policy environment (Russett and Starr 1981; Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013; Hudson 2014). This conceptualization reveals how foreign policy substance and the foreign policy making process are influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment; b) the external domestic foreign policy environment, defined mostly as the state-building environment; and c) the external foreign policy environment. The research question pursued here is how these three types of foreign policy environment influence foreign policy, whereby the term 'influence' means the extent of opportunities or constraints for foreign policy action. We assume that foreign policy is a continuous process; hence an additional question that we ask is how feedback on foreign policy actions (from the

¹ A notable exception is the investigation of the geographical proximity and historical context of Slovenia in relation to the Balkans (Bojinović 2005).

external foreign environment) affects the domestic external and internal environments, either through self-perception or via policy-making.


The structure of the article is as follows. We first conceptualize the foreign policy environment and state building, focusing on their interplay. We then look at opportunities and constraints for taking foreign policy action. We do this by dividing the analysis into three time periods; pre-independence paradiplomacy until 1992; the consolidation of the state until 2004 membership of Euro-Atlantic integrations; and the 'mature statehood' period, in which Slovenia's foreign policy orientation is challenged by international crises which follow one after the other since the financial crisis in 2007–2008. Methodologically, the article departs from understanding foreign policy as a policy (in terms of the content of decisions) and as a policy-making process (Carlsnaes 2012), thereby employing social constructivist epistemological grounds of constant interplay between the structure (the foreign policy environment) and the actors (decision-makers). The three-period historical analysis focuses on general normative foreign policy positions in strategic documents (self-perception and internal environment) and on selected foreign policy situations leading to concrete foreign policy decisions by Slovenian decision-makers.

Foreign policy environments as sources of opportunities and constraints for action

There are two different but complementary approaches to states' foreign policy environment. The internal-external divide follows Hill's conceptualization (2016: 176), where the internal environment corresponds to "the social and political process by which the actor comes to its choices" (Hill 2016: 183), meaning factors and actors directly involved in the foreign policy process. This environment thus includes decision-makers (in terms of their individual characteristics and their roles) and rules and norms in foreign policy-making (Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013: 13–15). The external foreign policy environment, for its part, includes material and semi-material factors of the state and its society,

such as demography, culture and image, including geopolitical and historical self-perception and consequently recognition of the state (Hill 2016: 176–184), and factors of international political interdependence — international governmental organizations, transnational processes, international law, foreign policies of other states and the nature and the position of the state in the international system. Kinsella, Russett and Starr (2013: Chapter 1), however, use the concept of levels of analysis to analyse the foreign policy environment. Levels of analysis are defined as “points on an ordered scale of size and complexity. These levels include units whose behaviour we attempt to describe, predict or explain, as well as units whose impact on individual decision-makers we examine” (Russett and Starr 1996: 11). The earlier approach, which used six levels of analysis (Russett and Starr 1996: 11),² has been narrowed down to three (Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013: Chapter 1). These are decision-makers and domestic society as the domestic environment levels of analysis, and global society as the foreign environment levels of analysis. External material and semi-material factors directly correspond to the domestic society level of analysis, whereas international political interdependence factors equal the global society level of analysis.

Figure 1: Interplay of external (domestic and foreign) and internal foreign policy environments



Source: Authors' own illustration based on Kinsella et al. (2013) and Hill (2016)

In sum (Figure 1), foreign policy substance and policy-making are influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment and, within that, by 'decision-makers'; b) external semi-material factors, equalling domestic society and government levels of analysis; and c) international interdependence or the global society level of analysis as the external

2 The previous six levels were individual, role, government, society, relations and international system (Russett and Starr 1996).

foreign environment. The environments enable foreign policy action by offering incentives and stimulative influence (i.e. opportunities) and/or constrain action due to negative influences preventing realization of some choices. In the following sections, we will elaborate on this conceptualization by looking at how various types of the foreign policy environment influence foreign policy-making in terms of opportunities and constraints.

Pre-independence paradiplomacy: from the 1970s until international recognition in 1992

As a Socialist Republic, paradiplomacy was used by Slovenia after the 1970s. Defined essentially as “the diplomatic practices, the international activities or the foreign policies of sub-state political entities” (Duran 2016: 1), paradiplomacy has also been interpreted as “an instance of diplomatic mediation of separation or estrangement [...] striking a middle-ground between the realist power play and the humanist need to connect and to engage with others” (Duran 2016: 4–5). As a former Yugoslav republic, Slovenia resorted to paradiplomacy to connect and engage internationally. During the break-up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian paradiplomacy took on an entirely new meaning: it was used as a tool to promote and achieve independence. In this section, we look at internal, external domestic and external foreign factors which influenced Slovenian foreign policy making at the time when Slovenia was still one of the six Yugoslav republics.

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution (Art. 271) allowed the constituent republics to exercise their individual external relations, primarily in the fields of trade, culture, science and sports. These activities were limited to what is conceptually referred to as ‘external relations’ rather than ‘foreign policy’ (Hill 2016: 6); the Constitution did not allow the republics to conduct independent foreign policies (Art. 281: pt. 7). Whatever their own international activities, they had to be in conformity with the principles of the federal foreign policy (Yugoslav Constitution: Fundamental Principles

pt. VII). In this respect, the normative basis of Slovenian paradiplomacy after 1975 was of a general collaborative nature and not part of a political programme with specific foreign policy content. The internal foreign policy environment in use was the Secretariat (renamed the Committee in 1980) for international cooperation of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. It was established in 1975, and was in operation until May 1990 when, under the newly elected democratic Slovenian government, it was transformed into a *de facto* foreign ministry (Jazbec 2011: 114). The other important institution at the federal republic level was the Institute for International Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Both institutions were organs of the Slovenian Executive Council, the highest executive body in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. In addition, some non-state institutions such as the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, the Research Centre for Cooperation with Developing Countries, numerous big Slovenian companies with their foreign representations, city-to-city international contacts, international connections from university and academia contributed to what Jazbec (2011: 114–116) has called a “pre-state diplomacy”.³ The internationalization of Slovenian business was particularly important. The introduction of the so-called Yugoslav “policy of open borders” in the 1970s allowed for economic liberalization (Boeckh 2014: 35) and enabled Slovenian companies to trade predominantly with Western European countries and attract foreign investments. As it later turned out, the infrastructure supporting business ties played an important role in the foreign external environment in which Slovenia needed to act to advocate for, and eventually secure, its international recognition. Last but not least, ties and collaborations should also be mentioned, with political movements such as the League of Communists, the Association of Socialist Youth and other youth organizations, Second World War veterans, trade unions and the Socialist International. Slovenian minorities, migrant workers and diaspora also played their part. Finally, various instruments for international cooperation were at the disposal of some of the aforementioned institutions, such as agreements, visits, declarations, publications, mixed commissions (e.g. with Bavaria and Carinthia), student exchange programmes and other exchanges at bilateral and

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3 These paradiplomatic links had not been applied for the pursuit of foreign policy goals prior to late 1980s. It was only when the Slovenian political leadership started to develop designs for independence that all available capabilities were employed (Jazbec 2011).

multilateral level (Boeckh 2014).⁴ Jazbec (2011: 118) has pointed out that non-governmental paradiplomacy came to the fore only in the mid-1980s when these actors actively participated in the promotion of Slovenian democratization. This, in Duran's terms (2016: 4), can be understood as a turning point of "connecting to engage with others".

Some of the central values on which the state based its foreign policy activities derived from the nature of the domestic democratization movement. For the latter, it was essential to assure the legality of action, otherwise infringement of the Yugoslav constitution would have given the federal government and the Yugoslav Army an opportunity to legally intervene in Slovenia (Bučar 2014). Since the federal and international legal principles were the main constraints for Slovenian foreign policy action towards independence, the politicians decided to respect them and act where they were "allowed": they kept changing the Slovenian constitution and, via paradiplomacy, called upon the legitimacy of its "foreign policy" decision. Thus, it was imperative 1) to hold a plebiscite before declaring independence and 2) to respect the federal constitution with reference to the *de facto* implementation of independence (Bučar 2014: 205).⁵ The crucial factor for foreign policy action was thus the self-perception of the society and political groupings to respect the rule of (international) law in order to construct the state as a proper democracy.

The centrality of a (proper) democracy norm is directly traceable to the official documents of Slovenia, not only to the Slovenian Constitution (adopted in June 1991) but also to those related to foreign policy. The Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy was adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in March 1991, even before the Constitution was voted upon and brought into force. It set the foundations for a normative and substantive framework of Slovenian foreign policy. In that document, Slovenia naturally identified survival and operational capacity as primary foreign policy goals. During that time, Slovenian foreign policy-makers operated under the assumption that socialist Yugoslavia would dissolve peacefully

4 A good example of a platform that Slovenia used for developing closer ties with neighbouring countries from the West was the Alps-Adria Working Group, established in 1978. The group consisted of regional authorities from former Yugoslavia (besides Slovenia, Croatia was also a member), Italy and Austria (Klabjan 2013).

5 There are several examples of action upon such a normative ground: a constructive role of the existing Slovenian authorities prior to democratic elections in April 1990, which served as a mediator between the Slovene public and the federal authorities; after democratic elections, inclusion of the Communist Party as an opposition in the reformed democratic political system; setting a qualified majority for plebiscite results to be legitimate; and numerous amendments to the Slovenian constitution so as not to overstep the federal one (Bučar 2014: 204–209).

(Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title 2). That assumption was proved wrong, and Slovenia had to fight its way towards independence. It entered the war against the Yugoslav army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*: JNA). The war that Slovenia won lasted ten days (27 June – 6 July 1991). During that period, the normative ground of state building continued to be actively pursued. The most notable example was the treatment of soldiers of the defeated JNA. On 29 June 1991, the Slovenian Secretariat for Internal Affairs dispatched detailed information to all police stations in Slovenia about the legal rights of soldiers and measures to guarantee their safety. Provisions of the Geneva Convention and cooperation with the Slovenian Red Cross, which detached itself from the Yugoslav Red Cross, were particularly taken into consideration (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 49). Another example to illustrate the same point is related to succession issues, which later became one of the most challenging for all the former Yugoslav republics. Milan Jazbec, a Slovenian diplomat who in 1991 held a post in the Yugoslav consulate in Klagenfurt, Austria, recalls that after the Slovenian declaration of independence, the Yugoslav government adopted the decision to close the consulate. The main reason for that decision appeared to be the fear of the government in Belgrade that Slovenia would seize the consulate building. However, the Slovenian government decided not to pursue that option. Rather, it declared that it would “act in accordance with international law” (Jazbec 2012). Finally, strong internal support for principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (the so-called Decalogue) is also worth mentioning. The Final Act was translated into the Slovenian language soon after its signature (Jazbec 2011: 115).

The 'othering' of Yugoslavia based on developing its own identity, closer to Western democratic values, remained at the core of Slovenian advocacy for its independence after the War. Opposing the dominant discourse of the federal Yugoslav authorities, Slovenia consolidated its identity around the will to implement democratic principles, respect for human rights and international law, hoping that such a self-identification would help it be perceived as a legitimate actor in the fast-restructuring of the post-Cold War international arena. These core values were included in the Constitution of Slovenia — e.g. the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Preamble, Arts. 3, 5, entire Title II, Arts. 14–65, Art. 159), of the rights of national minorities (Art. 5), the rights of foreigners (Art.

13), of foreign workers (Art. 79), the property-acquisition rights of foreigners (Art. 68), the principle of self-determination of peoples (Preamble, Art. 3a), of democracy (Arts. 1, 3, 3a), the rule of law (Arts. 2, 3a), of social welfare (Art. 2), of territorial integrity (Art. 4), the principles of secularism, freedom and equality of religion(s) (Art.7), the subjection of national laws to general principles of international law and to binding international treaties (Arts. 8: 153), the declaration of war and state of emergency only by the National Assembly (Art. 92), and the building of national defence on the principle of the “peaceful policy and culture of peace”, the oversight of which is conducted by the National Assembly (Art. 124).

In terms of more specific goals of Slovenian foreign policy in the wake of declared independence, Slovenia had two main areas of cooperation in sight, namely to pursue the “best possible relations with the republics [...] of Yugoslavia because of economic and many other reasons” (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title III C) and because of earlier experience and ties with Western economies, especially with Austria and Italy,⁶ Slovenians opted to take part in regional integration processes, particularly in the framework of the European Community (EC). The EC already had a visible presence in Slovenia due to the mediation role of the Ministerial Troika, who brokered a ceasefire between Slovenia and Yugoslavia at the Brioni (Croatia) meeting on 7 July 1991 (Rupel 1996: 192–193). The “strategic goal of pursuing EC membership” was identified by Slovenia as early as March 1991 (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title V), whereby membership of other (trans)European organizations, such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) or the Council of Europe, was seen as strategic in the sense of clearing the path to the desired goal.⁷

The second important element of the internal foreign policy environment was the construction of the foreign policy system in terms of its institutions (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service and diplomatic missions) and processes (Foreign Policy Act). This was the first and very challenging task

6 For a detailed analysis of Slovenian external domestic environment linkages to Western European flows (history, culture, trade) as an element of a cost-benefit analysis for pro-European integration, see Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič (2017).

7 For example, membership of the Council of Europe is a *de facto* mandatory requirement for any EC/EU candidate, to prove its ability to implement basic human rights standards according to the Copenhagen Criteria. In its Bulgaria Opinion from July 1997, the Commission elaborated on these criteria by underscoring that any state wishing to join the EU must first ratify the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Commission 1997). The Convention, of course, is the main pillar of the Council of Europe’s law, and every member has signed and ratified it.

for the (not yet) independent Slovenia. Slovenia had several experienced diplomats who served in the Yugoslav Foreign Service, but an almost non-existent infrastructure. Most Yugoslav foreign policy was conducted from Belgrade. Many Slovenians who worked on foreign policy issues in the federal administration received their education or training in the Yugoslav capital. Slovenian authorities began to work on their diplomatic networks. This task was set forth in the aforementioned Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy (1991). The document (Title 5) provided for a stronger role for a plenipotentiary of the Executive Council of the Slovenian National Assembly in Slovenia's conduct of its foreign affairs. From August 1990 until January 1991, these plenipotentiaries were sent to capitals such as Vienna, Washington, Brussels, Prague, Luxembourg, Rome, Vatican and Abidjan (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991). The document also provided for the establishment of Slovenian representations abroad, stating that "a general principle [...] for their operation [...] is equal to formation of diplomatic representations" (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991). The forms of these paradiplomatic representations were (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991):

- diplomatic-consular representations and diplomatic missions with other states;
- representatives with the role and status of honorary consuls;
- common representation with the *Ljubljanska banka* (a state-owned bank) or other Slovenian companies abroad;
- representation of Slovenian national interests through third states (those that would recognize Slovenian independence); and
- representations together with other Yugoslav republics on the basis of a provisional agreement of common Foreign Service, where a Slovenian representative would be the Head of Slovenian representation within a common Yugoslav representation.

These plans were outlined to create a proper diplomatic and consular network after Slovenia reached international recognition. It was estimated that about 35 to 40 diplomatic-consular representations should be established worldwide (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991).

During the 1991 War, the military forces and diplomatic service were filled with individuals who withdrew from the JNA's command and with Slovenian diplomats stationed in Belgrade and in the Yugoslav diplomatic service. A large majority of the latter supported the goals of the Slovenian political leadership for independence and actively engaged themselves in achieving Slovenia's international recognition (Rahten 2011: 664–665). Repatriation of the Slovenian diplomats and employees working for the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs was identified as a top priority of the state during the “transformation of powers” in the process of Yugoslav dissolution/Slovenian independence (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title 1). The domestic and foreign external environment allowed enough flexibility for this kind of action. The Yugoslav Constitution, laws and diplomatic practice provided that, for better relations with national minorities, the consular staff in neighbouring states should be of the nationality of the neighbouring federal republic (e.g. Slovenians as consuls in Klagenfurt and Trieste, Italy). The same applied for migration workers (e.g. Slovenians as consuls in Germany and in Cleveland, USA) (Jazbec 2011: 116).

The external domestic environment was identified as insufficiently developed for independent statehood, as the existing system of governance in Slovenia did not have the authority and appropriate organizational structures in essential areas of independent statehood: foreign affairs, finance, taxation, a customs system and the military (Bučar 2014: 208–209). The build-up of the structures was enabled by the Slovenian external domestic environment. Slovenia needed to demonstrate very quickly that it was able not only to establish and sustain border control in particular (in terms of military security and with respect to control of trade flows), but also to keep up democratic standards as referred to above (Bučar 2014: 210).

In terms of the external foreign environment, the factors that played a considerable role in Slovenia's effort to become an independent state⁸ are connected both with the crumbling of Yugoslavia and international circumstances at the time. In the former Yugoslavia, the Croatian decision to follow along the Slovenian independence claims and the empty Federal

8 Note that here we refer to Slovenian territory as a domestic environment even though it was not yet a separate state entity at the time.

Presidency seat from mid-May 1991 was important. The non-occupied position of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia added to the favourable political environment for making bold decisions, because the Yugoslav Army had no supreme commander (Bučar 2014: 209). At the international level, the positions of European, American and non-aligned states were not encouraging. These states had strong reservations after the Slovenian plebiscite and the declaration of independence. They accepted the possibility of a reform based on a consensus of constitutive republics, but clearly demanded that Yugoslavia remain one state. It became possible for Slovenia to pursue independence only when this conservative and in fact non-realistic view was confronted with radically changed international political circumstances which led to the break-up of multinational states. That, in turn, made room for smaller states to pursue their own interests (Bučar 2014: 214–215).⁹

Foreign policy consolidation until 2004 membership of Euro-Atlantic organizations

As the independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia inflamed the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Slovenia steered away from its original orientation to sustain friendly and cooperative relations with former Yugoslav republics. The war made that impossible. Slovenia developed a separate discourse, which focused on differences between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia, not to mention the Balkan region in general. The 'away from the Balkans' approach began to dominate discourse in both (public) diplomacy as well as domestically.

9 It is worth noting that the breakup of Yugoslavia challenged an important international norm, the principle of the right of self-determination, which was introduced in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Yet one needs to recall also the conflicting nature of the Helsinki principles because they also include the principle of preserving territorial integrity of states. To square the circle, "the Europeans chose to adapt their norms to their preferences and apply both principles to the federal republics as if they already were States and bearers of national sovereignty and as if international law did not oblige them to apply /these two principles/ to the Yugoslav state, its entire population and its external borders" (Woodward 1996 cited in Roberts 2016: 12). Roberts (2016: 12–15) has noted in his recent book *Conversations with Milošević* that such change of course was positive for Slovenia but detrimental to some other Yugoslav republics. He sees this as a shortcoming of European foreign policy which originated from prioritizing maintenance of unity among European Community member states at the expense of a long-term vision for all Yugoslav nations' future.

The internal environment of foreign policy during this period prioritized the consolidation of the foreign policy system at the expense of substantive strategic orientation. There was no foreign policy strategic document officially endorsed until 1999. The most important element of self-identification was democracy — respect of human rights, respect of the international law triangle and dissociation of the state from geographical proximity and the historical context of the Balkans (Bojinović 2005). In this context, the 'away from the Balkans' approach was pursued in order to associate Slovenia with Western democracies' form of international cooperation, proving Slovenia was a democratic country which did not belong to the war-waging region (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 59–62). The first example of the Slovenian 'new approach' was the rejection of participation in the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), launched in 1996 (Bojinović 2005: 21). Seeking an alternative way to establish itself, Slovenia looked elsewhere, primarily to Central Europe. In the early 1990s, Slovenia joined the Central European Initiative, became a member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement and entered into a dialogue with the Višegrád Group (Bučar 1994). Another, albeit comparatively less advocated, alternative was the Mediterranean. In the context of preparations for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), Slovenia began to promote itself as the most Mediterranean among the Central European member states and as the most central European among the Mediterranean ones (Bojinović Fenko 2010: 85). However, those attempts did not result in the desired outcomes. Slovenia remained at the door of the Višegrád Group, having the status of an observer. It stayed outside the EMP as well. The limitations with respect to these two foreign policy 'slippages' originated from constraints from the external foreign policy environment.¹⁰

At the global level, the record is a mixed one. Some foreign policy decisions arguably increased Slovenia's international visibility. In 1992, Slovenia became a member of the United Nations. It presented a successful candidacy for the UN Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent seat (serving in the UNSC from 1998 to 1999). Unfortunately, Slovenia could not escape some negative global public image. The most painful

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¹⁰ At that time, the EMP was pursued entirely with the instrumental purpose of joining any Western-led organization. Since the European Union had restricted the EMP to Mediterranean states of Southern Europe and North Africa and tried to manage the post-Yugoslav states via post-conflict stabilization policy, Slovenia fell short of EMP participation (Bojinović Fenko 2010: 85).

experience in this respect took place in 1998, when Slovenia withdrew from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the group it helped to establish, and which advocated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.¹¹ It also abandoned cooperation within the Human Security Network.¹² In the same year, the government initiated establishment of the International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ITF later expanded its geographical scope to the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Latin America, North and West Africa, transforming it into one of the main actors of humanitarian demining activity worldwide (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 60–61). These positive international engagements were seen among policy-makers as proof that Slovenia was “a reliable and a constructive partner in most important multilateral organizations [...] able to conduct most responsible political functions with credibility and success” (Rupel et al. 2000: 7).

With respect to the external domestic environment, the Slovenian ‘away from the Balkans’ approach gradually changed into a more inclusive (creative) way of thinking about that region; but the path to get there had many turns. For starters, an independent Slovenia wasted no time severing ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). At first sight, that seemed a logical move, since there was not much sympathy among non-aligned countries when Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia. However, the NAM at that time was still an important global player. One should also recall that the Movement was instrumental in making and sustaining Yugoslavia as a credible foreign policy actor (Boeckh 2014). This helps explain why other former Yugoslav republics were more careful in this regard.¹³ During the mid-1990s, not only the Balkans were far away from Slovenian sight: as membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO evidently became the primary foreign policy goals, Slovenia was highly engaged in a two-level game with the EU in terms of bilateral conditioning of the EU accession by Italy and Austria (Šabič 2002). The topics on the agenda were foreigners’ rights for property acquisition, the status and rights of minorities, and denationalization (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić 2015). Additionally, a

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11 The main reason for that was the ‘conflict of interest’. Slovenia entered the NAC as an applicant for membership in NATO. It was subsequently ‘reminded’ by an influential NATO member state that several NATO members actually do have nuclear weapons, and that therefore Slovenia’s application to become a NATO member was incompatible with NAC membership.

12 In fairness, this happened mainly due to limited financial and human resources.

13 For example, Croatia, which together with Slovenia was the first to leave Yugoslavia, kept its ties with the NAM (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 53).

domestic critical cost-benefit assessment of potential membership was largely disregarded and positive aspects of Euro-Atlantic integration were hailed by domestic political elites and consequently the public, with the minor exception of a few open academic debates (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017). The 'othering' of the (war-waging) Balkans and Yugoslav foreign policy accompanied by top-down Europeanization concerning core EU principles and values was the driver of Slovenian state foreign policy-making in the period of 1992–1998. Ironically, the very same Euro-Atlantic external foreign policy environment to which Slovenia wanted to get closer by abandoning its Balkan identity and connections pushed Slovenia to completely change this and reorient its foreign policy 'back to the (Western) Balkans' in 1998. In that year, in the context of accession talks with Slovenia, the EU demanded that Slovenia take an active role in South-East European (SEE) post-conflict cooperation schemes. Slovenia was extremely reluctant to do so as that compromised its effort to build an 'away from the Balkans' foreign policy profile. Importantly, in the domestic external environment, anti-Balkan sentiments were widespread. These developments were rather worrying for the then Slovenian government, which feared that domestic opposition parties would interpret Slovenian engagement in SEE as a reestablishment of the former Yugoslavia (Bojinović 2005: 21). In truth, such critical voices were understandable, because the public could not see the direction in which Slovenia wanted to go with its foreign policy. It became clear that a new foreign policy strategy was not only needed, but was overdue.

Despite being a factor of the internal foreign policy environment, the 1999 Declaration on Foreign Policy also bears strong elements of the external domestic environment, namely a completely changed self-identification. In the Declaration, the previous identity-endangering elements of the geopolitical external foreign policy environment — in particular the geographical proximity to and historical context with the Balkans — were changed into opportunities, comparative advantages even, for foreign policy action. "Based on its geographical, political, economic, cultural and historical predispositions, Slovenia can withhold the stance of respect for international law, strive for respect of human rights at home and in the world and offer good offices in solving complicated situations both in its neighbourhood and elsewhere" (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999: 8). Furthermore, the regional engagement of the state in Central and South

Eastern Europe was to "strengthen the position of Slovenia within wider Euro-Atlantic politics" (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999: 8). This 'new', holistic self-perception of the state was laid out in the 2002 government document in the context of engaging within Euro-Atlantic integrations, illustrating the Slovenian identity as Central European with a Mediterranean tradition and links with South-Eastern Europe, thus as "a bridge between different European regions" (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 63).

From 1998 to 2004, the EU and NATO accession negotiations strongly influenced the internal and external domestic foreign policy environment. Strong top-down Europeanization was present in process and substance terms: in foreign policy-making processes, the central formulation and implementation agency became the government office for European affairs. The latter consisted of bureaucrats, experts in particular fields of EU policies. It was led by the head of the Slovenian accession negotiations team (Kajnc 2009). The entire external domestic foreign policy environment of Slovenia was afterwards centred on the Euro-Atlantic accession process. It was important to meet the Copenhagen criteria, to take up the challenge of conditionality and to address the issue of reintegration into the SEE. During that period, the biggest failure of the Slovenian political and judicial system (and the government), which turned out to be a foreign policy constraint, was the non-implementation of the rights of so-called 'erased' people. This was demanded by the European Commission in 1998 (Bojinović Fenko and Urlič 2015: 115–116). The European Court of Human Rights' decision from March 2014, which was adopted in favour of some 26,000 affected former citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,¹⁴ officially confirmed the gap between the declared and the *de facto* level of implementation of the state's constitutive identity element — the norm of the respect for human rights. As for the EU-NATO accession talks, they consumed a lot of energy from Slovenian politicians, policy-makers and even academics, so a lot needed to be done. In some way, this was anticipated by the late President of Slovenia, Janez Drnovšek, who in 2003 opened up a series of discussions with various members of the public about the future of Slovenia (Pogovori o prihodnosti Slovenije 2003). Some of these thoughts found their way into the new strategic foreign policy document, to which we turn our attention in the final section.

14 For various reasons, they failed to obtain Slovenian citizenship within the deadline set by the Slovenian government. Consequently, they were stripped of all rights as residents of Slovenia (hence 'the erased'), forcing them to file for a status in former Yugoslav republics, whence most of them originally came.

Post-2004 foreign policy: from steering cruisers to rowing the boat (in rough waters)

After the EU and NATO accession, Slovenia again found itself in a vacuum. All major foreign policy goals had been accomplished, but no political reflection on the future strategic orientation seemed in sight. This internal environment factor had some important ramifications for Slovenia. General orientations, such as development assistance and the advocacy of human rights — in particular, the rights of the child — were considered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as traditional international activities. But the non-existence of a strategic foreign policy long-term plan made way for *ad hoc* decisions which Šabič and Kajnc (2014) termed “project-based foreign policy”: newly defined short-term goals, adjusted to the needs of a ‘consumer’, and with very little added value for Slovenia. Such ‘projects’ were the OSCE Presidency (2005), the Presidency of the Council of the EU (2008) and the Presidency of the Council of Europe (2009).

In retrospect, by holding presidencies of these international organizations, especially the EU, Slovenia took upon itself the responsibility to steer big cruisers, even though it had no knowledge, no experience, nor even sufficient capacity to do so. The presidencies took place at a time when Slovenia did not even have a foreign policy strategy of its own, and therefore no sense of the direction it would want to take in international affairs. Most importantly, it had low leadership capabilities and weak public administration as elements of the internal environment, and a lack of public support, let alone interest within the external domestic environment and the constraints of the external foreign environment in the form of the low ambitions of a small and new (member) state.

Considering these limitations, Slovenia has done a pretty good job. Save for some criticisms, especially with regard to the running of the OSCE Presidency (Šabič 2012), the Slovenian government proved its ability to deliver responsible European leadership. The fact that Slovenia conducted the presidencies of these bodies without any major procedural flaws — no matter the approach, termed a “symbolic challenge” by Kajnc (2009) and “playing it safe” by Klemenčič (2007) — resonated well with European

states (Klemenčič 2007; Lenarčič 2007; Jazbec 2008). The procedural adequacy also boosted the image of Slovenia as a 'star pupil' of the Big Bang EU enlargement in the external domestic and foreign environment. But there is one paradox that is often overlooked when scholars analyse Slovenian presidencies. The job was made easier to some extent, because each presiding country, notably a small one, more or less runs the ongoing presidency agendas, with relatively little space to make its own footprint. Slovenia was no exception, but it was able to find a niche of its own. That niche was the Western Balkans. The latter were assessed among other 2008 EU presidency priorities as in fact the only true Slovenian substantive choice and contribution (Kajnc 2009). Considering the fact that Slovenia pursued the 'away from the Balkans' policy not so long before that, and that Slovenia increasingly saw itself as a bridge builder towards the Western Balkans, this may be seen as quite a remarkable accomplishment.

But the years of stardom have long gone. With regard to Slovenia's internal foreign policy environment, current and possibly future challenges of its foreign policy are based on a highly volatile state of affairs. Some challenges are due to the external foreign environment, mostly the global economic and financial crisis, whereas others have a different origin. We firstly shed light on the latter. As already mentioned, some of the (perpetual) constraints for foreign policy-making in Slovenia originate from low human resources-related capabilities when compared with other states, as was clearly seen in the unsuccessful bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (2011), foreign policy mistakes from the past (in particular the lost cases at the European Court of Human Rights on the 'erased' and the *Ljubljanska banka* bank) and Yugoslav succession-related open issues, most notably the border dispute with Croatia (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014). Highly relevant internal environment constraints were so-called personalized foreign policy orientations, which were made possible due to the absence of a codified foreign policy strategy. Examples of personalized foreign policy agendas would include economic diplomacy by Dimitrij Rupel (2004–2008) and environmental diplomacy by Samuel Žbogar (2008–2011). Along these lines, one could place the failed candidacy by former Slovenian Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek in October 2014 for EU Commissioner, responsible for energy union, and Vice-President of the Commission. Solo actions of some foreign policy officials have done little good to the standing of Slovenia as a credible partner. A good example

is the statement by the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Erjavec in 2015, in which he ‘forecast’ a result of the arbitration on the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, which he thought would be favourable to Slovenia (SiolNet 2015). The arbiters revealed their decision in June 2017: the debate about who ‘won’ and who ‘lost’ in this arbitration can go on forever. The incident which uncovered unprofessional conduct of the Slovenian arbiter and his aide, an employee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can also be added to the list (MMCRTVSLO 2015).

Slovenia was hit particularly hard by the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, almost having accepted the *troika*.¹⁵ The previous romantic perception of the EU predominantly offering absolute gains to Slovenian society turned into a discussion about what EU policies should really be all about — that is to say, if Slovenia wanted to assure beneficial outcomes from EU policies, it could only do so through a much more active engagement in EU policy-making with regard to issues in its interest (Bojinović Fenko 2016). A warning was issued that the EU is not a system that would meet Slovenian values and national interests automatically, but might even jeopardize them (Lovec 2012). We evaluate this turn as a positive one per se. The public and the government became aware of the need to work much more substantively on European (and wider) foreign policy goals and analyse *ex ante* potential negative effects of international cooperation. Solidarity and equality, for example, had been reiterated as fundamental values after the Slovenian—and some governments of other EU member states — sensed that they were in an unequal position among Eurozone states as to how the Greek bailout had been handled, especially with regard to individual responsibilities (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017). This extends more generally into the domestic external environment, as national policy-makers are now being much more directly scrutinized with respect to meeting principles of democratic governance (in terms of responsibility of individual politicians and transparency of decision-making processes), especially with regard to management of state-owned companies, implementation of anti-corruption measures, rule of law and fiscal sustainability. The economic crisis thus had a huge impact on the functioning of the domestic political

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15 Slovenia had to resolve economic and fiscal problems and, during the period from April to June 2013, was seriously threatened by the European Commission that, should it not be able to resolve the issue of its budgetary imbalance on its own, it would have to accept the intervention of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission (the *troika*) (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017).

system due to its high dependence on EU policy-making and policies. The uncertainties brought about by the crisis led to domestic political changes in mid-2014 in Slovenia. Early parliamentary elections and the emergence of an entirely new political party took place,¹⁶ a party whose platform was based on the value of rule of law, transparent and responsible policy-making, and clean slate politicians to lead the government coalition.

These circumstances in the external domestic environment helped create a political climate in favour of writing a new foreign policy strategic document. Between the 1999 Declaration on Foreign Policy and 2015, the only clear Slovenian foreign policy document addressed the Western Balkans.¹⁷ The process of codifying a new foreign policy strategy, headed by diplomat turned ambassador to the Czech Republic, Leon Marc, responded to the increasing public impatience with the government. Never before had a foreign policy document been so open to public debate as this draft foreign policy strategy. In countless sessions—many of them open to the interested public—foreign policy planners received rich material to work with, with plenty of new ideas and thoughts that eventually made it into the final text. The document was adopted in 2015 (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015). What seems of particular importance is that the writers were very much aware of how closely interlinked domestic and foreign affairs are in a country's life; in fact, there is even one sub-chapter devoted solely to explaining the interdependence between domestic and foreign affairs (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: Chapter 1.3). According to Breuning's conceptualization of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) as insulated and embedded agencies, the Slovenian MFA used to be a highly insulated agency (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 51). However, the preparation of this strategic document strongly reflects a change in this respect and outlines the building of a "culture of foreign policy" (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: 9–10). This potentially led to making the MFA an embedded agency within the political system, functioning via the transparent rules and organizational practices of other public institutions. In this vein, the MFA organized in 2016 and 2017 a range of expert debates (which included scholars, members of think tanks and the business community) on Slovenian future engagement in the EU and

16 The party was named Stranka Mira Cerarja (SMC: The Party of Miro Cerar) after its president, a professor of international constitutional law and previous former legal advisor to several Slovenian governments. In early 2015, the party renamed itself Stranka modernega centra (SMC: The Party of the Modern Centre).

17 The National Assembly in 2010 adopted a strategic document on the Western Balkans, which has ever since been operationalized in yearly action plans by the MFA.

other international organizations.¹⁸ Additionally, in 2015 the MFA renewed its practices of recruiting new diplomatic staff, which has since been run via an open call for ten junior diplomats a year on profession-specific and entirely meritocratic selection criteria.¹⁹

With respect to the external foreign environment, the international political context, from the perspective of the developed North in general and Europe in particular, has drastically changed. Besides conventional threats that European countries, like any others, face today (international terrorism, ethnic conflicts, disrespect of international law), Slovenia's 2015 document made a specific reference to the rise of populism, as well as to the challenge of illegal migration and refugees. It clearly emphasized the dire consequences Europe (and, of course, Slovenia) might face if the ill response to outside challenges were to result, internally, in reducing some important rights such as free movement of labour within the EU, and, externally, in severe weakening of the EU as a global actor (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: 6). The migration crisis of 2015–2016 triggered a set of challenges that may have a considerable impact on Slovenia with regard to its neighbourhood and beyond. The cooperation with Balkan countries during the migration crisis has proved to be not only a value but also a (functional) necessity. The management and eventual closure of the so-called Balkan route²⁰ would have been impossible without the cooperation of critical countries such as Serbia and Macedonia. Yet, at the same time, of all its neighbours, Slovenia has the tensest relations with Croatia, a country which is a critical player in efforts to sustain stability in the Balkans. The prospect of good relations with other neighbours in lieu of decision-making and policy-making at the EU level is also not good. Hungary has fenced itself off, ostensibly because of the refugee threat. Austria insists on an indefinite 'temporary' measure to check the flow of passengers on its border with Slovenia, a Schengen state. Italy, on the other hand, continues to be a popular entry point for migrants. Slovenian Prime Minister Cerar reacted to these developments in February 2015 when, during the EU mini summit, he voiced strong criticism of the EU's

18 It is worth mentioning that Slovenian expert public opinion is gradually being liberated from academia and politics in the form of independent think tanks (e.g. Institute for Strategic Solutions formed in 2011 or Think Europe founded in 2016).

19 This withdrawal from previous occasional or sometimes prevailing exceptionalism in the recruitment and advancement practices of MFA (party links, nepotism, etc.) was ironically ended with the help of the economic crisis, which levelled the austerity measures in all ministries. On the effect of crisis on capital-based Slovenian experts in the Council of the EU working groups, see Bojnovič Fenko and Lovec (2015).

20 Before its closure, this route was very popular with refugees and migrants who tried to make their way to the West.

handling of the migration crisis and the potential of its mismanagement to tear apart the EU: "If we don't find a solution today, if we don't do everything we can today, then it is the end of the European Union as such" (World Post 2015). In January 2016, he additionally called for a joint European solution, including common EU measures and external border management, in his letter to the leaders of the EU and the countries along the Balkan migration route.²¹ Beside the traditional external foreign environment challenges (e.g. being a small state), foreign policies of neighbouring states and states of Central and Eastern Europe more widely, coupled with the inability of the EU to conduct resolute and consistent policy promises on migration management, have recently become a big constraint for Slovenia.

Conclusion

Foreign policy decisions taken by Slovenia during the period 1975–1992 can be explained via the interplay of all foreign policy environments. The internal environment at the very end of this pre-recognition period was an important constraint, but was neutralized via paradiplomatic activities. As a former Yugoslav republic with limited means of foreign representation, Slovenia had to rely on individuals from the Yugoslav diplomacy and, from the late 1980s onwards, extensively on non-governmental organizations, most notably social and political organizations, academia and companies doing business abroad. Domestic and international legitimacy were being pursued via the prioritization of democratic norms, especially the rule of law and the respect for international law in domestic and foreign policy. The foreign policy system and external domestic environment were being quickly built while benefiting from positive historical and political geography (e.g. valuable experience of doing business with the West). The internal and domestic external environments were built systematically to make the necessary change from the constraints of state formation to opportunities for domestic and foreign policy action. Of course, it was the change in the external foreign environment — the fall of the Socialist

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21 The letter is available in full text on the Slovenian Government web page (Vlada Republike Slovenije 2016).

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the growing support in the West for democratization in former Communist countries via reinterpretation of principles of international law — that represented a great opportunity to implement plans for independence and eventually international recognition.

In the second period (1992–2004), the main foreign policy constraint was the geopolitical and historical proximity to the war-waging former Yugoslav republics as the external domestic environment, which posed a threat to Slovenia's effort to create an image of a democratic, rule of (international) law respecting state. The external foreign environment again offered opportunities for action, albeit not necessarily always in Slovenia's favour. Firstly, the chances for Slovenia to become a member of Euro-Atlantic organizations became linked with the political condition to replace its 'away from the Balkans' policy with a more proactive approach towards the region. Secondly, persistent pressure from European institutions — most notably the EU — was being put on Slovenia with reference to the state systemic transition to democracy and a market economy (the shape of the external domestic environment). During that period, Slovenian decision-makers learned that effective implementation of conditions set by foreign bilateral or multilateral authorities was valued not only in *de facto* progress to membership status but also in the continuous positive perception of Slovenia as the so called 'star pupil'. However, this enormous non-critical obedience to the foreign environment also led to mistakes. These mistakes proved huge constraints for Slovenian foreign policy (e.g. lost court cases before the ECHR on the 'erased' and the *Ljubljanska banka*, other open succession issues including arbitration on the border with Croatia, and an ambiguous attitude towards the NAM). If the international community did not put pressure on Slovenia to conform to certain commonly accepted policies or laws, the internal and external domestic environments would not have the capabilities (or will) to identify some major problems with the non-implementation of respect for human rights and the rule of (international) law, the very principles on which Slovenian identity is built. With regard to this period, we conclude that the foreign external environment represented itself as an opportunity to be taken, but the internal and external domestic environments became a decisive long-term constraint.

As for the post-2004 period, after NATO and EU accession, Slovenia suffered 'foreign policy fatigue' in the internal environment. The 1999 strategy, focusing primarily on achieving membership of NATO and the EU, was, with the exception of the Western Balkans and the bridge-building agenda, obsolete. Yet no document followed it. The vacuum was filled by occasional appearances in the role of holders of presidencies of international organizations. Because the Slovenia-led presidencies were, by general acclaim, done well, once again the external foreign environment strengthened the image of the foreign policy of a successful state. The main constraint was primarily in the internal environment. Slovenian governments one after the other failed to provide a comprehensive reflection of Slovenia's place and direction in the world. Some ministers of foreign affairs used that 'empty space' to their own advantage and ran personalized foreign policy agendas. These constraints, however, are addressed in the new foreign policy strategy which Slovenia adopted in 2015. Other challenges to Slovenian foreign policy were seen, especially in the global economic and financial crisis. Paradoxically, the very environment which the state previously uncritically praised (advantages and opportunities of being a member of the EU) now pushed the decision-makers and the public to renew their self-identification and perception of EU integration. The migration crisis brought about more solo foreign policies of neighbouring states and states of wider Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with the inability of the EU to conduct resolute and consistent policy promises on migration management. This leads us to the (worrying) conclusion that the external foreign environment, which up to now has offered most opportunities for Slovenian foreign policy action, has recently become a big constraint. This can help explain why Slovenia has reacted rather ambiguously to the migration crisis by appealing to strengthening this foreign environment via common action but at the same time refraining from its own highly self-praised human rights advocacy, moving instead to securitizing the migrant issue in domestic legislation, and, ironically, to rely more on the Western Balkans.

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Olympic Diplomacy and the Emerging States: Striving for Influence in the Multipolar World

Dana Luša

Abstract

The world of sports is a reflection of the world of politics. It is becoming increasingly multipolar with the emerging states hosting mega sporting events. Firstly, the article problematizes the concept of multipolarity and, secondly, globalisation by questioning whether the Olympic Games reinforce national identities and promote national interests by using Olympic diplomacy as a soft power tool. In doing so, the article explores the correlation between the changes in international affairs and the hosting of and participation at the Olympic Games by emerging states such as Brazil, China and Russia. The analysis distinguishes globalisation from the role of the nation-state, by highlighting the evident differences between emerging states in terms of hosting the Games, but also takes into consideration geopolitical and geo-economic parameters.

KEY WORDS:

Olympic Games, Olympic diplomacy, soft power, emerging states, globalization, multipolarity

Introduction

This article aims to highlight the shift in contemporary international affairs, in which more states present themselves as active participants, and where emerging states enjoy an influence beyond their immediate region. They do this by challenging the dominance of “old” great powers. However, there are different interpretations of the current state of affairs. According to Gratius (2008: 1), there are three general tendencies: a new international order being simultaneously uni- and multipolar; the rise of Asian countries, namely India, China and Japan; and the (re) enforcement of the nation, state and religion. This increasingly multipolar world might be strongly correlated with the influence of “[A]sianisation in the economy and consequently in the political power” (Kurečić and Kampmark 2016: 91). Furthermore, they predict that the rise of contender states will be increasingly greater than the rise of dominant states. This will keep feeding into the right circumstances for the creation of a “truly multipolar world in the first half of the 21st century” (ibid).

The article argues that a multipolarity is emerging not only in international relations, but also in the hosting of the Olympic Games (see more in: Grix and Lee 2013: 3). For the most part, International Relations (IR) did not ignore the relevance of hosting the Games, which is also the main focus of this article. Particularly, there has been a lot of research exploring the economics behind the organisation of major sporting events (McBride 2016; Brunet and Xinwen 2008, Osada et al. 2016, Preuss 2004, Baade and Matheson 2015). Although sport does not represent the most frequent research interest among IR scholars, with its global outreach and the impact on international relations and a state's soft power, there has been an increase in the number of works focusing on the relationship between sports and politics (Houlihan 1994, Levermore and Budd 2004; Allison 1986, Allison 1993, Arnaud and Riordan 1998, Riordan and Krüger 1999). This article contributes to this trend by analysing emerging states' Olympic diplomacy as a soft power tool in the multipolar world.

The first question to address when speaking about the role of the Olympics Games is why they are being used as a case study to explore the concept of multipolarity? It is primarily because the Olympics represent the biggest

sporting event in the world, while the outreach of the Games and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) into areas outside of sport is unmatched. "The Games symbolise one of the largest single gatherings of humans, sporting games, festivals, rituals and grand spectacle all wrapped in one intense, colourful and often controversial extravaganza" (Kelly in Kelly and Brownell 2011: 1), while the IOC with its status presents itself as a diplomatic actor in the international community. The article therefore argues that by hosting and participating at the Olympics, and by using Olympic diplomacy, emerging states may signal future opportunities of enhancing their agency in global multipolar affairs (Grix and Lee 2013).

The article addresses several issues: first and foremost, the reasons behind using Olympic diplomacy and the bidding of emerging states to host the Olympic Games are questioned; as well as what this phenomenon says about the significance of the Games and the shift in the international order. Is there a correlation between hosting the games by the emerging states and the multipolarity of international affairs? Secondly, the article will try to answer whether nation-states still play a strong role in trying to use Olympic diplomacy to promote their particular interests and strengthen their national identity in the globalised world (considering their success in hosting and participating at the Games). The article explores cases in which three BRICS states hosted the Olympic Games: China in 2008, Russia in 2014, and Brazil in 2016.

The main hypotheses are the following:

- Although mega sporting events represent cultural, economic and political phenomena considered as "main contributors to the unifying process of globalization" (Koorep 2016), sport is never detached from the concept of nation. This means that the Olympic Games and Olympic diplomacy contribute to the heterogeneous side of globalisation by reinforcing national sentiment, nationalist ideas and identities, particularly in the case of emerging states.
- The world is becoming increasingly multipolar, which is mirrored in the hosting of mega sporting events being awarded to emerging countries. Using Olympic diplomacy and winning the bidding process for the Olympics sends out a signal of change in the international community.

Theoretical framework

To define the structure of current international affairs, one needs to start with the term 'polarity'. "Polarity is a distribution of power among actors in the international system" (Toje 2010: 7). According to Mearsheimer (2001: 4) "unipolarity is a system with only one great power, which needs to be able to put up a 'serious fight' against the leading state". Monteiro (2014: 8) argues that the international system will remain unipolar, "as long as the United States remain the only state with substantial global power capacity, or as long as Beijing chooses not to use its resources to develop a superpower's military capability." Multipolarity, on the other hand, refers to a "[d]istribution of power in which more than two powers have comparable amounts of military, cultural and economic influence". It is characterised by the absence of supranational organising principles (Toje 2010: 7).

According to Buzan's (2004: 69) prediction, the United States (US) "has been the only superpower and there are no other candidates on the horizon for that status for at least a couple of decades." In his work he coded Russia, China, Japan and the European Union as great powers. On the other hand, many authors argue that with the shift towards multipolarity, a singular category of a "superpower" and emerging powers are defining a new plural category, that of "great powers". This new category could potentially consist of countries such as the US, China, India, Japan, Russia and the European Union. According to Cooper and Alexandroff (2010: 2), multipolarity emerges from several shifts within the contemporary global order. Firstly, the US dominated liberal international order is being seriously challenged. Secondly, international institutions are facing a fundamental crisis of efficiency. Thirdly, there are serious issues regarding leadership. And fourthly and finally, the world is witnessing the emergence of new powers, namely in China, India and Brazil. Stephens (2009) uses the phrase "the crunching and gridding of geopolitical plates" for all the above-mentioned changes and all the new actors emerging on the global scene. Adding to this, we may add the hosting of the Olympic Games which has shifted from the West to the emerging states.

However, one might ask which states can actually be called emerging powers? According to Cooper and Flemes (2013: 945), several countries

can be perceived as such, as there is no precise definition of countries within this club. Therefore, different acronyms are both used and contested, such as BRIC¹, BRICS², BASIC³, and BRICSAM⁴. In this article, the BRICS states are being referred to as the emerging powers.

We understand globalisation as a concept which captures complex interrelations between the local and the global introduced and explained among others by Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015: 705) with the concept of 'glocalisation' and 'glocal consciousness', which refers to "how nation-states position themselves vis-a vis processes of globalization". This is particularly evident from using Olympic diplomacy by emerging states in order to change their international image, strengthen their national identity, or to position themselves on the global stage, which will be further addressed in the article.

In many cases, hosting the Games is perceived as a strategy relying on soft power. However, Nye's concept, applied to the case of the US is challenging to apply to all other cases. Namely, the results of soft power strategy often take much longer and its instruments are not fully under the control of governments (Nye in Cooper et al. 2013: 568). According to Shambaugh (2013) "soft power is not created by investing billions in global sports events. It is not a tool than can be purchased in a World Politics Shop". In the article, we use Nye's concept of soft power to understand emerging states' Olympic diplomacy and the attempts to increase their role in multipolar international relations, through hosting and participating at the Olympic Games.

One of the ways that governments wield soft power is through sport diplomacy, mostly manifested as public, indirect diplomacy. It is developed to communicate with the publics of other countries in order to influence their governments indirectly. Emerging states use its sub-category (Olympic diplomacy) in order to win the bid for hosting the Olympic Games. However, no universal definition of sport diplomacy

1 BRIC consists of Brazil, Russia, India and China.

2 South Africa formally joined with Brazil, Russia, India and China to create BRICS at a summit in 2011.

3 Became known in the context of the Copenhagen Conference of Climate Change Control (negotiations with the United States). Consist of Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

4 Refers to five most important emerging economies, known as the O5 (Outreach 5): China, Mexico, India, Brazil and South Africa.

exists, where some scholars consider it as subcultural diplomacy, while others think of it as public diplomacy influencing the mass audience and creating the image of the state. We define sport diplomacy as a range of formal and informal actions focused at implementing foreign policy through sport. For instance, this could mean to either endorse or condemn large sporting events; to strengthen nationalist sentiments; develop or refine the concepts of nation-states and national identities; but also, to communicate political messages, promote dialogue and encourage integration within multicultural societies (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283). The term Olympic diplomacy is usually equated with the term sport diplomacy and referring to the diplomatic role and policies of the IOC. In this article we approach Olympic diplomacy from the unit level, defining it as an effort made by states to win the bid for hosting and successfully participating at the Games; to promote historical and cultural heritage before, after and especially during the Games; to raise their significance and power in international relations by scoring the greatest results; and by, winning as many medals as possible, as well as to achieve economic benefits from hosting the Games.

The Olympic Games as the intersection of nationalism, globalization and universal values

Debates about the nation-states and globalisation are very common in IR literature (Berger; 2001, Reis 2004; Smith 2001). Anderson (2006: 3) argues that "nation-ness is the most universally-legitimate value in the political life of our time" while globalists "underline the weakening of the territorial boundaries of nation-states due to the certain economic, political and social forces being able to elude nation-state control". Concepts of nationalism and globalisation are themselves being disputed. Some scholars even reject the globalisation paradigm. Bairner (2001: 5-6), on the contrary, argues that: "we live in a post-national world in which distinctive identities based on the idea of nation are being eroded and an ever-increasing homogenization is occurring".

The area in which nationalism and globalisation are much-discussed concepts is the study of sport. Therefore, this section of the article investigates the extent to which hosting of the Olympic Games can be used for the strengthening of national identity and the expression of nationalism by the emerging states in the context of globalisation. Namely, one cannot disconnect nationalism from competition, as the basis of the Olympic Games is built on the premise of nation-states and national organisations, while also underscoring the ethos of the Games as human unity (Malia 2014: 3).

Allison (in Allison 2005: 2) argues that: “there is a global system of cores and peripheries in which leading sportsmen from peripheries rarely play in their country of origin”, which indicates interrelation between globalisation and sport. Furthermore, in the capital market, different nationals and interest groups become owners of national sporting clubs. The Olympics, according to Tomlinson (in Allison 2005: 45) operate “as a giant billboard for the elite crop of multi-national corporations that are the preferred sponsorship partners of the IOC.” “This serves the interest of five simultaneous processes, which characterize the present moment in sport: globalization, governmentalization, Americanization, televisualization and commodification” (Miller et al. 2001: 41). These economic, political and cultural dimensions’ intermesh in phenomena such as the Olympics symbolising the strengths of globalisation.

Good showcases of globalisation in sports are Michael Phelps⁵, Serena Williams⁶, Roger Federer⁷ and Usain Bolt⁸, who are cheered for around the globe, because of their extraordinary sporting results. At the Olympic Games in Rio 2016, universal human values were additionally shared with heart-warming images of the Olympic Refugees Team competing in recognition of the 60 million refugees around the world. A great example of the Olympic spirit was also a scene during the qualifying heat of the women’s 5000 meters, when New Zealand and American runners Nikki Hamblin and Abbey D’Agostino “set aside their own hopes and national

5 Michael Phelps is an American swimmer who won the most Olympic medals in history.

6 Serena Williams is an American tennis player who occupies 2nd place in number of Grand Slams won in the Open Era.

7 Roger Federer is a Swiss tennis player who won 19 Grand Slam single titles, the most in history. Among other achievements he holds a record of 302 weeks being the number one on the ATP rankings list.

8 Usain Bolt is a Jamaican sprinter and a nine-time Olympic gold medalist. In 2016 he became the first track athlete in modern Olympics to win gold medals in two individual disciplines at three consecutive Olympic games, which he achieved in the 100m and 200m sprint.

interests of making the finals to look out for a fellow competitor" (Imray 2016). They have been praised for embodying the Olympic spirit (Roy 2016). This proves the universal spirit of the Olympic Games, which is additionally strengthened by Maguire (2009: 5-6), who argues that "given the growth in the multiplicity of linkages that transcend the nation-states, we may be at the earliest stages of the development of a "transnational culture" or a "global culture". Koorep (2016:17) takes the view that "the mega sporting events provide us with a magnifying glass on the process of globalization".

To summarize: firstly, globalisation in sport is a reality, due to virtually omnipresent modes of communication. Around 342 million people watched the opening ceremony of the Rio Games in 2016, while the Beijing opening had more than 1 billion viewers (Roxborough 2016). Secondly, the rules of the game are understood by almost everyone. Thirdly, global sports present an excellent equaliser from the equal opportunities perspective. Namely, sport is supposed to be available to everyone, at least its basic forms or its amateur level (Marmolejo 2012). These arguments speak in favour of globalisation being very much present in sport.

On the other hand, nationalism, national interests and the role of a nation-state present driving forces for using Olympic diplomacy as a soft-power tool by emerging states. Furthermore, different interest groups use the Olympics to promote their goals. At the very beginning, one of the fundamental principles of the modern Olympics, developed by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, and embedded in the Olympic Charter, was the prohibition of any forms of propaganda or advertising related to any political, religious or racial issues. However, this policy has changed meaning and it is now quite easy to use the Olympic idea to manipulate the public mood (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283). In the case of the emerging host states there are certain groups using the Olympic Games, which in themselves are highly politicised, and reflect the global political situation, to fight their battles. Russia is an example in which activists put a spotlight on the disrespect for human rights and media freedoms and called for boycotting the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014 (Sorkonin 2013). The Beijing Olympic games were also encountered with several calls for boycotts organised by different organisations such as the International Campaign for Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet, as well as by many prominent

political and media figures. Bittnerová (2009: 10) distinguishes two types of pressures host countries can be put under: one being tactical, referring to attention drawn away from sports to any domestic and international issues, and the other being ideational by calling upon often authoritarian regime for differences between itself and the Olympic values. For example, the Brazilians, during their political turmoil⁹, wanted to use the Games to highlight their grievances, but both the Olympic Committee and Brazil's government warned that political acts are not allowed inside Olympic venues (Garcia-Navarro 2016).

Although the Olympics have been conceived to promote unity, cooperation and global understanding, except from particular groups and movements fighting for their cause, the emerging host states use Olympic diplomacy to promote different national agendas on the world stage. Namely, the Olympics present a tension between the joy of participation and the competition between representatives of nations.

Even though the existence of organisations such as the IOC (International Olympic Committee) shows some kind of the supranational governance of sport, nation-states remain important with international competitions organised around national teams. According to Large (2016), "the games succeeded because they indulge precisely what they claim to transcend – the world's basest instinct for tribalism." Going back to the past one can notice that in authoritarian states where the Government had direct control over sport (Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Spain), sporting competitions were therefore "circumscribed by political considerations that often transformed purely sporting contests into other rivalries: communism v. capitalism, fascism v. liberal democracy, communism v. social democracy" (Riordan 2003: 1). In the 1930s, sports played the most important role in shaping of Italian national glory abroad (Gordon and London 2006: 41-65), while the Berlin Olympics were the most controversial games even during the bidding process. As for the Cold War period, sport became an alternative means of competition between Americans representing liberal democracy and the free market, and the Soviets representing communism (Kobierecki 2013: 55). When the domination of the Soviet Union and other communist countries became more evident

9 "Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's elected president has been suspended and was awaiting an impeachment trial in the Senate for fiscal mismanagement" (Garcia-Navarro 2016).

in the 1960s, Americans realised that sport is a matter of international prestige and went on to win the most medals in the 1964 and 1968 Olympic Games. The situation changed again in favour of the Eastern bloc in the 1970's, while the 1980's can be called the era of sports boycotts (ibid.: 58). Medal counting and competition between two confronting blocks prove how the Games were misused for political purposes and for promoting national interests during the Cold War (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283).

The use of Olympic diplomacy by the host emerging states, aiming to reinforce national sentiment, national ideas and identities, which proves sport is never detached from the concept of nation, is particularly vivid. We claim that Olympic Games hosted by China, Brazil and Russia point at the heterogeneous side of globalisation, where Olympic diplomacy is used as a soft power tool to promote national interests. A country's initial ambition is to participate at the Olympic Games, which is followed by the incentive to host the Games and finally to win more medals to become a leading Olympic power.

Olympic diplomacy at the Beijing, Sochi and Rio Olympic Games

With the slogan "One World, One Dream" symbolizing the Chinese renaissance and the harmonisation of the world civilisation, China, which hosted the Olympics in 2008 (Beijing), attempted to mark its integration in the international community (Müller and Steyaert in Munoz 2013: 141). However, it used the Games to underscore exceptionalism, to restore the pride in its tradition and promote a set of ideas that would appeal also to states disconnected from the Western dominance. The process of organising the Games for China had to balance between international openness and nationalist tendencies. It was also supposed to create the perception of contemporary China as a world power without being labelled as "the sick man of East Asia" (Tan and Houlihan 2013: 134). Athletes and coaches were dispatched abroad, aiming to improve their performance and skills, simultaneously with welcoming foreign coaches to

bring new knowledge and resources.¹⁰ Xu (2006: 92) argues that “sport has been another frontier of New China’s struggle for international legitimacy and prestige”.

After the 2008 Summer Olympic Games had been awarded to China, the relationship between the Games, patriotism, national unity and modernisation has constantly been highlighted. “The passion of the Chinese nation, the excitement and the feeling of pride erupted like a volcano” (Fan et al. 2011: 35). Beijing’s two bids¹¹ for the Olympics reflected its strong economic development and its increasingly important role on the international political stage. The hosting of the Olympics signalled China’s position not only outwardly but also within the country’s borders, in its efforts to unify the people and strengthen national identity. Therefore, “a key success of the Beijing Games was in fostering Chinese nationalism” (Polson and Whiteside 2016: 3089 -3090). During the bidding process for the Olympic Games to be held in 2008, China relied on different Olympic diplomacy strategies such as publicising the bid nationally and internationally, campaigning worldwide, and investing heavily in their athletes who were supposed to “convince everybody about China’s modernity and international recognition” (Bitternová 2009:26) .

The most important showcase of the use of Olympic diplomacy as a soft power tool was seen at the opening ceremony aimed at presenting Chinese rich history and its success to the world. It was used to represent China as modern and innovative: to strengthen the correlation between athletic triumph and China’s status as an emerging state, as well as to improve its media communication skills (Jianping 2008:6). Olympic diplomacy was focused on showing China’s economic advancement by promoting a “High Tech” Olympics, in portraying China as politically stable and orderly, in asserting China’s achievement of international respectability and in addressing environmental issues by promoting a “Green Olympics”. The third concept of the Games was “People Olympics” (deLisle in Price and Dyan 2008: 19-29).

10 Zhang, China’s first male champion swimmer who has been training in Australia. This strategy resulted in winning a silver medal at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in the men’s 400m freestyle and in 2009 he was crowned the world champion at the Rome World Championships (Lei 2011). Among 711 sportsmen travelling to Rio, 29 foreign names drew attention (Youming 2016).

11 After losing its first bid to Sydney in 1993, Beijing won its second bid in 2001. In 1990, China hosted 11th Asia Games as the first major international sporting event on its soil. Despite the strong use of the Olympic diplomacy to win support for the hosting of the Games in 2000, China failed which led to “the first explosion of the Chinese nationalism in the reform era (Fan et al. 2011:33). The other cities were Toronto, Paris Istanbul and Osaka.

Except from serving these foreign policy goals, Olympic diplomacy was also used to consolidate China's nationalism resulting with the government gaining more popularity and support, or by convincing the domestic audience of their legitimacy. After China re-joined the Olympic movement in the 1970's, it participated at nine summer Olympic games, with the Beijing games presented as the most successful one (Li et al. 2007: 3). Its overall medal rankings ranged from eleventh place in Seoul in 1988 to first place in Beijing in 2008. The games it hosted were also the one at which China participated with the highest number of athletes in its Olympic history. China won 100 medals in Beijing in comparison to 63 in Athens in 2004 (Olympic.cn 2017). This brought official triumphalism and strengthened China's status as a rising sports power. The feelings of superiority advanced by the sporting success is associated with nationalism as the form of national identification.

On the other hand, the narrative of a globalised China was promoted particularly with the slogan "One World, One Dream", signalling cosmopolitanism, harmony and universality. The slogan was used to reassure the world that China, which showed its power in organising a spectacular mega event, is not a threatening China (Rosner 2009: 10). There were also several foreign-designed architectural interventions and projects, as well as contributions by Chinese celebrities, which supported the cosmopolitan theme of the Games. These narratives served to emphasise China's "deep engagement with the outside world" (deLisle in Price and Dyan 2008: 30).

The heterogeneous side of globalisation and the urge to promote national interests is also demonstrated in the case of Russia as the host of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. In July 2007 Russia was awarded the Games¹² with the opportunity for the country's return to "great power status" (Foxall 2015: 622). Putin's Federal Target Program for the Development of Sochi as a Mountain Climate Resort in 2006-2014, as the priority of the Russian government in 2006, presented a part of overall Russian Olympic Diplomacy (Pettersson and Vamling 2013: 7). According to Müller (2011: 2095), the Sochi Games have been characterised as Putin's "pet idea" with the Games having a twofold purpose: using Olympic diplomacy "to send a signal of strength and pride" to Russia's international

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12 The two other selected contenders for hosting the Games were Pyeongchang and Salzburg.

audience, legitimising Putin's rule, and showing Russia as a strong global player (Haus 2014). Russia decided to focus the opening ceremony on its contribution to universal values, literature and music, while simultaneously highlighting its power. This was done by showing the most progressive actors and stabilising events from its history (Gorenburg 2014). Additionally, the recent scandalous revelations of alleged state involvement in doping cover-ups at the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games and the suspension of Russian athletes from the Rio Olympics, reaffirm that sport, national interests and the Olympic Games are connected. According to Ford (2014) "the outcome of the Olympics has always had implications for national prestige, especially for Russia "whose Olympic success has risen and fallen in step with its changing geopolitical fortune" (Ford 2014). Instead, the Sochi Games not only affirmed Putin's popular status but worked to legitimise his government (Munt 2015: 42). This strong effort is evident from the fact that Russia participated at the Games with 232 athletes winning 33 medals and ending up in first place, which is the same result achieved at the Olympics held in 1994 in Lillehammer (Olympic.it 2017).

Adding further to the argument of emerging states' use of Olympic diplomacy to promote their national interests, one can notice that the hosting of the Olympic Games in 2016 and the FIFA World Cup in 2014 influenced the strengthening of Brazil's soft power. Therefore, the Olympic Games were fully endorsed by the national government and supported by, at the time, president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who stated that "with the Olympics Brazil gained its international citizenship and that the world has finally recognized it is Brazil's time" (Horne and Silvestre in Bainer et al. 2016: 490). Therefore, the Brazilians realised the importance of hosting mega sporting events and have been using it as a very important tool of their foreign policy. Brazil's role as the host country of two international mega sporting events gave it a chance to show itself to the world in a different light. However, due to the unfolding political turmoil, economic decline, a rise in armed violence, mounting environmental problems, the Zika virus health crisis, and the surge in social grievances against widespread inequality and public corruption, "Brazil's position as host nation was historically perilous" (BBC.com 2016). On the other hand, Brazil had a lot to offer as a model for positive social relationships in matters of race and inclusiveness, and as a country full of stories of inclusion and struggling democracy.

Brazil's Olympic diplomacy dates from the beginnings of the Modern Olympics and from always being represented at the IOC. The bidding for the Olympic Games in 2016 marked Brazil's fifth attempt, but for the first time it went to the second round (Almeida et al. 2014). The success of Brazil is also evident from the overall Rio games medal table, according to which it participated with its historical record of 465 athletes and occupied 13th place with 19 medals won. The worst ranking for Brazil was recorded during the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 (52nd place) (Olympic.it 2017).

Aforementioned experiences from using Olympic diplomacy and hosting the Games highlight the role of the nation-state and the opportunity given to emerging countries to use sport as a tool for promoting their national interests, national identity, and in most cases, to display their nationalism. It confirms the role of sports in supporting a state-centric approach. From the comprehensive analysis presented here, one can see the Olympic Games as an intersection of nationalism, globalisation, and universal values. Therefore, we can conclude that as much as sport contributes to the unifying process of globalisation, it also strengthens the concept of nation by promoting national identities and interests.

Multipolarity, emerging states and hosting the Olympic Games

The hosting of the Games represents great prestige, given that 29 Summer Games have been held in just 19 countries, and 22 Winter Games have been hosted by a total of 11 countries (seven of which also hosted the Summer Games). In 121 years, ending with the Summer Olympic Games held in Brazil in 2016, 45 out of 51 Olympics were organised in Europe, North and Central America and Australia.

Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic Games, saw them as a tool to overcome social inequalities, and a way for economically disadvantaged people to access sport. However, despite his intentions, “the Games have been dominated by a handful of states and by Euro-

centrism" (IPSA.org 2016). Furthermore, in terms of hosting these events - producing and marketing the sports equipment, controlling the sports federations or relevant decision-making - it is the West that dominates. There is a belief, among western politicians and bureaucrats, "that the Games should go only to countries that conform to western ideals of democracy and human rights" (Brownell 2014).

After London 2012, the Olympic Games are or will be hosted outside the "Western world" (The South American continent hosted its first Olympics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, while the next three Olympics hosts are located in Asia: Pyeongchang in 2018, Tokyo in 2020 and Beijing in 2022)¹³, which confirms our understanding of sport as a reflection of multipolar international relations. According to Kelly (in Kelly and Brownell 2011:7) "from Greece (the front of Western civilization) to China (the cradle of Asian civilisation), the Olympics were finally transiting from parochialism of its Eurocentric philosophy to a more truly global philosophical foundation." This trend raises the question of whether sport is influenced by geopolitics and geoeconomics, and follows the shifting of the international system towards multipolarity.

We argue that emerging countries with their Olympic diplomacy managed to position themselves as core nations, at least during the Games, having in mind that the Olympics illustrate the power of a nation. Furthermore, the shift of Olympic Games hosts symbolises a form of multipolarity in sports, emerging as multipolarity in politics that is setting in. China, South Africa and Brazil (members of the BRICS) have managed to become the hosts of Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups, which signals their respective arrival as credible powers. At the same time, it demonstrates "the new order of things not only in international sports, but also in the international system" (Grix and Lee 2013). Even during the Summit of the BRISC in 2011 the future cooperation was, among other, conditioned by organising successful Olympic Games and World Cups in Russia and Brasil (IPSA.org 2016). Global shifts are also evident from the fact that "Soviet-American duopoly gave way to Sino-American duopoly" in winning medals at the Olympic (16% of all medals won in Sydney, 17% in Athens,

13 Except from hosting there is also an evident increase of non-traditional western powers bidding for the Summer Games: China, Turkey, Brazil and Uzbekistan for the 2000 Games; Argentina, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Russia and Puerto Rico for the 2004 Games; Turkey, Japan, Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand for the 2008 Games; Russia, Cuba, Turkey and Brazil for the 2012 Games; Japan, Qatar, Czech Republic and Azerbaijan for the 2016 Games; Qatar, Turkey and Azerbaijan for the 2022 Games (Wikipedia.org 2017).

22% in Beijing, 20% in London and 19% in Rio). However, India presents the greatest counter-example in showing that political multipolarity and sports multipolarity are “cast from the same mould”. Furthermore, Russia and China are the only BRICS countries represented at the top 10 medal winner list from 2000 onwards.

Confirming the influence of political shifts in sport, Pound (2004: 198-199) argues that for some members of the IOC the starting point for deciding on the host city are geopolitical considerations. There is always a vivid discussion whether the country was selected only because of its achievements, or if it was perceived as a part of the wider region. According to Wallerstein (2009), “there is a geopolitical rationale behind the decision, which favored Brazil as a representative of the South”. Brazil hosted the 2007 Pan American Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as well as the 2016 Olympic Games, almost 50 years after Mexico City hosted the Games in 1968. This serves not just as the announcement of its readiness to join the advanced Western capitalist states, but “to indicate its shift from a regional actor to a global actor in international affairs” (Grix and Lee 2013: 14). There are always disputes whether the host country also presents a wider region. Brazil, with the significant power, acted as a “rare island of stability in a region of turmoil” (Fendrick 2013: 25). Its significance was also reaffirmed by the IOC statement that the bid for the 2016 Games “was not only national, but also of South America, a continent that never hosted the Games” (Almeida et al. 2014).

Another case of multipolar trends is Beijing hosting the Games. According to Grix and Lee (2013: 12), “China’s Olympics could be read as an attempt to present the nation that has shifted from being a regional superpower to a global power”. Breslin (2013: 623) argues that “China has become a more active and involved actor in global affairs not attempting to be part of a core, occupied by advanced capitalist states, but rather an emerging, alternative power to those in the West.” “Unlike Brazil, which called forth message of both regional and national development, China was in it for the good of China” (Fendrick 2013: 34). However, according to some authors, the Beijing Games also had regional significance and were used “to bring an Asian dimension to the Olympics” (Kelly in Kelly and Brownell 2011: 2), by presenting only the fifth games held in Asia (Tokyo 1964, Sapporo 1972, Nagano 1998, Seoul 1988 and Beijing 2008).

Finally, the Sochi Games were “all about Russia's return to power and more indicative of a post- Cold War rise of Russia, than it is of regional development” (Fendrick 2013:30).

Although the five rings represent the continents participating at the games, Africa is still a blank space on the Olympic hosting map. Developing countries have been excluded and marginalised from hosting the Games, through a very expensive bidding and hosting process and the role of geopolitics, although the Olympic ideal promotes sport as being available to all people on all continents.

Developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, must overcome many challenges to reach their goal of hosting the Games. The known African bids for the Olympics are South Africa for 2004, Egypt for 2008, South Africa for 2024, and Kenya for 2024 (Fendrick 2013: 51). According to the Olympic Charter, the IOC was supposed to suspend any discrimination policies, a responsibility it failed to uphold to developing countries. Therefore, we argue that sporting events conceal the geopolitical “standings” of the host nation. This view is confirmed by Immanuel Wallerstein (2009), who found that “geopolitics has never been absent from the games.”

Going into the past, one can find interesting data about developed countries exclusively hosting the Summer and Winter Games from 1928 through 1964. With the exclusion of Mexico in 1968, Beijing in 2008 and Rio in 2016, all other Olympic Games were hosted by developed rich Western countries (the same goes for the Winter Games if Russia and the former Yugoslavia were categorised as emerging economies) (Baade and Matheson 2015: 3). However, from 2008 BRICS countries hosted or will host four Games. What these countries have in common, despite their many differences, is that they have all become emerging players in multipolar international relations.

Conclusion

The three case-studies presented in this article clearly show that except from the unifying pattern, the Olympic Games are also a reflection of particular national interests and the strive for power, especially among emerging states. The appearance of some of the BRICS states as Olympic host nations follows the shift to multipolarity as evident within international relations.

One of the reasons behind this trend, except from particular national interest, geopolitics and emerging new powers on the global stage, are the interest groups in search of new markets and the role of geoeconomics.

Firstly, the cost of the Games presents the main argument why they are moving away from the developed West. Having in mind that a city's nor a country's government "receives no direct revenues from hosting the Olympics, the financial revenues must come from a Games-generated economic boost and increased tourism" (Koorep 2016: 33). Therefore, developed countries, which already have high-income economies have very little to win from hosting the Games.

Secondly, the Olympic hosting costs for BRICS countries, where resources are scarce and the fiscal balance more fragile are far greater. Scholars analysing the economics of hosting sporting mega-events warn "that such events fail to deliver the 'economic bonanza' promised by the event organisers, and that the benefits and costs are disproportionately shared" (Baade and Matheson 2015: 1). However, with each bidder trying to outdo the others, expenditures increased (Zimbalist 2015: 1).

Thirdly, there is the new market hypothesis. The hosting of mega-events presents an intensified competition for public attention and investment. Companies strive to associate themselves with the Games, in an effort to gain access to new markets with high profit potential. Therefore, a part of the rationale behind the choice for the Olympic Games' hosts is the geopolitics of expanding markets (Müller and Steyaert in Munoz 2013: 139-140), with India, China and Brazil being among the four largest economies

by 2030 (Grix and Lee 2013: 14). There are also corporate sponsors, who see the interest in their involvement in financing mega-events by selling products and reaching the largest potential market. According to Baade and Matheson (2015: 7), the global audience for the Summer Olympics is around 3.2 billion people. It is why a conclusion can be made that “multinational sponsors now want to target the emerging economies around the world rather than battling over one or two market share points in the oversaturated west” (Gibson 2010). Therefore, BRICS as the engine of the global market, represents a fertile ground for sponsors (Kirillov 2008: 38).

Fourthly, the bidding countries' nominal GDP might be considered as a factor, as well. Economic development was the idea behind the BRICS countries' desire to host the Olympics, the World Cup or the Commonwealth Games. Together, BRICS “hold more than 40% of the world's population and about 20% of the world's GDP” (Menhart 2016). Curi et al. (2011) argue that a “BRICS-style of hosting sports mega-events may be emerging”.¹⁴ These states “have shown that they are not backward or incompetent, thereby challenging the developed states” (Fendrick 2013: 25).

According to the analysis presented in this paper, it is evident that the world of sports is a reflection of the world of politics. It is becoming multipolar, with emerging countries hosting mega sporting events. Most of these countries use such events to announce their arrival on the world stage as global players. Although the hegemonic control of sports still remains with the Western world, which is trying to impose a consumption of narrow capitalist and Western sports culture, this has not led to a complete homogenisation. The Olympic Games still contribute to the heterogeneous side of globalisation, with non-Western states reinforcing national identities and promoting their own values and interests on a global scale. Globalisation has not flattened the world and we can still see a far-reaching contribution of Olympic diplomacy to nation-building and national pride.

There are evident differences between emerging countries in terms of hosting the Games, as well as other parameters, which are decisive

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¹⁴ Beijing hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, Delhi the Commonwealth Games in 2010, South Africa the FIFA World Cup in 2010, Russia the Winter Olympic Games in 2013 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018, and Brazil the Pan American Games in 2007, the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016.

for the shifting trends in the world of sports. Except for the geopolitical dimension of selecting the host country by recognising the hierarchy of the IOC as the supreme authority in all matters related to the Games (as well as the state of world politics), there is also a geo-economic dimension. This includes broadcast revenues and corporate sponsorships that acknowledge the capacity of sports to attract large audiences. These, along with the membership structure of the IOC, profit oriented sponsors, and other particular interests demonstrate the interconnection between geo-economics and the world of sports.

Finally, in many cases, hosting the Games is perceived as an Olympic diplomacy strategy and a soft power tool. Nations and cities seek to host the Games with the expectation that it will significantly boost their economies. However, scholars seem to agree that the benefits of hosting are generally not substantial enough to ensure an economic shift.¹⁵ The payoff might be realised only in the long run. According to Zimbalist (2015) “the main legacy consists of white elephants that cost billions to build and millions annually to maintain, along with mountains of debt that must be paid back over ten to thirty years.”

15 Of the \$3.85 billion from television rights in the period from 2009-2012, 56 percent came from the U.S. right fees. It is striking that the IOC does not share a large portion of the generated revenue with the Organizing Committee (less than 50 percent of the TV revenue) (Zimbalist 2015).

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Learning by Doing: The EU's Transformative Power and Conflicts in the Western Balkans

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the European Community/ European Union experience in the Western Balkans in the period from 1990 onwards in different context in order to assess different mechanisms which the European Union has gained with building the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within the Enlargement Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Additionally, the paper makes an assessment of the EU's involvement in the conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process was launched in 1999.

The authors argue that in the case of the military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, when the European Community was confronted with serious and hard security issues at the very beginning of creating its Common Foreign and Security Policy and in a period of time when the region was not part of the enlargement process, the Community and the Union afterwards proved to be extremely ineffective. In the second part, through three case studies, the paper demonstrate that with the combined use of CFSP mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider of peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans have been established.

KEY WORDS:

European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Stabilization and Association Process, Western Balkans, Conflict prevention and conflict resolution

Introduction

The words of the Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck are relevant even today: "Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in an arsenal ... A single spark will set off an explosion that will consume us all ... I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I can tell you where ... Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set it off." (Navrozov 2008). In the heart of Europe, instability in the Balkans entails dangerous spill-over effects into the Union in terms of organized crime, refugee flows and migratory pressures amongst others. Therefore, conflict prevention and conflict resolution in its neighbourhood constitute key external priorities of the European Union (EU).

Since the EU's approach to violent ethnic conflicts has been born and bred in the Balkans, this paper will attempt to compare the EU's experience in this region throughout time and in different contexts in order to assess the different mechanisms which the EU has employed in formulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the Enlargement Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It covers the period from 1990 onwards, when the dissolution of the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began. It will focus on the European Community's (EC) and afterwards the EU's role in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the period when the CFSP was created. The paper will then assess the EU's involvement in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was launched in 1999. It shows that the EU changed its role in the region due to the fact that the newly formed independent republics existing in a completely different political context ten years later, have greater incentive to become EU member states and be part of the EU market, but also due to the fact that the EU was equipped with several mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to the institutional shortcomings of the past with the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in 1999, and afterwards with the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in 2009.

The authors argue that in the case of the military conflicts that followed the SFRY disintegration, when the EC was confronted with serious security

issues at the very beginning of creating its CFSP and in a period when the region was not part of the enlargement process, the EC and EU afterwards proved to be extremely ineffective. The lack of unity among member states on the issues connected to the conflicts in SFRY also contributed towards the ineffectiveness of EC/EU actions. Moreover, without the proper mechanisms to act, the leverage of the EC and afterwards the EU had little impact on the process of resolving the crisis. The EC/EU was unable to use its enlargement policy in the case of former Yugoslavia also because of the fact that the country had no interest in becoming an EC member state and neither did its republics. In the second part, through three case studies, the paper will show that with the combined use of CFSP mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider of peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans are established. Under the changed circumstances ten years later and in a different context in the Balkans, using its conditionality policy and the 'proverbial carrot' of candidate status, the EU was instrumental in brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001; the Belgrade Agreement in 2002 that prevented the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from violently falling apart and having a knock-on effect on the weak balance in Kosovo; and, finally, the landmark Brussels Agreement on normalizing the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The latter agreement closed one of the most complicated chapters in the collapse of Yugoslavia. The prospect of concluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement and eventual EU membership for the newly formed independent states of former Yugoslavia, which did not have the big market of the former Federation to rely on, was used as strong leverage in persuading the parties to engage in negotiations that would lead to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. One of the main obstacles the EU faced in this process as well was the disunity of its member states – in the case of the dissolution of SFRY and in the Kosovo conflict. Because of a lack of unanimity among the member states, it cost the EU more time in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Finally, through analysis of the EU's conflict prevention and conflict resolution role in the Western Balkans after the creation of the SAP, the paper will also assess the role of the EU's High Representative and afterwards the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the process of coordinating the EU's activities in the region.

EC/EU role in the conflicts following the dissolution of SFRY

The former Yugoslav federation comprised six constituent republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia also had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Although nationalistic sentiment was present throughout Yugoslav history, it was efficiently suppressed by Tito's regime. Following his death in 1980, there was a resurgence of nationalist sentiment in the republics, which resulted in a demand for transformation of the country's political framework. By the end of 1990, inter-republic negotiations had been initiated with the sole purpose of finding a mutually acceptable solution for their future. Unfortunately, their divergent plans for the future, from independence of the republics (Slovenia and Croatia), establishing a looser confederation of independent republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia) and eventually federation (Serbia and Montenegro) could not be conciliated through negotiations and resulted in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II.

However, the main factor that led to this conflict was the fact that the borders of the republics did not correspond to the distribution of the various nationalities within the SFRY that also suffered from deep-seated historic antagonisms. The presence of a significant Serbian minority in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Croatian minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and moreover, the Serbian policy to establish a 'greater Serbia' by annexing Serbian-populated territory from within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was the other factor that contributed to the lengthy multi-ethnic conflicts (Brsakoska Bazerkoska 2016).

In June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, strong opposition from the Serb-dominated federal government and from Serbia, led to a military intervention by federal forces in Slovenia.¹ Almost immediately after the war ended in Slovenia, military conflict broke

¹ The Slovenian independence war lasted ten days, from 27 June to 7 July 1991, and ended with the signing of the Brioni Agreement, brokered under the political sponsorship of the European Community.

out in Croatia.² This escalating war continued throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.³ Only the Republic of Macedonia gained independence by peaceful means, while the two other republics – Serbia and Montenegro – formed a federation known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992.

The interest of the EC for the future of Yugoslavia and the prevention of the potential conflicts among the republics was present from the very beginning of the crisis in the first half of 1991. The process of dissolution of Yugoslavia matched with one of the biggest transformations of international politics in the twentieth century. It seemed that the key political actors, including the EC, were overwhelmed with the new situation that unfolded in a matter of months – from the fall of the Berlin wall and the unification of Germany to the beginning of the transition of communist societies to democracy and a market economy. Europe was strongly focused on the process of democratic transformation in Eastern Europe and at the beginning the situation in Yugoslavia was perceived as a collateral issue compared to the other emerging challenges such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union or the Gulf War. Additionally, the unfolding of the Yugoslav crisis coincided with the final negotiations for the design of the Treaty of the European Union, a document that based the future of the EC on the three-pillar system that included the Common Foreign and Security Policy. All these factors made the EC/EU more reliant on help from outside (mainly from the US), than capable of relying on the newly formed mechanisms.

During the EPC Ministerial meeting held on 26 March 1991, a conclusion that the preservation of SFRY represented the primary goal of the Community was adopted. The EC had continuously monitored the deteriorating situation in the country (EC 1991a; 1991b) and on 29 May 1991, Jacques Santer, Luxembourg's Prime Minister and at the time holding the presidency of the Council of the European Community, and Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, met with leaders in Yugoslavia with an offer of accelerated EC membership and considerable financial assistance in return for a peaceful solution to the

2 The Croatian independence war lasted until 1995 and led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and revived the memories of the brutalities of World War II.

3 Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in 1992 and ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The brutality of the war in Bosnia was accompanied with massive crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as widespread killings, rapes, torture, deportation to camps and the siege of towns.

crisis (Gligorov 2000). The EC membership was not a priority for the leaders of the Yugoslav republics at that time, when heated nationalistic rhetoric was ongoing. In June 1991, Slovenian and Croatian unilateral acts of independence were passed. This only further escalated tensions.

After a number of unsuccessful attempts and appeals to maintain peace (EC 1991c; 1991d; 1991e), on 27 August 1991 the EC decided to convene a Peace Conference⁴ and to establish an Arbitration Commission that was expected to enhance the rule of law in the settlement of differences relating to the Yugoslav crisis (EC 1991f). The Arbitration Commission consisted of the presidents of the Constitutional courts of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. In the period from 1991-1993 the Commission adopted 15 legal opinions including opinions regarding the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. The new EC approach represented a result of the determination to avoid sending mixed and often conflicting signals in respect to the solution of the crisis; in particular this referred to Germany, as well as the tendency to limit potential US involvement in the overall process. Additionally, the Peace Conference represented an opportunity to test the new emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Lord Carrington presided over the Conference on Yugoslavia, which commenced on 7 September 1991. However, as a result of Serbian and Montenegrin discontent, Lord Carrington's peace plan draft was later rejected and consequently, the last opportunity to preserve Yugoslavia as a sovereign state or as a union of states failed.

Bearing in mind the unsuccessful attempts to bring an end to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the second half of 1991 and the failure to reach a peace agreement at the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC decided to open the procedure of recognition of the "new" states. During the Ministerial meeting held from 15-16 December 1991, the EC adopted two documents regarding the international recognition of the new states: the Guidelines for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the Declaration Concerning the Condition for Recognition of New States.

4 The Peace Conference brought together the Federal Presidency and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, the President of the EC Council, and representatives of the EC Commission and EC member states.

These two documents, together with the Arbitration Commission, created the mechanism which managed the process of recognition of all Yugoslav republics. Four Yugoslav republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia – have submitted requests for international recognition. However, on the last day of the deadline, before the official opinion of the Arbitration Commission was prepared, Germany announced the “Christmas recognition” of Slovenia and Croatia. Undoubtedly, this defiant and controversial approach undermined the EC’s struggle to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy and in particular its attempt to prove to the international community, and mainly the United States, that Europe was able to maintain a joint position on key international challenges.

On 11 January 1992 the Arbitration Commission handed down the opinions regarding the applications of the four Yugoslav republics in which it concluded that only Slovenia and Macedonia had fulfilled the recognition criteria. Still, on 15 January 1992 the EC Presidency decided to recognize Slovenia and Croatia only (EC 1992a). Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as an independent state by the EC on 6 April 1992 (EC 1992b). As Shaw suggested, the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia represented a clear example of premature recognition due to the fact that neither country had effective control of its territory – Croatia did not control one-third of its territory, and before the signing of the Dayton peace agreement Bosnia did not control almost 70 per cent of its territory (Shaw 1997).

Under intense pressure from Germany, the EC and its member states recognised Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. By doing so, they partly ignored the opinion issued from its own Arbitration Commission that Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two republics that met all the criteria to be recognised as new states. According to Blockmans (2014), “the political impact of these measures on the dissolution and the war in Yugoslavia was significant, because it isolated and punished the Serb/Montenegrin-dominated federal authorities and it also ended the European stewardship of the international efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict, due to Serbia’s distrust of the EC as a mediator.”

EU role after 1995 - a need for a stronger US presence

It became evident that the positions of the key European states were dominating the situation rather than there being a unified joint response. In particular, this refers to the German Christmas recognition of Slovenia and Croatia which by-passed the Arbitration Commission mechanism. It could be concluded that the EC policy in respect to the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis could be determined by the following factors: a lack of mechanisms for a joint European response; an inclination of domination of a few European countries in particular Germany; and finally, the EC/EU membership not being an incentive for the newly-formed states.

For that reason, the US decided to make an effort to end the war raging through the territory of the former SFRY. In November 1995 in Dayton, after four years of war and numerous atrocities, the peace initiative that was undertaken by the United States supported by the UN Security Council and the Contact Group, finally resulted in a ceasefire agreement.

Being unable to deal with the conflicts in its backyard was seen as a failure for the EU. Although it was freshly equipped with the Common Foreign and Security Policy and having confidence that "the hour of Europe has dawned"⁵ (Gligorov 2000), the EU was incapable of stopping the brutal breakdown of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Blockmans 2014).

Since the EU was unable to put in effect the newly defined CFSP to deal with the war in Yugoslavia, it prompted the EU leaders to rethink the mechanisms in the treaties, in order to strongly engage the EU in global peace diplomacy. The Treaty of Amsterdam redefined both the instruments and the decision-making procedures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. One of the novelties introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam which pushed the EU's diplomatic role on the international scene was the introduction of the High Representative for the CFSP, who at the same time held the position of the Council's Secretary General.

Once again, the changes and innovations within the EU, this time with the Treaty of Amsterdam, were put to the test with the new violent conflict

5 In May 1991, Jacques Poos, one of the negotiators of the Brioni Agreement that ended the ten-day war in Slovenia in 1991, declared: "The hour of Europe has dawned."

at the end of the 1990s in Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo and its struggle for self-rule began in 1998. However, it was too soon for all the novelties introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam to be put into action especially given the violence of the conflict. Therefore, the EU once again needed US assistance in the resolution of the conflict. The conflict ended one year later with the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo.

Once the war in former Yugoslavia was over, the EU was presented with a new opportunity in the Balkans. The political landscape in the Balkans had changed – the new states which did not rely on the large market of the Federation, exhausted by the war that raged on their territories for a decade, presented the EU with a completely different political context for its conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanisms. The EU, on the other hand, was now equipped with the CFSP mechanisms, as well as with the appeal of the enlargement policy which proved to be very successful in the Eastern European countries. And finally, by introducing the High Representative for the CFSP, the role of the EU in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans was strengthened. All these factors – the changed political context in the Balkans, together with the higher EU leverage provided through its newly introduced mechanisms – resulted in a more effective engagement of the EU. The next part of the article will analyze the role of the EU in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans in a changed environment for the newly-formed countries and for the EU.

The EU's second chance in the Balkans

Introducing the SAP - the additional tool for conflict prevention and conflict resolution?

In view of the EU's acknowledged failure to deal with the unfolding tragedy of Yugoslavia's disintegration in the 1990s, the EU was determined to contribute to the stabilization of the region and to restore external credibility

in the Balkans, which had been lost during the wars in the ex-Yugoslav republics. The success in the Western Balkans was long perceived as a test for the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Therefore, the EU designed the process of Stabilization and Association especially for the Western Balkan countries. It was tailored in a manner to be suitable for the process of post-communist transition, post-war reconciliation and EU integration.

In 1993, at the Copenhagen Council, the EU member states agreed that the Central and East European countries could join the EU and put forward certain criteria to be met before accession (European Council 1993). The Copenhagen criteria have been accepted as the main point of reference when assessing the success of the individual candidates' countries development and progress towards EU membership. In this way, the EU had great influence on the outcome of the reform efforts in the individual candidate countries. The most important part of that process is the fact that, apart from the long-term membership perspective, the enlargement process brings numerous short and medium-term benefits. Those benefits include financial aid, policy advice, political cooperation, technical assistance as well as visa liberalisation.

The enlargement context in the Western Balkans has changed, mainly because the region is characterized by legacies of war and a political climate that enabled the flourishing of organized crime, corruption and illegal migration. The EU first had to stabilize the region after the dissolution of the SFRY and then associate the newly emerged countries. The Stabilization and Association Process was launched in 1999 and granted the countries from the Western Balkans the status of potential candidate countries. In 2003, the Thessaloniki Agenda promoted political dialogue and cooperation in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the strengthening of parliamentary cooperation and institution building (Council of the European Union 2003). The basic starting point for the SAP is the EU's security framework. According to Chris Patten (2002), then EU Commissioner for External Relations:

“The choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans export instability to us. I know which I would prefer.

There is one more lesson I take from the Balkans today: never, never, never give up. Because what is happening in this region today shows how it is possible to turn failed states into successful states, how it is possible to fashion hope out of despair, how it is possible to make a difference. We have a long way to go in the Balkans: but we are getting there.”

Therefore, the EU conditionality policy in the Balkans was designed as a multi-dimensional instrument directed towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform. In addition to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the Western Balkans countries are expected to meet additional criteria that are country-specific and mainly linked to different peace agreements;⁶ the promotion of regional cooperation and reconciliation is also expected.

The ‘proverbial carrot’ of future membership in the EU gives the much-needed efficiency to the SAP. By using both positive conditionality entailing the promise of a certain benefit in return for the fulfilment of a predetermined condition, or negative conditionality involving the infliction of a punishment or sanction in the event a specified obligation was violated (the EU has the option to freeze the financial assets for that country when it fails to meet the objectives) the conditionality policy within the Western Balkan countries has been used very effectively in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In the three cases that will be elaborated below, both the EU’s Special Representatives (EUSRs) as well as the High Representative have played a role.

After the SAP was launched in 1999, on three different occasions the European Union was faced with the possibility of new conflicts in the Balkans. The EU used several incentives in the conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans: signing the SAA, visa free regimes, candidate status, starting negotiations, as well as the political and personal influence of the High Representative and of specially appointed Special Representatives. The three cases that will be elaborated further are the following: the EU’s role in the latent conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, the process of conflict prevention and the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and finally

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6 UN Resolution 1244; Dayton Agreement; Ohrid Agreement; Belgrade Agreement; Brussels Agreement.

its role in the process of brokering an agreement on normalizing the relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia

The first country to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001 was the Republic of Macedonia. It was also the third republic of the former SFRY to achieve candidate status.⁷ According to Michael Sahlin (2007: 103–108), the former EU Special Representative to the Republic of Macedonia:

“In that sense the political stability, inter-ethnic harmony, progress and ultimately EU accession of Macedonia has become a prestige matter for the EU... Macedonia's crisis and post-crisis experience as well as her initial accession experience... coincides generically and in time with important steps in the evolution of the EU's policies of enlargement and of crisis management institutional and capacity enhancement.”

Both the EU enlargement policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy were influenced and in some ways redefined by EU involvement in Macedonia. Macedonia negotiated the Stabilization and Association Agreement during 1999 and 2000 and the Agreement was due to be signed during the spring of 2001. However, at the beginning of 2001, the country slid into an armed conflict. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 had a huge influence on the region and on the Republic of Macedonia as well. The crisis gave rise to an enormous influx of ethnic Albanian refugees, which threatened the fragile ethnic balance of Macedonia. It damaged the economy and weakened the government (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 81). The call of the Albanian minority for greater representation in the state system triggered the conflict in Macedonia that brought the country to the brink of civil war in 2001. The conflict took the EU by surprise and the Swedish Presidency at the time decided to use the closer relationship with the EU as an alternative to war (Giandomenico 2009: 89-112). In the Macedonian case, the EU used the so-called European perspective as a conflict management tool. One of the reasons this conflict

⁷ Slovenia was the first and became a Member State in 2004. Croatia was the second and became a member on 1 July 2013.

management tool was effective was that this approach was accepted by the Macedonian government. Following the intense negotiations and 'shuttle diplomacy' between Skopje and Brussels, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed in Ohrid in August 2001.

From that point, besides the essential Copenhagen criteria, the Ohrid Framework Agreement became another tool of measuring the progress that the country makes towards fulfilling the conditions for EU membership, and it was a very important one. For the EU, it was important to achieve success in the Balkans, where it had historically been mainly passive. Therefore, in 2005, despite the fact that Macedonia did not reach the required quality of state administration, elections and other important issues, the EU member states had little option but to grant candidate status because of the progress regarding the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Even today, the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains an essential element for democracy and rule of law assessment in the country.

According to Sahlin (2007: 103-108), the EU actions in Macedonia were a very special case of what can be seen as comparatively successful conflict prevention and crisis management. This was a huge investment for the EU. Moreover, European action in Macedonia was closely connected to protecting the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a symbol for the successful conflict management carried out by the EU.

Within the general enlargement process of the EU, the countries were rarely discussed individually. However, EU involvement in Macedonia was vast. The High Representative Javier Solana confirmed this commitment of the EU (Solana 2001):

"The European Union will now redouble its efforts in supporting the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and will give priority to help bring Macedonia closer to the EU, as foreseen in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement... I will myself continue to help the implementation process where I can, assisted by my Special Representative in Skopje, Alain Le Roy, and in close co-operation with the President and Government and the international community."

In 2004, the society was once again on the brink of another crisis as a referendum was called to put a stop to the process of redistributing the powers from central government to the newly created local authorities, as part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Commission Delegation in Skopje was very active in supporting this process and, using its conditionality policy and the 'carrot' of the candidate status, the EU managed to pressure the government to proceed with what was seen as a painful process of decentralization.⁸ Although the granting of candidate status to the Republic of Macedonia in 2005 was seen as recognition of important progress, particularly regarding the inter-ethnic situation, the absence of membership negotiations until this day reflects some serious weaknesses. An additional condition to begin the negotiations was imposed on the Republic of Macedonia: a resolution of the name issue with neighbouring Greece. Once again, the EU member states' inability to reach a consensus on the name issue between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece prolonged the integration process of this small country in the Balkans. The lack of a European perspective opened the way for authoritarianism in Macedonia and contributed towards the building of a captured state phenomenon.⁹

Saving the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

After dealing successfully with the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, but with the fresh memory of the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslav federation, the EU had an interest in preventing a further break-up of Yugoslavia. This was considered to be quite a controversial issue (Tocci 2007: 78-100). As a federal state constructed by Serbia and Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was created in 1992. One of the imperatives to pursue domestic reforms, to cope with the internal political problems and to proceed with European integration was to have a functional federal state between Serbia and Montenegro. In the autumn of 2001, Belgrade was becoming increasingly willing to allow for a referendum in Montenegro, since there was a growing feeling that Montenegrin independence would put an end to the political and constitutional stalemate. However, at that point in time, Montenegrin

8 The proposed law was designed partly to give communes with an Albanian majority the right of self-governance.

9 This is a description of the country which is given in the Progress Report by the European Commission. It is supposed to designate a state where there is a long-lasting bifurcation of state and the party.

independence was an unwelcome development because the EU was not ready to deal with Kosovo and a new federal state could provide a framework for the reintegration of Kosovo. According to Tocci (ibid.), “the EU feared that the disintegration of the Western Balkans had not yet reached the smallest matryoshka doll and that further fragmentation could have triggered renewed violence and instability in the war-torn region.”

In this case, it was the EU's High Representative Javier Solana who was heavily involved in the negotiations. He was instrumental in brokering the Belgrade Agreement on 14 March 2002. The Agreement gave birth to the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was named ‘Solania’ because of Solana's involvement. After two years, it became apparent that the new problematic union arrangement did not resolve the significant political and structural differences between the two republics, but it managed to introduce a three-year period of cooling off before Serbia and Montenegro could start the peaceful separation.

Consequently, Montenegro seceded and declared independence in 2006. Although the State Union between Serbia and Montenegro did not last long, the EU's involvement contributed towards its peaceful dissolution and provided for a relatively tension-free secession of Montenegro.

EU in Kosovo after the Lisbon Treaty

Its failure in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 gave the EU greater incentive to become involved in the process of reconstruction of Kosovo afterwards through different mechanisms. Although, the EU was mainly working in close cooperation with other international organisation in Kosovo, its involvement had different shapes and roles. Primarily, the EU was involved in the fourth pillar of UNMIK which dealt with privatization and regulatory issues and then the establishment of the EU Monitoring Mission. Some emergency programmes were implemented by the European Commission Task Force and then by the newly established European Agency for Reconstruction. By 2004, the EU's High Representative Javier Solana dispatched a personal representative and the European Commission opened a Liaison Office in Pristina.

The violent clashes between the Serb and Albanian communities in

March 2004 made it clear that the *status quo* could not be maintained. The Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, and the Head of UNMIK, Kai Eide, urged to have the negotiations on Kosovo's final status opened without delay (Eide 2005). The talks between Belgrade and Pristina began, led by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who was assisted by two high ranking EU officials – one from the Council and one from the Commission. Ahtisaari presented his Comprehensive Proposal in March 2007. In his report, Martti Ahtisaari recommended a conditioned independence of Kosovo, supervised by the international community (International Crisis Group 2007). He argued that it was the only option, since the reintegration into Serbia was not viable and the continuation of the international administration was not sustainable (ibid.).

There are numerous discrepancies between the EU member states when it comes to the issue of the Kosovo status. The countries facing problems of national minorities at home (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) were sympathetic to the Serbian claim for territorial integrity. As the former EU Representative to the final status talks, Stefan Lehne explains: “As long as the Contact Group remained operational, the Council of the EU found it relatively easy to bridge the internal divisions by simply mirroring the Contact Group's positions in its own statements. After [UN Chief Negotiator Martti] Ahtisaari submitted his proposal the EU still managed to agree to support the proposal (which did not explicitly mention independence), while emphasizing the need for a UN Security Council decision” (Lehne 2009), which never came. As the resolution of the issue in Kosovo was of pivotal importance for the EU, which had failed previously in Bosnia and had to leave the driving seat to the United States, High Representative Solana stepped in. He opened up the possibility of by-passing the Security Council Resolution: if Russia, as a traditional partner of Serbia, continued to block the Resolution within the UNSC, then the EU would take its own decision (Koeth 2010: 227-247). He was backed by the then Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who was stating that “Kosovo is a profoundly European matter” (Rehn 2007).

By the beginning of 2008, it was more than apparent that the authorities in Pristina would declare independence. This fact divided the EU, especially

since five of its member states¹⁰ announced that they would never recognize Kosovo's independence without a new UNSC Resolution. The EU's answer to the forthcoming unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was to accelerate the deployment of the mission before the independence, so EULEX would not become involved in a following row over the non-recognition (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 746-763). Deploying the EULEX mission in this manner meant that it was departing from the mission's primary origin as a mission serving the Ahtisaari proposal for Kosovo's supervised independence. This solution, together with the appointment of only one person to serve as both the EU Special Representative and the International Civilian Representative (ICR) in Kosovo¹¹ showed clearly the EU's systemic shortcomings regarding Kosovo.

Another challenge for the EU after the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was the prevention of a future conflict between the Serbian minority living in Kosovo and Kosovo's Albanian majority. After the International Court of Justice (2010) issued the advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2010, the EU had another chance in Kosovo. The EU had to find a way to bring both Serbia and Kosovo to the negotiating table to find a way to normalise their relations and to prevent future conflicts. The EU's readiness to facilitate a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo was welcomed by the UN General Assembly's Resolution 298 (2010).

The talks led by the EU were perceived as a factor for peace, security and stability in the Balkan region. The 'First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations' between Serbia and Kosovo (the Brussels Agreement) was concluded on 19 April 2013 at the headquarters of the EEAS in Brussels. This deal for normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo offers the possibility to close another chapter in the recent violent history of the Balkans. Catherine Ashton's leadership and dedication played a significant role in the positive outcome of the EU-facilitated dialogue. The main incentive for Kosovo offered by the EU was the possible opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, while Serbia was offered the prospect of starting membership

10 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain

11 ICR was heading the International Civil Office, which was an institution not mandated by the UN. However, it reported to the International Steering Group of countries that supported Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. The ICR mandate ended on 10 September 2012.

talks with the EU. Ashton's efforts were backed by both the Commission and the member states, especially by Germany. At that point, there was a strong consensus among the EU member states that the Kosovo–Serbia relations should be normalized, especially since good neighbourly relations were added as one of the criteria for the advancement on the EU integration path. The Brussels Agreement brought Kosovo closer to signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, while Serbia received the 'carrot' of starting the screening process which precedes accession negotiations with the EU. The SAA between Kosovo and the EU came into force in April 2016 and Serbia began the accession negotiations in January 2014.

Conclusions

Regarding the more difficult security issues, the EU's approach in dealing with them is often perceived as weak. This was once again proven in the case of the conflicts that raged in the Balkans in the past two decades. The war in former Yugoslavia was one of the greatest failures of the EC/EU diplomacy and can be contributed to several factors – lack of suitable mechanisms for conflict prevention and conflict resolution, lack of alertness, lack of institutional capacity when it comes to the EU institutions, as well as the lack of the appeal of the EU membership at that point in time for the Yugoslav republics and the lack of consent of the parties to be mediated by the EU. The EU was faced with the dissolution of SFRY at the inception of its existence at the beginning of the 1990s. The CFSP mechanisms were just starting to build and grow, and the prospect of future EU membership was not as tempting and important as for today's independent republics.

In any case, the EU's efforts were strengthened throughout the years. After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999, the EU did score successes in the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Balkans, such as the case of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the 2002 Belgrade Agreement. With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the EU was equipped with several mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to

the institutional shortcomings of the past. Therefore, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo stands out as a success. It is both the outcome and also the characteristics of the diplomatic process itself that led to the successful Brussels Agreement in 2013. It was a high-level and high-paced diplomatic process. The facilitated dialogue showed that the EU could use the prospect of closer relations as a powerful tool to convince third parties to settle their disputes peacefully.

Finally, the EU still needs to tackle one issue that makes conflict prevention and conflict resolution more time-consuming and sometimes unsuccessful: the lack of unity among member states on how a strategy to tackle and resolve disputes on the borders of the EU should be defined. It is difficult to have a strategy for conflict prevention and conflict resolution abroad when the EU is divided. When the big countries pursue their own interests and the smaller member states block decisions in order to draw attention to their own concerns, the EU can achieve little. One of the reasons for the high-profile failures of EU peace diplomacy during the break-off of the former Yugoslav Federation was the disunity of the member states.

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Preserving 'Great Power Status': The Complex Case of the British Intervention in the Falklands (1982)

Matthieu Grandpierron

Abstract

This article aims to examine the importance of an often overlooked argument when it comes to explaining why great powers go to war against a weaker actor. This argument involves great power status considerations. The article argues that states care deeply about their status, especially states which are current and former great powers, and would opt to go to war to preserve this status even if the political and military consequences of such intervention are negligible to objective observers. To illustrate this argument, I will be looking at why the British decided to reestablish their sovereignty over the Falklands in 1982. The empirical part of the analysis is based on formerly secret documents declassified by the British government. This qualitative primary analysis of British documents provides new insights about the crisis and suggests that status considerations played a large role in the British decision to re-conquer the Falklands.

KEY WORDS:

great powers, status, recognition, status perception, United Kingdom, Falkland Islands

Introduction

In 2010, the British government began declassifying documents related to the Falklands crisis (1982). These documents are now available on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website. They are related to the negotiations with Argentina and cover the crucial period 1979-1982, when the situation spiraled out of control and ended up in a military conflict. These documents are largely comprised of reports from the cabinet's internal discussions as well as communications from the Falklands' governor. They offer a great deal of information on how the British government perceived the Falklands issue; they also provide information on how the island's residents perceived their situation and also the pivotal role of Argentinean public opinion.

It is important to analyze these newly declassified documents to confirm the relevance of previously applied theories to explain why negotiations failed and war ensued 32 years after the fact. The Falklands crisis also had other consequences that still stand today: the islands' sovereignty continues to be an important issue for Argentina and the United Kingdom to such an extent that the UK organized a referendum in 2012 to ask the islanders if they wanted to remain British. The result was 99.8% in favor of a British citizenship (Falkland Islands Government 2013). As soon as the results were revealed, Buenos Aires qualified it as illegal and argued that the islands belong to Argentina. London has permanently deployed fighter squadrons to ensure air superiority in that region and to - de facto - deter Argentina from invading the islands again. The aim of this article is not to explain the conflict itself, but rather to provide an explanatory model as to why Britain decided to risk its entire navy and international prestige to re-conquer remote islands in the South Atlantic.

Literature review

Many books and articles are dedicated to the Falklands crisis. This abundant literature can be divided into three major categories. (1) The

first is made up of works from decision-makers involved in the conflict (Thatcher 1993; Haig 1984; Weinberger 1990; Costa Méndez 1993; Menéndez 1983) and from officers and soldiers who were deployed on the battlefield (Woodward 1992; Thompson 1992; Piaggi 1998; Bramley 1993; Lawrence and Lawrence 1988).

(2) The second category in the literature is composed of historical works. A part of this cohort describes and presents the conduct of the war and of military operations (Adkin 1995; Gordon 1989; Middlebrook 1985 and 1989; Schmitt and Green 1985; Calvert 1982; Hastings and Jenkins 1983). Another part focuses on describing the value proposition bargain from a factual point of view and how the crisis was (mis) managed by the two sides, but with very little convincing theoretical evidence developed (Freedman 1982 and 1988; Williams 1983). Douglas Kinney also takes this perspective but offers an explanation as to why the two sides couldn't find any peaceful resolution to the dispute prior to the conflict. His argument is that no agreement was reached due to the view of the world the two countries had and their lack of imagination in finding a mutually face-saving compromise. In addition, there are studies about the legal aspects of the conflict in relation to international law (Calvert 1983; Windsor 1983; Schmitt and Green 1985; Franck 1983; Bluth 1987; Perl and Larson 1983).

(3) The third category is composed of academic works. Most of them concentrate on explaining the Argentine decision to invade the Falklands (Welch 1997 and 2005). The most common argument is the diversionary theory of war: Jack Levy and Lily Vakili (1992) highlight the impact and decisive importance that the Argentine domestic and social situation had on the Junta and on its desire to recover the island to salvage its political leadership.¹ Other scholars defend the idea of mutual misperceptions (Paul 1994; Rotberg and Rubb 1984). However, there are very few studies that explain the Falklands conflict from the British side. One of the most notable works is that of Virginia Gamba (1987) but unfortunately, her work presents more the general international and political context in which Britain was from 1945 to 1982 and not the actual British motivation to go to war. The most widely accepted theoretical argument is that Thatcher took the decision to re-conquer the Falklands in order to save her political

1 To go to war to distract domestic opinion from domestic shifts in order to gain public support and ultimately win the next elections (Sobek 2007).

career and shift the focus away from her domestic policies. With only access to the conflict timelines and studies of the British domestic context, the argument of diversionary war appears to be relevant and tempting to accept. However, a detailed study of declassified documents proves that both Thatcher and her government were not particularly concerned by the outcome of the next elections when they took the decision to send the entire Royal Navy on 5 April.

Other IR scholars, particularly Richard Ned Lebow (1983) and David McCourt (2014) have argued that Britain reacted this way to the Argentine invasion because of prestige factors (Lebow) and national identity considerations (McCourt). These arguments seem closer to reality, but they suffer still from some limitations. Lebow's work is flawed from evidence limitations as recognized by the author himself: "in the absence of these documents the investigator can only piece together the outlines of the story from evidence available at this time [speeches, interviews, newspapers account]" (Lebow 1983). The available documents in 1983 are problematic to use because when it comes to speeches, interviews and newspapers reports, we cannot be certain if what is said and written is accurate and reflects real motivations or is an expression of the way politicians want the audience to understand a given situation. The other concern is that it explains the conflict from a crisis management point of view and emphasizes miscalculations, but barely provides theoretical explanations as to the reason why miscalculations occurred. However, his claim that prestige and status considerations played an important role in the British decision to go to war is a solid conclusion as this study will show. McCourt's work takes several key events involving Britain (the Suez crisis, the Skybolt affair, the Falklands' crisis) and demonstrates how Britain constructed its role during these events, based on the use of George Herbert Mead's concepts of role-taking, role-playing, and alter-casting. However, his work does not directly examine the British government's motivations to go to war against Argentina.

Theoretical section

Why would this research be different from those already existing? Firstly, because I rely primarily on declassified documents to base my claims (see the data collection part for more details), which enable me to have a clear insight into the British decision-making process and mindset at that time. Based on this evidence, I will make the argument that the British motivation to retake the Falklands was essentially based on status and prestige considerations.

Great power status and its implications

Defining great power and great power status

The term “great power” was first used in 1815 during the Vienna Congress to name states having the responsibility to create and sustain international rules (Nolan 2006: 72). Since 1815, the terminology of “great power” is often used in IR to name the most important and powerful countries. When it comes to providing criteria to identify great powers, there is a strong tendency use only material criteria, such as economic and military power: “a great power, almost by definition, is one which has the capacity to control events beyond its own borders; and that is usually based on the ability to use military force” (Howard 1971: 254; Rothstein 1968; Levy 1983; Modelski and Morgan 1985; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Baron 2013; Mearsheimer 2014). However, this understanding is too limited: focusing on military power and economic power, although important, is not enough (Duque 2015). To give a more accurate definition of what a great power is, identification criteria should rather be based on the three types of power identified by Robert Dahl (1957), Steven Lukes (1974), and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005). These three aspects of power can be found in Manjeet Pardesi’s recent works. In his article “Is India a Great power? Understanding Great Power status” (2015), he explains that great powers are countries having security and economic related interests outside of

the home region, that they have capabilities to promote their interests and that finally they have seen their aspirations to be considered as great powers recognised. Based on this, it seems to be more accurate to define a great power as a state possessing the five following characteristics: (1) having interests (economic, strategic, diplomatic or cultural) in other region(s) than its home region and being able to prevent other actors from following policies harmful to its interests or to compel others to bow to some extent to its interests; (2) then a great power is also a country having both the resolve and capabilities to be active on the international stage (promoting initiatives, imposing norms/rules of conduct, controlling the agenda and taking the lead to find solutions to global issues). A great power is a state having resolve/will/willpower and because of that will not be irresolute about its behaviours and policies. A great power is, therefore, an active state and influential on the international stage, a state that offers solutions to international issues. Although successful outcomes are more desirable, failures, to some extent, are inevitable; what is important is the level of activity deployed by the state; (3) a great power is also a country enjoying freedom of action on the international stage, having a certain level of autonomy to take foreign policy decisions or to resort to the use of military force; (4) Finally, it is a country that has been granted the status of a great power by other international actors, meaning that this country has been recognised to possess the previous criteria. The two essential criteria are number 2 and number 4: willingness to be active on the international stage and to assume special responsibilities, and recognition from other actors.

Status can be defined as “the rank an actor occupies in a given social group” (Onea 2014: 129) and has at its core the notion of social groups’ consensus about the position an actor has in a given hierarchy (Dafoe, Rensthen and Huth 2014). “Status often hold ‘social roles’, such as being dominant within a group, having moral authority within a group, being the leader of a coalition, or being the defender of a group of people” (Dafoe et al. 2014: 374). A given position in a hierarchy has prescribed duties, functions to be performed, and rights to be enjoyed. Great power status is a very particular type of status, because it goes along with expected higher task performances and a better ability to resolve regional and international issues (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 263-264). Since the Vienna Congress (1814-1815) great powers have attributed themselves

with, and the international community has recognised the existence of a specific responsibility: to prevent further war from breaking out, as well as to tackle future international crises (Battistella 2012: 663). Special duties embodied in the status of a great power have changed according to the global context. The first special duty was to maintain the balance of power and to defend states' right to have an independent existence (Nolan 2006: 74). This first task has been gradually extended to the preservation of the actual order: that is to say preventing physical aggression (Morris 2011) but also preventing (and punishing) aggression in contravention of international law (Jackson 2000: 202). In exchange for responsibilities at the global stage and status, great powers must prove their commitment to fulfil these expectations, even if it is costly (Bukovansky et al. 2012; Nolan 2006). Great power status provides privileges: states enjoying it cannot be ignored in resolving international issues and when it comes to negotiating agreements, the supposed gap of power between the great power and its counter-parts makes the weaker actor agree to the great power's terms (Aron 1962: 68). More generally, "the group is more reticent to impose, it makes requests more carefully, and it offers various public signs of respect" (O'Neill 2001: 139). Claimed status has to be recognised by others to be fully enjoyed. The recognition process is therefore a two-step process: self-recognition and then recognition by others. In this process I identify three components, called the 'three circles of recognition'.

Attaining and retaining great power status: a Sisyphian task

The three step process to earning great power status

When a country consistently fulfils the great powers' criteria elaborated above, its leaders/ruling elites and its citizens start to believe their country is special; and because their country is special, they should be considered differently from other countries. A feeling of superiority, or at least an impression of being different from and unique compared to others enhances national self-esteem. There are two clearly defined groups of

states: all the others and their country. To ordinary people as well as to ruling elites, it is unthinkable that their country could be anything less than a great power. The great power status recognition starts, therefore, by self-recognition/attribution of this particular status. This step is essential. If leaders/ruling elites are not convinced their country is a great power, how could they ask others to grant them this status? To make use of a comparison from theatre: an actor needs to believe he is the character he will be playing during the theatre play. If the actor is not persuaded he is indeed the character he will be playing, then the audience will notice and refuse to acknowledge that it is anything more than a theatre play. The insistence that their country should be seen as a great power and granted privileges and prestige linked to that position becomes a key element of a state's foreign policy until full international recognition occurs (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 262). Self-attribution of status is, of course, necessary in the quest for this status, but it is not sufficient. What is lacking is being recognised by others. The state needs the approval of others to achieve status. They are used by the state as a mirror on which its image is reflected: "social status rests on collective judgment, or rather a consensus of opinion within a group. No one can by himself confer status on another, and if a man's social position were assessed differently by everybody he met, he would have no social status at all" (Marshall 1977: 198 quoted in Paul et al. 2014: 8). Approval of two other circles- evolving states enjoying different status - is required.

The second circle is composed of actors already enjoying the sought after status, that is to say in this case the second circle is composed of other great powers. When a country is believed to perform the role(s) and to satisfy most of the great power criteria, it is recognised by other great powers as a member of their "club". At its beginning, "the great power system was rather like a British gentleman's club, with admission controlled by the existing members. If established great powers begin to treat another state as one of their members, that country ipso facto became a great power" (Scott 2006: 119). The decision to co-opt new members by already recognised great powers is rather a subjective process than an objective one based only on material criteria. Co-optation, indeed, means, more or less, being the same, having the same characteristics as others have. Actors who are already members of a group impose their views, goals and behaviours and potential members have to follow these

rules in order to become members of the group. Recognition/co-optation by the second circle is important: high status group members (other great powers) are more prominent and influential in their opinion and their help is sought more often; their actions and behaviours draw particular attention and their positions taken and policies carry more weight than those of other actors (de Waal, Gregg and Lammers 2015: 447). This step is a good achievement but is only partial because the group of great powers is a small sample of actors (normally no more than ten countries). Of course, being recognised by great powers as being a pre-condition of great power legitimacy, it still needs a stronger stimulus. It needs support (recognition) from the remaining actors. To achieve full recognition, a country needs to see its status recognised by a bigger group, that is to say the international community.

The international community is the third and last circle. Status recognition from the third circle usually follows the recognition from the second circle, because international actors tend to mirror what great powers do. For example, when great powers decide to open an embassy in a state's capital city or to recognize the existence of a new country, other countries tend to mirror this decision. The third circle exhibits most of the time the behaviour of an audience during a theatre play. During a theatre play, the audience can consider or not the performance as appropriate (well performed) and confirms the reality of the role. The third circle has exactly this function. It watches the second circle acting and gives the status of great power to states performing the way great powers should. That does not mean that countries belonging to the third circle cannot develop autonomous foreign policies. It simply means they do not have much impact on world politics. These countries have barely any capabilities and are therefore out of play (Badie 2013: 84). However, if the third circle is not convinced by the performance, it may stop treating the state as a great power. The way the third circle behaves toward a great power is a sort of reality-testing. The image of great power a state gives is tested, evaluated by the third circle against observations of the great power's behaviour on the international stage. Once status is achieved and recognised, the quest for status does not really end, like Sisyphus constantly trying to roll a boulder up to a hill, only to watch it rolling back down, repeating this action again and again.

The importance of appropriate status signalling

To keep great power status, those who attributed to have it must believe the state continues to meet the required criteria in producing an appropriate status signalling. This demands constant efforts, "the whole group has an inducement to pressure the individual to behave correctly" (O'Neill 2001: 91). Great power status has been granted because the state was perceived as being legitimate in having the capabilities required and resolve to take roles associated with great power status. A great power's legitimacy to be a great power is compared not only to other members of the group, but it is also compared to the great power's past. Other great powers' capabilities and behaviour and the state's past are used as reference points in which symbols often play an important role: "status-seeking actions can be largely symbolic and aimed at influencing other's perceptions" (Welch Larson and Schevchenko 2010: 5). When these efforts cannot be afforded for a long time, or if wrong and inappropriate status signalling actions are sent, then it can encourage the second and third circles to stop perceiving a country as being a great power, and in this case great power status and correlated rights are put at stake. Inappropriate or wrong status signalling can take several aspects. Firstly, it can take a material shape (e.g. the reduction of the size of the military or of its budget) for various reasons. Then, inappropriate and wrong status signalling can also take a more informal aspect. In this case, all is based on assumptions and perceptions: for some reasons a great power is alleged to be less efficient and influential in its role(s); as a result, its will of being and acting as a great power is questioned. This second type of inappropriate status signalling tends to be harder to deal with because everything is based on perceptions and interpretations of a given behaviour.

A country suspected to be sending inappropriate status signals can endure status uncertainty. The second and third circle (and sometimes even the country's domestic opinion) start to have doubts about the real capacities of the country to be a true great power. Status uncertainty, if not addressed quickly, tends often to lead to what is called 'the recognition denial' (Lindemann 2010). The recognition denial is the gap between the claimed frame and the frame perceived by others. There is recognition denial when the image a state has of itself is higher than the image given back by others. The more important the gap is, the stronger feelings of

frustration (and even humiliation) are (Lindemann 2010: 51). Status denial tends to lead to an increase of challenges and what is perceived as provocation by the state facing status uncertainty as the fear factor included in great power status is eroding. In this sense, challenges are a symbolic demand of a proof of great power. To avoid status denial, the state must “demonstrate their possession of qualities that warrant their acceptance” (Lebow 2010: 94). If the challenged great power responds to the challenge(s) in a satisfying manner, the challenges might stop. But if not, then challenges might continue until the imposture is revealed to all. Hence the need to make the second and third circles to see the state as a great power. The shape of actions to take can differ, but it “often requires publicly incurring some cost or risk, often by participating in violence” (O’Neill 2001: 91).

What happens in the case of a challenge from a weaker actor? Being challenged (or worse attacked) by a weaker actor is humiliating because the simple fact to be a great power should deter weaker actors from challenging the state. The fact that an inferior actor challenges a great power is deeply humiliating: it provokes anger when a challenge “comes from an actor who lacks the standing to challenge or insult us [...]. Great powers feel enraged if challenged by such a state” (Lebow 2008: 69). This challenge can create doubts about the reality of the great power status. The expected behaviour from a great power is to put the inferior actor back in its place. If this expected task is not performed (or performed with difficulties), questions will arise about the legitimacy of the state claiming great power status. As noted by Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan: “once the symbol [of weakness] was created, there was no turning back” (Sewell and Ryan 2017: 293). The challenged great power may be sending inappropriate status signals (cuts in the arm forces, diplomatic difficulties to weigh on the international stage, retreat from world affairs, etc.) In this scenario, the situation can quickly become difficult. The challenged state will have to decide between attempting to punish the challenger to send an appropriate status signal and thus taking the risk to publicly fail because it has no more capabilities to do so. Or, the state can decide not to react to the challenge, making clear that the second and third circles were right to interpret its signals as inappropriate for a great power. The dilemma for states facing status uncertainty is the following: to maintain great power status, the challenger has to be punished severely

(and decisively), but taking the decision to go to war can lead to a more damaging consequence in the case of a failure: a great power defeated militarily by a weaker actor would be very embarrassing. First, because of the defeat but also because intervening in peripheral regions has important symbolic aspects. A challenge in the periphery may have zero effect on vital interests, but is highly symbolic: "when engaged in a conflict for global stakes, what may appear as a marginal interest will be invested with a significance it would not otherwise have, for almost any challenge is to be seen by the challenger and by third parties as a test of one's will" (Tucker 1981: 144-145 quoted in O'Neill 2001: 105).

Methodology

Research design

The research instrument I use to analyse the declassified documents is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is defined as the "qualitative and interpretative recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena" (Abdelal et al. 2009: 6). It is in speeches and in written documents that perceptions of a given situation can be found. For example, if it appears that status and prestige considerations are the cause of the decision to go to war, then words or idioms expressing these ideas should be found in documents before the decision to go to war is taken. However, there are two major risks in applying the discourse analysis method to leaders' discourses and writings. The first one is: how can we be sure that what is said or written by leaders is the truth? This risk has been highlighted by Paul Saurette (2007), and many others. Saurette studied the motives George Bush had when he took the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. They were basing their analyses on public discourses Bush made. When studying public discourses, it must be taken into account that these discourses are addressed to domestic public opinion as well as to international public opinion, while books written by politicians are often used as justification a posteriori. I mitigate this risk in the data collection section, where I explain that I have selected mainly

declassified documents as sources.

Declassified documents enable us to avoid the first risk because they give us unique insights from the decision-making processes. As the documents were first designed to remain classified, there is less risk that what is written is untrue. The second risk is lying about "hidden interests". How to affirm that what is assigned to emotions, identities, perceptions is not a useful mask to hide material interests? It is mitigated too by the use of declassified documents. Indeed, they give insights into the decision-making process leading to war and therefore, reveal what were thoughts and considerations of decision-makers at the time the decision was taken. Maybe there are material interests but the documents would reveal that these material interests did not matter to them. These documents would also reveal whether decision-makers were conscious or not of the potential existence of material interests.

Data collection

A series of documents on the Falkland crisis have been declassified since 2010 by the British government and published on the Margaret Thatcher foundation's website.² These documents are very valuable because they consist of transcripts of both the secret and public negotiations between Argentina and Britain, of reports to the British Government from the Falklands Governor, of reports from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of the Argentine public and of government opinions regarding the issue. The documents also consist of personal notes to Margaret Thatcher from her advisers, and even more valuable, most of these notes are annotated by Thatcher herself, which enables one to have a good idea on how she was perceiving the situation. As a result, these declassified documents give the opportunity to know what happened behind the stage; as politicians do not always show the same considerations in public or in secrecy. In total 1.840 documents related to the Falklands war have been declassified and published by the British government. I actually limited myself to 328 of these documents as this paper is focused on the decision to go to war and not on what happened after the decision to respond was taken and the Navy received the order to sail to the South Atlantic. That is why I studied

2 For each document quoted, the reader will find the access link in the references.

and analyzed only the documents from 10 May 1979 (the first declassified document was issued at this date) to 7 April 1982 (debates at Parliament after the fleet departed). The documents used are classified as follows.

Table 1: classification of the British sources.

Type of documents	Number of documents
Reports regarding the history of the Falklands' dispute	8
Propositions for future policy in the Falklands	4
Comments on future policies by ministers	6
Documents related to UK-Argentine negotiations (including direct messages from UK ministers to Argentine ministers and vice versa)	21
Minutes between ministers	73
Documents issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to ministers.	23
FCO to UK embassy in Buenos Aires	23
Minutes and letters to Margaret Thatcher (MT)	43
Letters from MT to FCO	13
Reports on the situation in Argentina (on the economy, military and political situation, including Argentine press opinion)	17
Reports on discussions during Defense and Overseas Policy Committee	14
Reports from Ministry of Defense (MOD) to FCO	6
Public interventions of MT	6
FCO to Port Stainley	8
Letters from and to the governor of the Falklands	9
UK-US talks (excluding Haig's letters)	10
Reports on British ministers' visits to the Falklands	2
Reports to the Cabinet on the House of Common's position	2
Minutes to the Cabinet	7
Reports from the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires	31
MT messages to Head of States and vice-versa (including Ronald Reagan)	10

The hypothesis derived from the theoretical considerations I made previously is that great powers perceived as being in decline will respond to an aggression in their periphery by the use of the military force in order to maintain their state's status. If this hypothesis is correct, then discussions, speeches or notes evoking the place of the country on the international stage should be found within the declassified documents. The table below gives some examples of words and expressions (in bold) found in the declassified documents and linked to the theory previously explained.³

Table 2: examples of expressions supporting my theoretical claims

Hypothesis	Verification
Restoring prestige and great power's identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "the significance of the Falklands was enormous [...] for our standing in the world" - "since the Suez fiasco [...] we had come to be seen [...] as a nation, which lacked the will and capability to defend its interests [...] victory in the Falklands change that" - "a British readiness to surrender sovereignty over the Falklands might have implications for the British positions [...]"

Case-study: Britain confronted in the Falklands' crisis

The analysis of the case-study of the British decision to go to war to reconquer the Falklands Islands aims to highlight the role status considerations and emotions played. This section is organised as follows: in the first part, I will recall elements that show Britain was facing great power status denial; then, in the second part and based on a qualitative analysis of declassified documents, I will highlight that status considerations and the desire to be recognised again as a great power played an important role in the British decision to go to war.

³ Only documents providing the most relevant examples will be directly quoted in this paper.

The remaining consequences of Suez: is Britain still legitimately claiming great power status?

From Suez to the Falklands: a succession of embarrassing military issues

The Suez fiasco in 1956 had a disastrous impact on British prestige. It also had an impact on how British citizens were seeing their country in the world and the place they thought Britain had on the international stage. Before Suez, they were persuaded that their country was on the same level as the USA and the USSR: they thought they could compete with these states. After all the United Kingdom was the only European country involved from the beginning until the end of the Second World War and which successfully prevented a Nazi invasion (Marx 1993; Chassaigne 2009). After the end of WWII and despite its economic and industrial weaknesses, British diplomacy managed to create the impression that Britain was the only country which could bridge the differences between the US and the USSR: the UK was the country to which European countries should be close to in order to be connected to the US and the country to which the US should be linked to if they wanted to keep good relations with European states and also with the Soviets. But Suez changed everything; the image that the UK was a great power literally exploded. The British had to withdraw from the Suez Canal because of US and USSR pressures (Moscow even threatened to use nuclear weapons and Washington launched a financial offensive on the British Pound). The Suez failed expeditions revealed two weaknesses Britain had: first, that its conventional forces were not adapted and were using outdated WWII equipment (Robbins 2013). Secondly, without nuclear weapons, the UK was vulnerable to international pressures, especially from US and Soviet pressure.

Since the end of WWII, Britain had seen its military capacities decrease. Britain had no nuclear weapons and a solution to change that was to buy nuclear systems from the US (the Polaris missiles for submarines). However, this solution appeared to be extremely costly and had consequences on the defence budget: the choice was either obtaining a deterrence capability or developing new programs (such as new ships for the Royal Navy). The decision to acquire Polaris missiles certainly did provide nuclear systems to

the UK, at least in theory. There were persistent rumours that Britain was not an autonomous nuclear power because a Washington agreement and double-key procedure were limiting the use of British nuclear weapons: “during the period from mid-1958 to March 1962, the British government would have had to secure US permission and authorization to arm the more reliable half of the V-Bombers” (Bronk 2014: 994). Although these rumours have been denied by the British government, they were revived each time the British had to renew its systems. Conventional forces were not in a much better state. Since the 1960's Britain no longer had any modern aircraft carriers, which is quite problematic already for a great power, but it is even more problematic due to the image of the Royal Navy.⁴ An aircraft carrier is considered to be a visible instrument of a state's power (for example : a US aircraft carrier sailing through the Strait of Taiwan helped de-escalate the tension between Taiwan and China in 1996). Due to the psychological impact linked to the possession of an aircraft carrier and its military power and value, it is not surprising that Henry Kissinger (when he was US Secretary of State) always opened an emergency session with the sentence “where are the carriers?” (Holloway III 2007). The embarrassing combination of military and economic weaknesses, of military and diplomatic humiliations, and of a global British disengagement from world affairs, has made foreign diplomats ask their British counterparts the question “what has happened to your country?” (McCourt 2011: 1618). Last but not least, once the Falklands have been invaded, Britain suffered another humiliation through its military. Indeed, once the small British Garrison surrendered, they were humiliated by the Argentinians by being forced to lay on the ground, face on the ground and pictures were taken of them in this position. These pictures were released. This has been perceived as outrageous by the British, and Thatcher mentioned this surrender in her speech at the House of Commons in which she emphasized that Royal Marines fought well “in the pure tradition” of British forces, and that ultimately, British armed forces will have the opportunity to take revenge on this humiliation (Thatcher 1982a).

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4 The Invincible class commissioned in 1980 (HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Illustrious) weighed 22,000 tones and could carry only 22 STOVL aircraft. There are two types of aircraft carriers. The first one is called CATOVAR (catapulted assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery) and the second one is called STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing). The first type is considered more efficient because the aircrafts are launched by a steam catapult, they can carrier more armament and fuel. Whereas in the second type, aircrafts need to be lighter in order to be able to take off without help, therefore they can carry fewer munitions and fuel, their autonomy is less important. Possessing an aircraft carrier is considered as the ultimate display of a country's prestige and influence as the former head of the Royal Navy Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope said: “to put it simply, countries that aspire to strategic international influence have aircraft carriers” (BBC News 2012).

The symbolic (inappropriate) signal sent by decommissioning HMS

Endurance: the UK further in retreat?

The Falklands issue raised concern about British resolve and commitment, because of the perceived gap between the official positions and the policies taken. Officially, the British position regarding the Falklands was no sovereignty transfer. In 1979 Thatcher annotated a report from Lord Carrington (the Foreign Minister), in which Carrington explained that, the best solution regarding the Falklands would be to proceed to a sovereignty transfer to Argentina. Next to the proposition, Thatcher annotated: "I could not possibly agree" (Carrington 1979). However opposite signals were sent: in the meantime, the defense budget was decreased, the Royal Navy's tasks concentrated on hunting Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic, and HMS Endurance was decommissioned. HMS Endurance is an ice patrol ship, which has zero military value but was the only ship the Royal Navy permanently deployed in the Falklands, withdrawing and decommissioning it gave the impression that Britain was slowly retreating from this region. This decision raised some concerns among British politicians as recalled by Lord Carrington: "I remain concerned at the strength of public and Parliamentary opposition to HMS Endurance's withdrawal and at consequences for our position on the Falklands" (Carrington 1982).

Stopping once for all humiliations and status denial; sending a strong signal to the world: "we are back in control"

Going to war for the Falklands to send an appropriate signal about British great power status.

Sending the entire Royal Navy to the Falklands was a very risky decision. Nothing could have predicted nor guaranteed a British success. The islands are 13,000 km from Britain and the nearest supply port and airport Britain could use were at the Ascension islands, 6,000 km away from the Falklands, putting British strategic bombers out of range. Compared to the British, the Argentinians would operate at "only" 700 km from their bases. Winning a war in these conditions would certainly restore British prestige in the world. It would first prove that Britain has the capacity to project its hard power far away, but demonstrated it also had the financial capacity

and resolve to do so: it has to be remembered that the decision to send the Royal Navy had been taken very quickly. The islands were invaded on 2 April and the task force sailed three days later, on 5 April. As the UK was considered to be in decline, a victory in the Falklands would be considered as an astonishing achievement and would surely make the entire world forget about the Suez fiasco and restore the image of a strong and victorious United Kingdom.

It seems that British politicians were conscious that the Falklands crisis was the perfect opportunity to restore British credibility as a great power, before, during and after the deployment of British forces. Before the Argentine invasion, Robert Armstrong, the Secretary of the Cabinet, wrote a minute to Margaret Thatcher in which he argued that the way Britain would settle the Falklands dispute would be decisive for British status and prestige: "a British readiness to surrender sovereignty over the Falklands Islands might have implications for the British position elsewhere in the world [...]. What would the international reactions be if the UK showed itself willing to negotiate with the Argentines over sovereignty of the Falklands Islands? Would this be regarded as another example of enlightened statesmanship, or simply another sign that GB is on the skids?" (Armstrong 1980). This note is very interesting because it is annotated by Thatcher and she underlined the last proposition, making clear that, to her, a retreat from the Falklands would be interpreted by the international community as a display of weakness. After the departure of the fleet, Members of Parliament also made the argument that the Falklands crisis would determine British future international standing. For example, Member of Parliament Winston Churchill (the grandson of the WWII Prime Minister) declared that failing to re-conquer the Falklands "would have repercussion [...]. Britain's standing and credibility in the world [...] will be judged by the resolution and determination with which we meet this challenge [...]" (HC Deb 7 April 1982, vol 21 cc 959-1052). And after the conflict, the argument that the victory in the Falklands reestablished Britain as a great power was repeatedly used by Thatcher in her speeches and in her autobiography: "our country has won a great victory and we are entitled to be proud [...]. Britain [still is] the nation that built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world" (Thatcher 1982c). She continued in praising what made Britain special compared to other countries: "the British are competent, courageous and resolute" [...] The lesson of the Falklands is

that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history".⁵

Showing British commitment to great power status commitment: defending international law principles by going to war against Argentina.

According to the definition of great power status, a great power has special duties and roles to perform. An expected duty from great powers is to manage the international system and thus to enforce the principles ruling it (Dafoe et al. 2014; Morris 2011). Two arguments evoking the duties of great powers were used by Britain to justify their decision to go to war: (1) defending the right of people to self-determination, and (2) protecting democracy from dictatorship.

(1) One can find reference to the right of people to self-determination in Thatcher's speeches before she became Prime Minister. In 1977, she was in the Shadow Cabinet and challenged the Labour government on its position regarding the Falklands during a Shadow Cabinet discussion the 23 February: "we should press the Foreign Secretary on his intentions and support the wish of the Islanders to remain British" (Shadow Cabinet 1977). "The wishes of the Falklands islanders are paramount" is one of the most frequently cited sentences by Thatcher. She used this expression in private as well as during public intervention. A good example of that is of her speech on 3 March 1982 in the House of Commons: "the people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. They are few in number but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right". She also reminds us of this position in her autobiography (Thatcher 1993: 175-176). Other British officials also referred to this position, such as the Falklands Governor Rex Hunt: "when he [the

5 See also her autobiography for another formulation of the same argument: "the significance of the Falklands was enormous, both for Britain's self-confidence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fiasco in 1956, the British Foreign policy had been one long retreat [...] we had come to be seen by both friends and enemies as a nation, which lacked the will and the capability to defend its interests in peace, let alone in war. Victory in the Falklands changed that" (Thatcher 1993: 173-175). The importance the Falklands crisis had is emphasized by the place Thatcher dedicated to it in her autobiography (40 pages in total). This suggests that there was a before and after watershed in the Falklands for Britain.

governor] left the Falklands, he said that the people were in tears. They do not want to be Argentinean" (Thatcher 1982a).

(2) While the fleet was on its way to the Falklands, two resolutions were adopted by the UN Security Council: resolution 502 on 3 April and resolution 505 on 26 May. The first one consisted of demanding from Argentina a complete withdrawal from the Falklands and the second one calling Britain and Argentina to agree on a ceasefire before negotiations could start. In this context, The British government declared that the first use of the fleet dispatched is to be used as diplomatic support as Cecil Parkinson wrote to the Conservative constituency chairman: "it is a test for the whole nation. [...] any diplomatic solution must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the islanders shall remain paramount" [...] "the eyes of the world are now focused on the Falklands islands [...] to see whether brute force or the rule of law will triumph. Whether naked aggression occurs it must be overcome" (Parkinson 1982).⁶ The fact that Argentina refused to follow resolution 502 and to evacuate the Falklands gave Britain the opportunity to take the role of the protector of international law and democracy against the aggression from authoritarianism (symbolized by Argentina). The rhetoric used by Thatcher reveals a clear description of the situation: "I'm standing up for the right of self-determination. I'm standing up for our territory. I'm standing up for our people. I'm standing up for international law. I'm standing up for all those territories - those small territories and peoples the world over - whom, if someone doesn't stand up and say to an invader 'enough, stop', would be at risk".⁷ In a telegram to Ronald Reagan she wrote in May 1982, she saw the Falklands crisis as the continuation of the fight of democracy and freedom against dictatorship: "we shall fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe" (Thatcher 1982b).

She went further in the assimilation of the Falklands crisis to the fight for freedom and democracy against dictatorship by making an analogy to Munich (1938). In Munich, Neville Chamberlain sacrificed a large portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany to "save" the peace, or so he thought (Breuning 2007: 56). Thatcher identified

6 The letter details Thatcher's motives to send the Royal Navy to the Falklands. Cecil Parkinson is at that time junior trade minister and a member of the war cabinet during the crisis.

7 About Thatcher clear-cutting understanding of the world see Stephen Benedict Dyson (2009: 40-41), Antony King (1985: 132) and Francis Pym (1984).

herself as being in the same situation as Chamberlain, but this time Britain would not step down as the US Secretary of State Haig wrote after a meeting with Thatcher: "she rapped sharply on the tabletop and recalled that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and spoke of Czechoslovakia as a faraway people about we know so little". Recalling that this omission had led to the eventual "death of 45 million people, she identified the Argentine challenge as a repeat performance" (Young 1989: 72) and compared Galtieri to Hitler: "a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister" (Thatcher 1993: 181).

Conclusion

This paper aimed to highlight the importance of an often disregarded argument to explain causes of war: considerations for status and prestige. Evidence supporting the argument that Britain re-conquered the Falklands to save its great power status can be found in the declassified documents. This article also aimed to make studies based on analysis of primary sources more popular, or at least to make such studies be more widely considered in the academic field. Declassified documents are unique sources for researches as they provide authentic insights on decision-making processes. In this article, I have followed a qualitative discourse analysis path. It would be very interesting to continue the analysis of the Falklands case study, but next time by using these documents for a quantitative study. A quantitative study would enable us measure and to make comparisons between lexicon fields referring to prestige considerations, domestic politics concerns and strategic concerns, to ascertain which one is the most prominent.

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The Quo Vadis of Democratization in Post-Egypt Arab Spring

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Abstract

This paper aims at examining how democratization in post-uprising Egypt remains flawed and the reasons for this failure. As a background, democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt has collapsed and it seems now merely an illusion. The situation worsened since Egypt's democratically elected President Morsi was expelled from office through a coup, following mass protests demanding Morsi's discharge. Egypt's democratization is hard to achieve due to the shadow of the Pharaoh in Egypt, that is, entrenched ruling elites; Egypt's democratization process can never succeed while Egypt's old ruling elites are reluctant to allow this to happen.

KEY WORDS:

democracy, transition, Egypt, Arab Spring

Introduction

The period after the 2011 Arab Spring toppling of Hosni Mubarak brought high expectations among Egyptians to rebuild Egypt as a democratic country. Although expectations were quite high, the military coup led by Abdul Fatah El-Sisi on 3 July 2013 towards Egypt's first democratically-elected president, Mohammad Morsi, retarded the process of democratic transition in Egypt.

Since then, despite seizing power, the military has installed an interim government led by Adly Mansour, the former head of the Egyptian supreme constitutional court. The military-backed interim government guided the country along the roadmap drafted by the military. In the meantime, the victory of Abdul Fatah El-Sisi in Egypt's 2014 presidential election, which was backed by the military, failed to lead the nation through democratic transition. Under Sisi, Egyptian authorities decided to criminalize the Moslem Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential Islamist group in Egypt. In 2014, the courts decided to dissolve the Moslem Brotherhood's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – to which Morsi belongs – and the party was also excluded from Egypt's 2015 parliamentary elections in order to prevent the rise of “extremists” (Aly and Essaila 2016).

Afterwards, conditions worsened when the mass media became controlled by the government. Moreover, a great number of civilians were in detention, undergoing military trials, following the banning of civil society and pro-democracy organizations by the authorities, and the passing of several laws restricting the rights of Egyptians.

This paper contains six sections. In the first section the paper provides an overview of Egypt's democratization process prior to the 2011 Arab Spring in Egypt. In the second part, the paper discusses the turmoil of Egypt's 25 January revolution that led to the fall of Mubarak's regime. It also examines the flawed democratic transition in the hands of the military under SCAF and the environment in which Morsi was elected as Egypt's first democratically elected president.

While the third section examines Morsi's administration's policies when he was in power, and his missteps in building relations with the military and opposition, the fourth part observes the role of Egypt's military in Morsi's discharge, the election of president Abdul Fatah El-Sisi, and the military's dominance over Egyptian politics and economics that is hindering the prospect of democratization in the country.

The exclusion of Islamic groups and the restriction of civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) during President Sisi's period are described and explained in the fifth section of this paper. The last and sixth section provides a deep analysis of the research question and a theoretical framework for understanding the problems raised.

This paper aims at presenting a brief description and analysis to explain the failing process of democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt. It also presents a brief overview of recent events and the development of Egypt's democratization during the leadership of the current president, Sisi. The main purpose of this paper is to find the cause of democratic degeneration in post-2011 Egypt, which has resulted in the Arab Spring to appear as an illusion. This study applies a qualitative comparative approach method to address the problem of the study. As will be explained later in the paper, a comparative approach was used to deepen and strengthen the hypothesis of this study, which was done through analysing the failed transition of recent events. Ultimately, the theories and concepts of democratization, democratic transition, and civil society are the most suitable concepts to be applied in this paper.

Literature review

In the meantime, due to an unachievable consensus over a definition of democracy among scholars, there are a lot of interpretations of democracy, resulting in different kinds, types, and conceptualization on what democracy actually is.

Larry Diamond's *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation* gave a definition of electoral democracy, which previously was posed by Joseph Schumpeter as a minimalist democracy. This is to say that a country is claimed to be a democratic one when it is at least able to address certain requirements such as a multi-party system and regular elections to assume government office. This minimalist democracy, also known as procedural democracy, is considered to be suitable for a country that has just entered the democratic transition stage (Diamond 1999: 9–10).

However, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argued that democracy cannot be merely viewed from the elements of procedural democracy such as elections and a multi-party system. Democracy should have a constitution to guarantee the basic freedoms, rights, and protections towards the rights of minority groups. Essentially, democracy has to be interpreted substantially. This means that democracy should be applied in everyday life and be part of the political culture that can guarantee the basic rights and ensure the freedoms of individuals and groups (Stepan 2000: 39).

Regarding this substantial democracy, the Egyptian Constitutions of 1971, 2012 and 2014 have illustrated Egypt as a democratic state. The constitutions clearly describe the substantial democracy that addresses the basic rights and freedoms of any individual. Equal opportunity, freedom of thought, participation of women, freedom of the press, protection from violence, etc. are some of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Egyptian constitutions. It means that these constitutions have guaranteed human rights values and supported Islamic *Shari'a* in a liberal perspective (Lombardi and Brown 2005). Although liberalization processes in Egypt can be traced from the era of Anwar Sadat through various elections, a multiparty system, and economic development, the fulfillment of basic rights and freedoms has constantly been violated. The infringement of these rights and freedoms have become more intense during the turmoil since Mubarak's resignation, the events of Morsi's downfall, and Abdul Fatah El-Sisi's coming to power.

Jeffrey Haynes argues that the development of a democratization process cannot be separated from these four stages: (1) political liberalization; (2) the collapse of the non-democratic regime; (3) democratic transition and; (4) democratic consolidation (Haynes 2013: 2). In that process, after

the collapse of the authoritarian regime, the country has entered the stage of a transition process. The study of democratic transition has been increasingly widespread and developed especially during the third wave of democratization from 1974 until the 1990s when more than thirty non-democratic countries turned to democracy (Huntington 1991: 12).

In the case of Egypt, the downfall of Mubarak's non-democratic regime put the country into a transitional period, particularly when the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, led the transitional process until the next presidential election was held (Stein 2012: 5). Grasping the meaning of transition introduced by O'Donnell and Schmitter, in which they define transition as the interval between the fall of an authoritarian regime and the establishment of a new regime (whether democratic, authoritarian, revolutionary or hybrid) (O'Donnell et al. 1986: 6), the transitional period in Egypt ended when SCAF handed over power to Morsi, Egypt's first democratically-elected president.

However, the transition process is deemed to be quite a difficult and long process, as one of the outcomes is conflict among political parties and interest groups (O'Donnell 1994: 60). This happens because the transition process is marked by an increase of public participation, political liberalization, enhancement of civil rights, as well as the implementation of democratic procedures in public spheres. Yet, each country has its different implementation of the transition process in accordance with the conditions prevailing in that country. Hence, noting the events in the post-Morsi era, Egypt is still completely in the process of the so-called democratic transition.

Stephen J. King's *The New Authoritarian in the Middle East and North Africa* emphasizes that authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is both persistent and dynamic (King 2009: 5). He argues that most countries in the region began to proceed into democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the region did not directly turn into a democratic one. Rather, he argues that the system invented a new model of authoritarianism, replacing its predecessor, 'old authoritarianism' (King 2009: 31–32).

Samuel Huntington's *Democracy's Third Wave* pointed out that the emergence of liberalization in some of the Middle East and African countries in the 1990s was the impact of the 'snowballing' of democratization taking place in other countries such as in Eastern Europe (Huntington 1991: 16).

Michael Schulz's *The Role of Civil Society in Regional Governance in the Middle East*, in the volume *Civil Society and International Governance* edited by David Armstrong and Valeria Bello, aims to highlight the development and the furtherance of civil society in the Middle East. He explains that the emergence of civil society in the Middle East in the 1990s was supposed to be the forerunner for the development of democracy in the region. However, the enhancement of civil society in the region is not as vivid as in many other regions in the world, as it is often controlled and movements are restricted by the state apparatus (*Muhkabarati*) (Schulz 2011: 166–171).

Amy Hawthorn's *Middle Eastern Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer* stresses that in many Arab countries, the growing number of civil society organizations do not lead the country to democratization. State repression has become the main challenge, limiting the space and activities of civil society. The durable authoritarianism in the region has weakened the role of civil society (Hawthorne 2004: 10). Meanwhile, the role of civil society is significant to the country as it reinforces democracy through public scrutiny (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 324).

Many believe that the upheaval that surged in most Middle Eastern countries in late 2010 was the path for the region to be able to open up to democratization. In his book *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, Mehran Kamrava offers an analysis that durable authoritarianism in the Middle East was maintained by the ruling bargain in which the government guarantees the prosperity of the people. Instead, the ruling autocrats could only maintain their durable authoritarianism by banning political parties and taking control of civil society, NGOs, and trade unions (Kamrava 2014: 20).

Kamrava then mentions the rise and fall of the ruling bargain which also became the cause of the emergence of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. He points out two advancements behind the upheavals in the region. The

first significant factor is the ease in getting information on other events in the region, which relates to the enhancement of education and the rapid emergence of both traditional and new media in the region. Second, the states that were affected by the unfolding crisis had a dynamic response (Kamrava 2014: 39).

Departing from this point, it is clear that the new media (social media) has had a great impact in advancing information to the region. Facebook and Twitter are the tools which made a contagion effect, starting from the Tunisian revolution, to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and eventually becoming more dynamic. Hand in hand with Kamrava, Lachen Achy (Achy 2012) argues that the inability of these Middle Eastern rulers to maintain their authoritarian bargain is affected by several factors, namely economy, demography, and education.

In Egypt, though Mubarak's overthrow has moved the country into a democratic transitional stage, the transition and democratic process in Egypt remain uncertain. Even after the victory of Morsi in Egypt's first democratic elections in 2013, the insurgency in Egyptian political, social, and economic spheres were undeniable. No matter how much the Egyptian democratic movements insisted on turning the country into a democratic one, the authoritarians' tone still remains strong in Egypt's democratization process.

One of the factors hindering the democratization process is the military. The roles of Egypt's military in dominating the everyday life of Egypt's people have been beyond doubt for decades. Amos Perlmutter, in *Egypt, The Praetorian State*, argues that Egypt is a praetorian state where the potential for the state to be dominated by the military remains high. He argues that in countries where civil governments fail to legitimate themselves, the military appears and intervenes in civilian affairs and often dominates them (Perlmutter 1974: 4–5). He still argues that mostly, praetorian elements exist in developing and underdeveloped countries, where the executive body is ineffective and compounded by political decay. In addition, when the authoritarian regime falls, the army tends to intervene in the transition process as the political sphere is stuck in a fragile condition (Perlmutter 1977: 18).

Hand in hand with Perlmutter, Samuel Huntington, in *Political Order and Changing Societies*, argues that military involvement is not only based on military affairs but also for political purposes. Thus, these so-called praetorian measures are not only undertaken by the military but also by social forces that are highly politicized and influenced by the military. This is what Huntington calls a praetorian society; further, such mobilization along the interests of the military would worsen already weak government institutions and their ability to articulate public interest (Huntington 2006: 195–196).

In the case of Egypt, although the military dominates Egypt's structural, institutional and even constitutional spheres, but we cannot say that Egypt is totally ruled by the military, like the military Junta in Myanmar. Unfortunately, still, the military's ascendancy goes hand-in-hand with the prolonged existence of authoritarianism in Egypt, along with the ruling elites, the so-called "deep state", which indeed cannot be seen except in an abstract way. These types of military roles have maintained the endurance of the authoritarian regime and hindered the process of democratization in Egypt.

As Georg Sørensen points out, the success of a democratic transition process cannot be separated from the interference of elite groups (military, economic, and political elites) in order to protect their interests. In most cases, these countries have democratic elements but transition is limited in its completion. Public participation and freedom, which are the foundations of building political democracy, are limited. This kind of democracy is called by Sørensen a restricted democracy (Sørensen 2008: 46–49). This kind of democracy was used by the Mubarak regime to maintain its power over 34 years, an authoritarianism hidden behind democratic ideas.

These kinds of concepts are used in explaining the developments, and reversals, of Egypt's democratic process.

Egypt's democratic experience

Egypt's democratic experience started once the country gained independence from British occupation in 1922. It can be seen through the implementation of the 1923 constitution in which a parliamentary democratic system was established, allowing civilians to have greater liberty (Dunne and Hamzawy 2008: 18). However, liberalization could not help Egypt escape from economic and social problems, since the influences of British colonialism remained for the next thirty years. This situation eventually led to a coup conducted by the Free Officer Movement against the monarchy regime in 1952. Since then, Egypt has been led by autocrats with a military background (Hassan 2010: 320).

In Gamal Abdul Nasser's years in power, the development of democratization was challenged by some of Nasser's policies, restricting the development of basic democratic elements. Nasser then abolished political pluralism that had been developed in the previous monarchic era, by imposing a one-party political system with the dissolution of parliament and banning the existence of opposition groups, both Islamist and leftist. Indirectly, the policy had given Nasser all executive power and made him Egypt's greatest power holder (Selim 2015: 30–31).

This condition is compatible with the idea of Mehran Kamrava's assertion of the use of an authoritarian bargain by Nasser, in his populist days between 1950s-1960s, in order to forward his political interests. In such a condition, his power was strengthened and coloured by these political patterns (Kamrava 2014: 20).

Following Nasser's death, his successor, Anwar Sadat, marked a turning point, transforming Egypt's political, economic, and foreign policies towards political and economic liberalization that was opposite to Nasser's socialism (Hassan 2010: 321). One of Sadat's liberalization policies, The *Infitah* (open-door) was introduced in order to enhance foreign investment. Thus, economic liberalization is closely related to the shift of Egypt's foreign policy from Russia under Nasser, to the west, which in this case is America, under Sadat (Baker 1981: 378). The decision to

turn from the east to the west forced Egypt to re-consider its openness to democratization, since America embraced the democratic agenda. In this way, as a form of acceptance to the American side, economic and political liberalization became priority matters in Sadat's years in power.

In order to enhance political liberalization, Sadat attempted to introduce a multiparty system. It was marked by the publication of Law 40/1977, in which five political parties were established. The Social Liberalist Party stood for the right, the National Progressive Party represented the left, the Socialist Labor Party, New Wafd Party and the centrist Egypt Arab Socialist Party, which afterwards Sadat changed to the National Democratic Party (NDP) were directed by Sadat himself (Selim 2015: 32). However, Sadat's rule was not so different from his predecessor Nasser, as he decided to diminish the role of the opposition, individual parties and the media by releasing a number of decrees of restriction and repression (Selim 2015: 33).

The reasons for this political shift were that, at the outset of his power, Sadat needed the political legitimacy and support from the Egyptian people, in coping with any domestic issues regarding political instability (Barnett and Levy 1991: 379). He would change his image from an authoritarian, to democratic leader, although he realized that it was not easy. In fact, he indeed had to tackle serious problems regarding Egypt's economic condition and security, leading him back to behaving similarly to Nasser as an authoritarian leader.

Despite the liberalizations receiving a positive reception, mainly from the west, the consequences to Egyptian's domestic conditions were quite severe. The reduction of subsidies on basic commodities resulted in the appearance of massive demonstrations and riots in Egyptian cities in early 1977. Thus, government policies to reduce subsidies were to show financial responsibility to major aid agencies and foreign investors from wealthy donor countries like the USA, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The mass protests resulted in casualties, with 79 people killed, 1000 wounded and 1250 jailed (Baker 1981: 381).

Anwar Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, implemented policies aimed to restore stability. Mubarak released political prisoners and called for national reconciliation among political opponents. He then increased

press freedoms and allowed the establishment of political parties, which led to the presence of 24 political parties during Mubarak's ruling years (Selim 2015: 34).

However, although there were several elements of electoral democracy found in his leadership, through legislative and presidential elections, Mubarak's fifth victory in Egypt's presidential elections cannot be separated from suppression towards opposition groups, judges, journalists, and the Moslem Brotherhood, who all challenged the continuity of his power (Arafat 2011: 20–151). In his book, Arafat mentioned some factors hindering democratic transition during Mubarak's rule, such as weak opposition parties and civil society, the difficulty of concluding a peaceful transition, rampant corruption, de-liberalization policies, and the threat of retribution (Arafat 2011: 137–153).

The depiction of Mubarak's electoral democracy was the picture of authoritarianism in the age of democratization. In a sense, in the midst of the demands of the people as well as huge international pressure for the country to move closer towards democracy, the authoritarian regime in Egypt used the electoral system as a shield, branding the country as one in the consolidation process of democratization, even though the reality was quite different (Brownlee 2007: 2)

The aforementioned policies were depicted by Larry Diamond as pseudo democracy, in which the existence of a non-democratic regime is covered by formal democratic elements such as elections and a multi-party system (Diamond 1999: 17). In the case of Egypt, the ruling party, NDP, maintained its hegemony in most of Egypt's parliamentary elections. Thus, the tactics of the NDP and Mubarak cannot be separated from repression, patronage, and media control by the Mubarak regime.

Post-Egypt uprising: flawed transition

The wave of democratization, also known as *Arab Spring*, surged through

the Arab world in the last quarter of 2010, leading to mass protests demanding the downfall of various authoritarian regimes in the region. Egypt was no exception, experiencing severe protests after being controlled by Hosni Mubarak for 30 years (Nassif 2013).

The major reason why this large-scale mass-protest took to the streets demanding the autocrat's downfall, is due to the rupture of the ruling bargain between the regime and the people. In recent decades, the durable autocrats in the Arab world proffer social services to the people in lieu of minimizing the role of citizens in the decision making-process (Yahya 2017: 3)

In Egypt, the protests demanding the ouster of Hosni Mubarak showed the fury of the people as Mubarak failed to preserve the ruling bargain he had maintained for decades. The flawed authoritarian bargain in Arab States, and particularly in Egypt, was due to the inability of these autocratic regimes to cope with demographic growth, a youth bulge, and unemployment over the past decades. The situation was also worsened by the ruler's combining of repression, economic benefits, and political concessions (Achy 2012).

The key elements of the revolution, such as youth, social media, activism, civil society, and NGOs, were consolidating their power to ouster the last 'Pharaoh of Egypt'. It can be assumed that the repression and the reluctance of the regime to embrace human rights and democracy had become the main reason for Egyptians to reveal their prolonged frustration, after 34 years of Mubarak's authoritarianism. In the midst of massive protests and the spontaneous military decision to side with the people, Mubarak then resigned from his office in February 2011. Mubarak's resignation had brought a huge expectation in the hearts of Egyptians to turn the country from authoritarianism to democracy (El-Sherif 2014: 3).

In the post-Mubarak period, the higher military council, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), held power during the transition period, after suspending the 1971 constitution and dissolving parliament. SCAF held a referendum and assured the freedom of the media and the youth, as well as paved the way for the legislative and presidential elections that took place afterwards (Kuncahyono 2013).

For the first time, the people and the military seemed to be allied. The slogan “*the army and the people are one hand*” depicted the intimacy of these two allies. Moreover, in the months following Mubarak’s ouster, the SCAF had promised to ensure the freedom of the media, youth and NGOs. However, in the following days, in the midst of political indeterminacy, as well as the postponement of a legislative election that was supposed to be held around six months after Mubarak’s resignation, the people were frightened by ongoing military domination (McCormick 2011).

As a result, the rate of various mass protests and demonstrations significantly increased, and according to data from Amnesty International, SCAF took repressive measures against the media and civil society groups whose positions differed with SCAF’s. In addition, various violations, including virginity tests held by the military towards women protesters in *Tahrir Square*, had insulted and harassed the rights of Egyptian women specifically (Mannheimer 2014: 18). Furthermore, the enactment of a state of emergency, as well as the military tribunals that tried civilians, which have existed since the Mubarak era, were considered to undermine the democratic expectations of the Egyptians. Ever since this period, the proximity of these two allies has been damaged.

From this flawed transition, the public wondered about the meaning of the January 25 revolution for the interests of the people. Indeed, the transition is producing a different level of achievement when compared to the Tunisian Uprising. The democratization process in Tunisia has been relatively more successful because of the smaller political role and intervention of the military.

In Tunisia, the military seems reluctant to be deeply involved in political affairs in the Tunisian transitional process. Zine El Abidine Bin Ali tried to dissociate the armed forces from political and economic affairs (Mannheimer 2014: 19). It was totally different in Egypt, where the military has played many roles in the transition and in fact dominated Egypt’s economy ever since Nasser was in power.

In the case of Egypt, from the beginning of Mubarak’s ouster, Egyptians have lost their opportunity to turn the country into a democratic one, due to the intervention of the military. However, it was not the people who

chose the military to implement Egypt's transition. It was Mubarak who handed power to the SCAF, and the people had forgotten for a while that the military was part of Mubarak's legacy. At first, the people seemed glad and did not recognize SCAF's motives to maintain power. Moreover, the Egyptian military has had longstanding influence in protecting the country. But then, the broken promises by SCAF has made the people realize that they had ignored the worst things when the military comes to power - that it would be difficult for them to withdraw.

In the final quarter of 2011, which popularized the slogan "*Down! Down with military rule*", SCAF then held an election, both legislative and presidential. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the party affiliated with the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) won the largest number of seats in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. In the presidential election that was held afterwards, Mohammad Morsi, the FJP candidate, claimed victory over Hosni Mubarak's Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, and was declared Egypt's first democratically-elected president (Kuncahyono 2013: 204)

Egypt under Morsi: losing an opportunity

The victory of Morsi marked the first successful democratic transition in post-Arab Spring Egypt. Though he gained the presidency, Morsi still faced various economic, political and social problems left by the Mubarak regime. In the post-Mubarak era, Morsi was not only confronted by the demands of the people, but also had to deal with and build relations with Mubarak's remnants, called the *deep state*, that had been deeply rooted in Egypt's political, economy and social sphere.

While all parties anticipated the success of a democratic transition in Egypt, this has not emerged as easily as imagined. Since the very beginning, when Morsi came to power, the political polarization among Egyptian elites was noticeable and became one of the main challenges of Morsi's policy. Secular groups who felt betrayed by the military and the Moslem

Brotherhood combined forces and formed an opposition group, the National Salvation Front (NSF), which later became Morsi's main political opposition in the country. The NSF boycotted Morsi's referendum on the draft constitution, held in late December 2012, arguing that the new constitutional draft was only benefiting Islamist party groups, dominated by the Moslem Brotherhood (Gerbaudo 2013).

Since then, the state has seen further divisions and polarizations which have ruined the democratic transition process. Consequently, those divisions have complicated Egypt's political decision making process. When one side of the party feels disadvantaged by a policy made by the other side, the deep rupture among the polarized parties cannot be avoided. The peak of public outrage happened during Morsi's 22 November constitutional decrees that granted him extensive powers, beyond the control of Egypt's courts. Those controversial decrees were considered by many in the opposition as the resurgence of a new Pharaoh (Gerbaudo 2013).

After Mubarak, the economic factors behind Mubarak's downfall caused greater devastation to the transitional process. These unresolved economic problems were worsened during Morsi's years in power. The high prices of basic foods, high rates of unemployment, and electricity and oil crises triggered more complaints and political instability. The percentage of the population living in poverty increased from 25.2% in 2010/2012, to 26.3% in 2012/2013, and the state debt increased from US \$5 billion/year up to \$8 billion/year a few days after the coup. Loans from the IMF and other sources of funds still cannot fix these problems (Farid 2014).

In Egypt, the Islamist party was unable to deal with political factions, in contrast with the Tunisian Ennahda Islamist party, which also won the first election in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. The very first time the Ennahda party was in charge, it managed to share power with various factions and created political partnerships with moderate secularist and moderate Islamist groups (Ghannouchi 2014).

Morsi failed to deal with the opposition, a failure compounded by his policies which tried to minimize the role of the military. The cases above have led to the emergence of anti-Morsi demonstrations, namely

tamarrod which later led to the coup conducted by the Egyptian military (Mannheimer 2014: 17).

When the military decided to remove Morsi from power, Egypt lost the opportunity to build a democratic institution in the post-SCAF transition era. It seems difficult to describe what kind of democratic character Egypt has, if its first democratically-elected president was ousted not less than a year after he came to power.

Egyptian democracy: dependent on the military

The development of Egypt's democratization cannot be separated from the massive influence of the military since the fall of the monarchy in 1952. Since then, Egypt has been dominated by military autocrats and by a president who came from a military background until the downfall of Mubarak in 2011. In the Nasser era, Egypt was depicted as a military society. In such a political culture, the involvement of the military inside Egypt's political administration in the era of Nasser happened easily. Beyond that, Nasser also entangled the military in many countries with giant economic projects.

In the era of Sadat, despite the de-politicization of the military started by Sadat, the military still had many privileges and built the military-economic empire. It is estimated that around 40% of the total Egyptian economy came from business companies controlled by the military. It was also supported by \$1.3 billion in US military assistance annually since Sadat signed the Camp David accords in 1979 (Pappalarado 2011).

The position of the military grew stronger under Mubarak's regime. The military was granted many privileges, not only in the political, but also in the economic sphere (Sayigh 2012: 84). Since then, the military has built what Trias Kuncahyono expressed as "a state within a state", that has great impact on economic and social structures in Egypt (Kuncahyono 2013: 208).

In the midst of deepened polarization and division with the mass protests demanding Morsi's resignation, military aircraft flew over the crowds and dropped the Egyptian flag, denoting that the military had decided to take the people's side. The anniversary of Mubarak's resignation on 30 June 2012 served as the culmination of protests towards Morsi's government. On the next day, General Abdul Fatah El-Sisi came on public television and announced a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi, to take an immediate decision on Egypt's politics (Fisher 2013).

Morsi ignored El-Sisi's ultimatum, which forced the military to stage a coup against him and develop the roadmap for Egypt's future. After suspending the 2012 Egyptian constitution, the military then appointed Adly Mansour, the head of the Egyptian Supreme Court, to become an interim president, and formed a cabinet mostly consisting of Mubarak's remnants and retired military generals (El-Adawy 2013).

The military has enormous power in building Egypt's democratization process. It can be said that the success of Egypt's democratic transition is decided by the military. When Abdul Fatah El-Sisi gained a massive victory in the 2014 presidential election, the prospect of Egypt's democratization process was questioned. El-Sisi, who is backed by the military and its allies that were also behind the downfall of Morsi, increasingly indicated that the country was still under the shadow of the old ruling elites.

The shadow of the old regime has led to a flawed process of democratic transition in post-Arab Spring Egypt. It can be said that the repressive measures used by the SCAF, and the military coup towards Morsi, have depicted Egypt taking a hard-line approach to the country's ongoing transitional process. As noted by O'Donnell and Schmitter, the use of hard-line and soft-line approaches within the political elite have a large influence on the democratic transition process (O'Donnell et al. 1991). The soft-line approach makes it easy to facilitate, negotiate and compromise between split factions. In contrast, the use of a hard-line approach shows a country is reluctant to use diplomatic processes in implementing its transition process.

Alongside the use of a hard-line approach rather than a soft-line one, the military and the ruling elites or the *old guards*, still maintain their position

in the hearts of the Egyptians. This is not only because the military has a long-standing history in protecting the country, but also due to the anti-Morsi protesters who had lost hope in an Islamist President's leadership. They also feared *Ikhwanization* that would Islamize the country in the same way as Iran after the 1979 Iranian revolutions. These were compounded with the support of the opposition groups and the United States, who has enjoyed long relations with the Egyptian military (Al-Amin 2013).

In accordance with the statement of Perlmutter as previously mentioned, the praetorian military appears and survives in a country where their institutions are weak and fragile or is still in the transitional process. Taking into account the fact that Egypt's military has deep connections in politics and the economy, and has tightened their relationships with the external actors, along with Egyptian ruling elites, it is clear that the success of transition and the democratic process is all in the hands of Egypt's military.

The question emerges: how could the military's role endure and maintain durable autocrats in Egypt, even after the country succeeded in toppling Mubarak and Morsi. Even the new President Sisi has insisted that the country has turned into a democratic one. In fact, ever since Egypt's first republic was formed, the ruling elites that mostly come from the military, are reluctant to turn the country into a democracy. As Egypt's major power holder, they would never let a civilian with no military background control them. Therefore, in the midst of international demands for a democratic system, they tend to let democracy arise by diminishing the role of dictatorial leaders and installing many characteristics of a democratic system. In fact, they construct scenarios to keep their power in place, much like how the military staged a coup of Morsi's government. Therefore, even when the dictatorial leaders have been overthrown, the military's power and interests are still in place, and governments with military backing remain.

The exclusion of islamists

After the military staged a coup of Egypt's first democratically elected President, Morsi, there was strong resistance from Morsi's Islamist supporters, who assumed that military actions were not legitimate. Morsi's supporters undertook massive protests and demonstrations, demanding the restoration of Morsi's power as Egypt's president. Instead of receiving a positive response from Egyptian authorities, these groups suffered repression from security forces, both military and police.

The clashes between the security forces and Morsi's supporters heated up when Adly Mansour declared a state of emergency, which was applied during Mubarak's years in power. The declaration of a state of emergency was applied following the sit-in and mass protest of Morsi's supporters, demanding the restoration of Morsi (Bassiouni 2013: 1–4).

A thousand rallies held by Morsi supporters took place in two main locations, Raba'a Al-Adawiya and An-Nahda Square Cairo. The security forces moved directly to both locations without giving any notice or opportunity for protesters to leave the location peacefully. Those repressive actions were met with provocative actions by the demonstrators, making casualties inevitable. More than 300 people died and 1000 others were injured during the protest that occurred on 14 August 2013 (Bassiouni 2013: 4).

The media, with great influence in shaping public opinion on the recent events, has been polarized since Morsi came to power. Media such as Aljazeera Egypt, Misr25, Al-Hafiz, Ar-Rahma and An-Nas, which are considered to be sympathetic to the Moslem Brotherhood, were banned from broadcasting (Radsch 2013).

The intensity of societal polarization increased when Egypt's High Court announced the banning of the largest Islamic movement, the Moslem Brotherhood, and labelled the group as a terrorist organization. Brotherhood members and leaders were arrested and their assets were frozen. Moreover, their affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice

Party (FJP) was dissolved by the court and could not participate in legislative elections (El-Dine 2014: 3).

The decisions of El-Sisi's authorities in excluding the Moslem Brotherhood from Egypt's political arena was feared to be the same experience as Algeria back in 1992, when the military there boycotted the electoral victory of the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), in Algeria in 1991. The Algerian military then suspended the constitution, forced the president from power and took over the transitional government. The Algerian Islamic groups that had been repressed and persecuted turned to the extremist groups and performed terrors that led to a prolonged Algerian conflict (Zaretsky 2013).

The Algerian bad experience was feared to be reoccurring in Egypt when Sisi's authority excluded the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt's domestic political sphere. The deepening polarization of and discrimination towards marginalized Islamist groups, has resulted in a prolonged conflict that is hindering the future prospects of Egypt's democratization.

Why has the recent transition failed?

In his short speech before members of Egypt's newest parliament in the first quarter of 2016, President Abdul Fatah El-Sisi revealed that Egypt has successfully passed the transition phase and has established a democracy. The president also claimed that the country has rebuilt the foundations of democratic elements such as institutional and constitutional law (The New Arab 2016). Egypt itself has been without a parliament since its dissolution in 2012.

Has the Egyptian transition to democracy been successfully achieved, despite the government's massive repression?

Previously, in the period of the post-Morsi era, when Egypt was managed by the military-backed interim government in the absence of parliament,

and in the face of civil unrest, Mansour issued a number of laws that have curtailed the liberty of civilians. The protest law, released in November 2013, regulates a set of regulations for forming an association and a set of regulations to be followed when holding protests and demonstrations. It also stipulates the number of people and places allowed to hold such events (Brown 2014).

In addition to the protest law, there are university regulations issued by the Supreme Council of the Universities, one of the bodies under the Ministry of Higher Education of Egypt, allowing interdiction and prohibition of demonstrations and associations related to political parties (Brown 2014).

If we look at the prospect of stability and democratization in Egypt, Egypt still has a long way to achieve real democracy. In the era of Sisi, the number of detained, tortured, and arrested journalists has significantly increased. The suppression of opposition groups has been carried out by the issuance of various laws restricting the people's freedom of expression. The oppression to the Moslem Brotherhood and the labelling of the FJP as a terrorist group were forms of suppression of Islamist groups in Egypt.

In the third quarter of 2015, Sisi approved additional drafting of anti-terrorism laws, stipulating that terrorism is the act of violence, intimidation, and threats addressed to the government and civilians in public, that threatens the security of the country. In this case, the journalist and reporter who incite and spread false news regarding the government, the military forces, and the police are included as terrorists and are sanctioned in accordance to existing laws (Sirgany 2015)

Yet, in fact, the arrest and detainment of journalists by the military and police was commonly known in the post-Morsi era. As noticed by Alfred Stepan, democracy cannot be interpreted solely through electoral democracy, especially when the electoral system seems far from fair and free. In the post-Mubarak period, Egypt indeed had elements of substantive democracy, such as civil society, civil liberties, media, and NGOs. But while still in development, these nascent elements were challenged and restricted during Sisi's rule. This was worsened by the exclusion of the Moslem Brotherhood from Egypt's political landscape, indicating that the government marginalized one particular group that

was perceived to have ruined the ongoing transition process.

The report shows that Egypt is not free, which is proven by a lack of freedom of speech as one of the fundamental rights of citizens. Moreover, most of the magazines and televisions belong to the government limiting the publication of independent media (Mohammadpour 2016: 147-153).

In the period after Morsi, the detainment of local and foreign journalists increased significantly, with 25 journalists in custody until December 2016. This makes Egypt the second largest country in the world regarding the number of journalist prisoners, preceded only by China with 38 journalist prisoners (Committee to Protect Journalists 2016).

The latest Global Terrorism Index report highlights that the country's global terrorism index has significantly increased. Egypt ranks 13th out of 162 countries on the global terrorism index. Acts of terrorism in Egypt increased in 2015 and 2016 when the country jumped to 9th rank with the death toll reaching 662 until 2016 (Terrorism Index 2016).

Consequently, security threats have harmed the country's stability. According to the latest report from Aljazeera, the escalation of terrorist attacks has significantly increased in Egypt since Morsi's overthrow in 2013. The violent attacks were mainly located in the Sinai Peninsula (Al Jazeera 2016).

From 2013 to 2016, 60,000 Egyptians and foreigners have been arrested by security forces (Reiter 2016). Local human rights organizations reported that there were 326 extrajudicial killings committed by security and intelligence agencies in 2015. The number increased to 754 cases by mid-2016 (Hamzawy 2017: 20)

Up to June 2016, the Sisi administration had imposed 218 of a total of 554 travel bans in Egypt since 2011. The report from the Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) states that the majority of individuals banned from entering the country were researchers and academics, whose research generally criticize Sisi's administration (Magid 2016).

Article 89 of the law regarding the establishment and role of NGOs,

restricted the activities of NGOs and was passed by the Egyptian parliament in November 2016. Previously, in October 2016, the local courts approved the freeze of assets of 5 human rights activists and 3 NGOs accused of receiving financial aid from abroad, which were believed to be threatening security and national stability (Najjar 2017).

As Michael Schulz and Larry Diamond previously argued, civil society has an imperative role in transition processes, as they act as forerunners for the improvement of democratization in the Middle East. In Egypt, while Mubarak and his predecessor maintained the ruling bargain with the people, in return for restricting the role of civil society, Sisi's administration took the same path as his predecessor in diminishing its role. Yet, it is still not clear how Sisi could maintain the bargain with the people in the midst of upheaval and disunion after Morsi's ouster. This is why democratization in Tunisia is much better than in Egypt. As in Tunisia, post-Ben Ali's resignation, civil society played a massive role in keeping an eye on the government's activities.

In Egypt's 1971 constitution, the country was portrayed as democratic, in return for holding both legislative and presidential elections, along with periodic referenda since 1950. Yet, this was no more than a pseudo-democracy filled with government manipulation (Winter 2015: 9). It seems like this pseudo-democracy still runs in Egypt today. Claiming that the country had completed democratic transition, it was obvious that President Sisi wanted to get recognition from the world, despite the tumultuous events, restrictions, and regulations limiting Egyptians from speaking or acting freely during his regime.

It seems like the Pharaohs still cast a shadow over Egyptians every day, in order to maintain their power and interest. When the Islamist Morsi won the 2012 presidential election, they feared that Morsi would diminish their power and turn the country into an Islamic state. Therefore, they had to use any and all measures in order to maintain their interests and power. These measures were depicted previously, in the section explaining the coup against Morsi.

In this democratic era where non-democratic countries are marginalized and face many international pressures to turn to democracy, Sisi's

authority insisted that Egypt has completely upheld both the procedural and electoral elements of democracy. But in reality, it is part of his tactic to upgrade autocracy in Egypt by diminishing the elements upgrading democracy, civil society, media freedoms, NGOs, and journalists.

It has been seven years since Mubarak's dismissal from power, and three years since the first democratically elected president's ouster by the military. At the beginning, Sisi's presidency established various policies in order to stabilize the country. In the midst of cleavages between the Islamists, secularists, and military forces, it seemed difficult for Sisi to maintain the ruling bargain that could gratify all these divided groups.

With the military forces persistently showing praetorian characteristics, it would be hard for a civilian president with no military background to endure a presidential term. If President Sisi persists in diminishing the role of civil society and NGOs, excluding the Moslem Brotherhood, arresting and detaining journalists and subjecting people to military trials, all the prospects of democratization in Egypt will only be an illusion.

Conclusion

The recent transition failed due to the shadow of Egypt's previous regime hindering the transitional and democratization process. The situation was worsened by military supremacy over the political sphere, most obviously seen through the military coup which toppled Mohammad Morsi from power. Morsi's ouster through the coup shows the flaws in the transitional process being formed since Mubarak's downfall.

Many believe that the recent situation in Egypt is worse than compared to the Mubarak era. The restriction of journalism and media, the military trials of civilians, tortures and detentions by the armed forces, and the control of civil society and NGOs prove that the current regime is not different from its predecessor prior to the Arab Spring in 2011.

In sum, the success of Egypt's democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt is an illusion as long as the country's current ruling elites, military forces, judiciary, and Mubarak remnants insist on maintaining their longstanding authoritarian tendencies in domestic affairs. The reluctance of these actors to move the country towards democratic consolidation has left all the Egyptians' efforts and struggles in establishing and preserving democracy in vain.

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Book Reviews

Vladimir Unkovski-Korica

The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment

2016. London and New York: I.B. Tauris. Pages: 320. ISBN 978-1-78076-328-6.

Vladimir Unkovski-Korica is a Lecturer in Legacies of Communism (within Central and East European Studies) at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. He did his Master's at Oxford and obtained his PhD from the London School of Economics (LSE). Prior to joining the University of Glasgow, he worked at the LSE, the University of Rijeka, and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. His main research focus is on communism, Yugoslav and Balkan history, and the effects of the Cold War. His first book is *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment*.

Following Susan Woodward's (1995) path-breaking research in *Socialist Unemployment*, Unkovski-Korica tries to explain the emergence of Yugoslav self-management, and the wider market reforms, in the early post-WWII period in relation not only to the ideological positions of the Yugoslav leadership and the political pressures of bloc politics, but also in relation to the country's international economic position, most importantly its current account deficit. In addition, Unkovski-Korica explores state-society relations in the first decade and a half after WWII in Yugoslavia – how the party-state interacted with trade unions, workers, workers' councils after they were formed, various organizations in the Popular Front, the peasantry, and others, and how this conditioned the Party's domestic reforms.

The book is divided into 4 chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with the 1944-1948 period, from the liberation of Belgrade to the Tito-Stalin split. It focuses on the Communist Party's attempts to bring about quick economic reconstruction and development, and its oscillation between using mass mobilization and administrative controls versus trying to build a more stable and market-oriented institutional

framework for achieving these goals. Unkovski-Korica presents evidence that this oscillation was highly conditioned by Yugoslavia's frustrated expectations of foreign aid from both superpowers, and by the Party leadership's differing ideas about the best way to ensure a rational use of limited resources to boost exports. His major addition to the literature is that he explored how the reforms were also conditioned by the relationship between the Party and the working class (including the unions) and the peasantry, as well as the fact that he showed that the oscillations existed even before major conflicts emerged with the West and the USSR.

The second chapter covers the 1948-1953 period (until Stalin's death), during which self-management was born. The main thread running through the chapter are the various deviations from the Party's economic plans (a fluctuating labor force, lackluster attempts at political mobilization, pressures for higher industrial wages and higher prices of agricultural products, breaking budgets, etc.) and the Party leadership's attempts to overcome them.

Unkovski-Korica argues that the Party was following the same two lines of policy as in the preceding period – a mass mobilization/administrative and a stable/market-oriented one, the latter also including decentralization of both the state, the Party, the organizations of the Popular Front, and of production. Unkovski-Korica documents extensively the problems that the federal Party faced in its relations to republic-level Party branches, the organizations of the Popular Front, unions, workers, peasants, firm managers, and others. He shows that the idea of workers' councils was a pragmatic attempt at bringing workers to accept the need to restrain wage growth and increase labor productivity. Self-management only later became an ideological pillar of the "Yugoslav Road to Socialism" as well. Furthermore, at least initially, workers' councils were not meant to reduce the power of management, but rather be an auxiliary organ to it.

The third chapter deals with the 1953-1958 period (until the 1958 miners' strike in Trbovlje) and focuses on Yugoslavia's international economic positioning. The volatile international situation during this period – the conflict around Trieste, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Suez crisis, the beginnings of the Vietnam war – convinced the Party leadership that it should not seek to be tied to either bloc, and that it should pursue stronger trade relations with Third World countries (i.e. non-alignment). Yet, this

also meant that Yugoslavia had to pursue an export orientation even more than it had already started doing in the preceding period. For a part of the Party leadership, this export imperative implied a stronger market-oriented approach to domestic policy, among other things through strengthening self-management, allowing some retention of foreign currency by exporting firms, tying wages to firm-level productivity, etc.. All of these were seen as inducements to higher productivity. However, the use of such mechanisms lessened the ability of the Party-state to pursue more even regional development through administrative measures, on top of the fact that it had to concentrate investment in the already more developed parts of the country in order to achieve the highest increase in exports. The seeds of the country's disintegration were thus sown already in this period – the stage was set for conflicts between the richer and poorer republics, the market was eroding a more socialist moral orientation, while the Party and the mass organizations were expected to counter this through political work and education, something which ultimately failed.

The final chapter, covering the 1958-1964 period, deals primarily with the conflicts between the reform and conservative factions within the Party – both within the federal leadership, and between republic-level parties (which generally began to reflect the conservative/reform division). The conservative faction sought to recentralize the state apparatus, the Party, the mass organizations, and to reassert political and administrative control, in order to provide for more development in the poorer parts of the country, and to finally solve the country's current account problem. The market reform faction was naturally against this, as it impinged on their own interests. In that, it could find an alliance with more skilled workers and the unions. By the early 1960s, internal Party unity was unravelling. A particularly interesting part of the chapter is Unkovski-Korica's exploration of the conflicts between Tito and Kardelj.

Unkovski-Korica's book makes two major contributions to the literature. The first is the use of archival sources that have thus far not been tapped, such as documents from the early Federal Economic Council, the Party's Politburo, the archives of the Confederation of Trade Unions, and others. These allowed him to provide more evidence for some of the arguments already present in the literature than has been the case thus far. Second, Unkovski-Korica extensively explored state-society relations, enabled by

the use of the mentioned archival sources. This is an under-researched topic in relation to Yugoslavia, at least in the early post-war years.

In addition to the above, two strengths of the book stand out. Unkovski-Korica has managed to remain completely neutral throughout. He only occasionally offers his assessments of whether some policy-choices seemed well thought-out or not, and never clouds the analysis with his personal opinions and judgements. Instead, the focus is on the interests and interpretations of the contemporary actors. Also, Unkovski-Korica never fails to analyze the context of the decisions that various actors made, to the fullest extent allowed by the source he has used. This offers an excellent picture of the dynamism of the period under research.

There are a few minor points that could be improved in the book. On occasion, the book can be over-detailed, with the main thread of the argument becoming a bit difficult to follow, and the relevance of certain points not being completely clear. It would have been good, for example, if the author had divided the effects of various policy choices and international pressures into categories (for example, economic, political, etc.). Also, the book is geared towards readers who already have a certain knowledge of Yugoslavia. For that reason, certain events, organizations, institutional structures, etc., are not explained, but it is assumed that the reader will know the context. While this is more a matter of the author's choice of how to write rather than a problem *per se*, a few explanatory paragraphs here and there would have gone a long way in making the book more accessible to readers new to the topic of Yugoslavia's post-war political economy. Nevertheless, these minor points should not detract anyone from reading this book, which is, indeed, an excellent piece of scholarly research.

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Jonathan Gander

Strategic Analysis: A Creative and Cultural Industries Perspective

2017. Routledge. Pages: 168. ISBN 978-1-138-18526.

The book *Strategic Analysis: A Creative and Cultural Industries Perspective* by Jonathan Gander aims to demonstrate how the practice of strategic thinking and analysis can and should be applied by managers working in the Creative and Cultural Industries (CCI). Through a range of competitive scenarios and case studies in CCI, the book provides a clear series of steps through which to identify and tackle strategic issues facing an enterprise and the wider CCI sector.

The book is divided into 6 chapters dealing with the ways how organizations that produce creative and cultural products with symbolic meaning analyse their current competitive situation and make decisions about possible future strategic directions.

The first chapter of the book entitled *Competing in the creative and cultural industries* discusses what it means to be strategic in the CCI and argues that having a strategy and adopting a competitive approach presents a significant achievement for organizations in the CCI. The author is also aware that constructing and following a strategy is an outcome that requires a considerable investment of time and thought, economic as well as reputational resources, which may eventually prevent organizations in CCI from seeking a strategy that will give them a competitive advantage. The chapter concludes with a scheme to divide the various sectors that make up the CCI into three groupings of enterprises: those providing an ephemeral experience, those providing either one-off non-scalable products or services, and those creating enduring reproducible products or services. The analysis of strategic considerations, approaches and applications is further organized using these three groups.

The second chapter *Diagnosing the problem and formulating a response* introduces some of the recommended models and frameworks that can

be used to analyse a company's current competitive position to diagnose the strategic problem, challenge or opportunity. This includes analysis of the current strategic position of the company using three interconnected levels of analysis: the macro-environment, the industry and the firm. In the following chapters, these analytical perspectives and frameworks were applied to different sectors within the CCI.

Each of the next three chapters took one grouping of creative/cultural organizations to identify the critical success factors that shape competition within them. To examine aspects of competition and to illustrate how the strategizing tools introduced in Chapter 2 can be applied, each chapter used different case studies. By applying these diagnostic tools and frameworks, the author demonstrated how such diagnosis might be applied and lead to a range of strategic directions applicable for each grouping. The third chapter *Strategizing for experience providers* deals with the CCI firms involved in designing, delivering and hosting experiences such as popular music gigs and classical performances, ballet and contemporary dance performances, opera and musicals, exhibitions, festivals and art shows. What characterizes them is that they are involved in making something happen, at a particular place and time, not making a thing that can be distributed. *Strategizing for bespoke singularities/one-offs* is the title of the fourth chapter which investigates strategies for organizations producing products and services that are singular in character and not designed for mass production. Those organizations include three linked types of creative practice: 1. Providers of services such as design agencies, architectural practices and marketing firms; 2. Visual artists; and 3. Couture fashion designers. The fifth chapter *Strategizing for the makers of reproducible products* includes strategies for organizations that make popular music, films, TV and radio programmes, digital games, high street fashions and accessories, photographic prints, books and magazines. Those are highly reproducible cultural products intended for mass reproduction and distribution. A range of possible strategic directions for organizations operating in these three areas were presented in each chapter.

The sixth chapter *Crafting a strategy* considers how decisions are made, how strategic directions might be crafted, and how the proposed bases of competitive advantage might be evaluated and selected. For the

strategy to be effectively crafted by the organization through a reflective process of thinking and acting, organizations need to, according to the author, reject the view that strategy is the province of the senior management team and encourage all employees to 'own' the strategy and therefore seek to craft it rather than merely follow it. To develop a concise strategy, organizations must clearly indicate what problems are being solved, how and why. It is necessary to have a structured set of diagnostic frameworks and agreed competitive principles.

The concluding chapter summarizes the issues analysed in this book and considers how the relationships within the organization and between the organization and its customers/community can give the organization a competitive advantage and help identify strategic directions that could help the organization thrive. Three strategic directions were presented in this chapter: *co-creation*, the situation when users are involved in creating, not just consuming; *crowdfunding*, funding model for creative and cultural production projects; *sharing economy*, collaborative consumption, and *behind-the-scenes approach*, which means establishing a link between the creator, the product and oneself. Although the creative and cultural organizations are highly distinctive in the way they operate, make decisions, design and deliver their products and services, this, according to the author, does not alter the value of established concepts and frameworks for thinking and acting strategically.

This book serves as a valuable resource for scholars and practitioners in the creative sector interested in how organizations in the CCI sector might apply strategic thinking to the way they analyse their current competitive situation and make decisions about possible future strategic directions.

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Sabine Marschall

Tourism and Memories of Home. Migrants, Displaced People, Exiles and Diasporic Communities

2017. Channel View Publications. Pages: 304. ISBN: 9781845416027.

Right from the title of the book *Tourism and Memories of Home. Migrants, Displaced People, Exiles and Diasporic Communities*, edited by Sabine Marschall, the reader is intrigued to discover the unusual link between tourism and migration. This collection of essays inverts the classical conceptualization of tourism in which the state of being “home and away” is seen as its defining marker. The book thus investigates “home” as a destination. To be more precise, its focus is on the relationship between tourism, memory and home – the link often neglected both within Tourism and Memory Studies. Divided into 13 chapters, the book presents eleven different studies of the researchers and scholars whose interest is to bring the reader somewhat closer to the experiences of people’s return journeys and their inner transformations around the globe.

In the introductory chapter, Sabine Marschall first investigates the notion of home and homeland. Indeed, home plays the essential role in the consciousness of the individuals who, according to the sense of identity they have with regards to their homeland, identify themselves as immigrants, expatriates or refugees. As Marschall explains the various notions involved around the term ‘migrant’ which are indispensable in understanding this tourism-memory relationship, the reader differentiates a simple return journey after being on holidays from the “homecoming” trip inspired by memories and the sense of belonging in which a person desires “to consolidate one’s own sense of self”.

The second chapter “Homecoming Emigrants as Tourists: Reconnecting the Scottish Diaspora”, written by Marjory Harper, examines the diaspora tourism in Scotland since the mid-19th century. This interesting historical analysis of rich data gives an insight into the experiences of Scottish emigrants. At the same time, this study demonstrates that the business of

ancestral and emigrant tourism is growing as a valuable niche market in Scotland. Interestingly, people wanting to explore their roots and heritage are keen to spend more money than the usual tourists. This economic benefit and the commercialization of “homecomings” is also discussed on the example of the Basque, Irish, and Scots-Irish Diaspora in the second last chapter “*Ongi Etorri Etxera (Welcome Home): A Gathering of Homecomings: Personal and Ancestral Memory*” by John Bieter, Patrick R. Ireland and Nina M. Ray.

The memories of trauma are well portrayed in the chapter “You Can’t Go Home Again – Only Visit: Memory, Trauma and Tourism at Chernobyl” by Kevin Hannam and Ganna Yankovska. The authors interviewed twelve victims of the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in order to examine their relationships with their old homes, as well as to express their views on the emerging tourism in this “ghost town” area. This so called “dark tourism” or “toxic tourism” is also the central theme of Carol A. Kidron’s case study presented in the tenth chapter “Domesticating Dark Tourism: Familial Roots Trips to the Holocaust Past”. The author outlines the fact that there is a difficulty in finding “homely feelings” in dark tourism. Despite that, Israeli children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors whose intention was only to explore family roots and broaden their historical knowledge ended up with emotively intense experiences.

The fourth chapter “Emotional Inventories: Accounts of Post-war Journeys ‘Home’ by Ethnic German Expellees” by Julia Wagner portrays nostalgia which here refers literally to its full meaning – the craving for home. The study is based on 62 written accounts of people who have lost their homes being Germans or German Jews and came back as tourists between the early 1950s and 1970s. Similarly, Palestinian homesick tourism is discussed in the following fifth chapter “‘Home Tourism’ within a Conflict: Palestinian Visits to Houses and Villages Depopulated in 1948” by Noga Kadman and Mustafa Kabha. This analysis examines 14 interviews of Palestinians who became refugees during the war of 1948. For most of them, notions of fear and anxiety are interwoven in their contemporary lives that they are reluctant to visit their homes.

Kalyan Bhandari in the “Travelling at Special Times: The Nepali Diaspora’s Yearning for Belongingness” (chapter 6) investigates the experiences of

the return journeys undertaken by the Nepali diasporic community in the UK after the massive earthquake in Nepal in 2015. The research showed the Nepali's strong sense of identity which is rooted in their everyday lives. Routine plays the central role in the reflection of their memory and sense of belonging, as they try to create a similar, homely environment in the host country.

How homeland tourists travel to remember who they are and how they idealize their bonds of family is shown in the seventh chapter "Collecting Kinship and Crafting Home: The Souveniring of Self and Other in Diaspora Homeland Tourism" written by Jillian L. Powers. Three different groups of Americans were examined who undertook their homeland journeys. In order to distinguish themselves from Others, they did not want to be associated with tourists in the first place.

The political position of the Eritrean migrants is discussed by Anna Arnone in "Returning, Imagining and Recreating Home from the Diaspora: Tourism Narratives of the Eritrean Diaspora in Italy" (chapter 8). This research comes as an outcome of the 12-year-long work with the Eritrean community in Milan. Their narratives of the return journeys, being part of their liberation struggle, served as a basis for the understanding of their collective memory. This chapter also shows how adults' memories influence youth, as well as youth's difficulties to relate with local people.

The interesting case of double diaspora, first away from Germany, and then away from Transylvania in Romania, is presented in the "Travelling to the Homeland over a Double Diaspora: Memory, Landscape and Sense of Belonging. Insights from Transylvanian Saxons" (chapter 9) by Andrea Corsale and Monica Iorio. The authors were therefore focused on the Saxons' perceptions of home (present place of residence) and homeland (immaterial, emotional attachment), as they need to differentiate those two terms due to their complex past.

Aaron Yankholmes explored African American root tourism and collective slave memories in the eleventh chapter "The Articulation of Collective Slave Memories and 'Home' among Expatriate Diasporan Africans in Ghana". Despite the fact that the whole book examines temporary touristic visits, this chapter, on the contrary, is focused on those who

permanently came back to the land of their enslaved ancestors.

Finally, the book receives its anthropologic touch in the “Epilogue: Home, Travel, Memory and Anthropology” as Nelson Graburn rounds off this collection of essays. It once again highlights the notions of home and homeland as strong markers of both group and individual identity.

To conclude, this book serves as a valuable resource for scholars interested in the intersection of tourism and migration. Although neglected, this field proves to be very important for a large spectrum of researchers and academics. However, the beauty of this book is actually in its universality, for almost every human knows what nostalgia, memory and home means. This makes the book's audience unlimited, as the book can be read, understood and enjoyed without being an expert in tourism, heritage or anthropology. While taking the joint journey back to one's past we learn that roots tourism is a means through which we explore personal identities grounded in collective memories. This rich set of stories full of emotionally charged experiences will ultimately cause the reader to reflect on his own life.

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Andrew Small

China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics

2015. United Kingdom: Hurst Publishers. Pages: 288. ISBN 9781849043410.

Andrew Small's book *The-China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics* is an attempt towards the hitherto less studied and less researched arena of the Sino-Pakistan relationship. It is a vital area of study in the global political setup, and has various ramifications on not only South Asia but cross-continental implications.

Andrew Small has delved deeply into the study of this peculiar relationship and its changing contours down through the corridors of time. Small has given a proper insight into the fomenting of the Sino-Pakistan relationship and the changing nature of this relationship over a period of time. The relationship is guided by political expediency, changes in the internal political dynamics of Pakistan, insurgency in Xinjiang province of China and also the various geopolitical changes in the greater international system. The Sino-Pakistan relationship was fomented post-1959 Lhasa uprising which China believed had the covert support of India. China was made to realize that it would be prudent for it to distract India by relying upon Pakistan as an ally. Ever since then, China has helped Pakistan as a vital entity which can enable it to contain India and thus balancing the power dynamics of the region.

Small has elaborately studied this relationship by extensive field research, interviews with relevant officials and an extensive search of available sources.

The relationship between China and Pakistan had traditionally been primarily guided by an 'India centric approach', which had primarily guided Sino-Pakistan relationships in the early phase. China provided military arms to Pakistan in order to enable it to act as a suitable and dependable counterweight against India, in the absence of any other trustworthy ally in the neighborhood which China could rely upon. However, this relationship, as Small suggests, has now gradually transformed and shifted from the traditional 'India centric' to a more pragmatic and China's

'Westward policy oriented' one in which Pakistan owing to its geostrategic location plays potentially a vital role in enabling China to realize its 'China Dream'. New vistas of trade have opened which enable it to provide access to the Persian Gulf directly via the Karakoram highway and the Gwadar Port on the Makran Coast. It provides China with an opportunity to play a vital role as a trade conduit between the West and the East. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will benefit Pakistan enormously as this will lead to considerable development of its infrastructure.

However, as a quid pro quo, China is taking keen interest in Pakistan's internal affairs owing to its diminishing trust or the capabilities of Pakistan's state machinery to ensure the safety of Chinese workers in Pakistan. Small has portended towards the Lal Masjid episode as an example of China's proactive interference in Pakistan's internal security wherein it is believed that the decision of Pakistan's military to attack Lal Masjid was covertly guided by Chinese leadership, owing to the fact that the hostages in Lal Masjid were Chinese citizens working in massage parlors in Islamabad.

Small's book has elaborated that much of the aspects of this mystified relationship have come out of the shadows, although there are still many aspects of this relationship that still remain a mystery.

Apart from the prologue, in the first chapter of the book Small gives a vivid account of the beginning of the fomenting of the Sino-Pakistan relationship post-1959 Lhasa uprising. China believed that the asylum to Dalai Lama was a part of the greater design of India to create a buffer state between China and India, to reap certain geopolitical and strategic benefits. A comprehensive view is given of the relationship between the two countries that developed over the three wars – the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. The Sino-Pakistan relationship was placed at a higher pedestal and grew stronger after the 1962 Sino-India war. It reinforced China's belief about Pakistan's geostrategic importance as an ally in the region and the need to strengthen and stabilize Pakistan. After the defeat of Pakistan in 1971, China helped the country to develop a set of military capabilities to ensure that it would never face the same fate again (p. 3). This relationship has been vital for both nations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the spearhead of the 'China camp' in Pakistan played a pivotal role in forging good relations with China,

despite of the opposition from the pro-US Camp in Pakistan, who thought that increased alignment towards China will spoil US-Pakistan relations.

Small writes that China did not intervene militarily on Pakistan's side during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Bhutto was urging China to intervene and open a second front. China declined citing its own compulsions and its apprehension about Soviet invasion in the case it opened any front against India, in preparedness for which China was itself heavily involved in local Civil Defense Programmes. This portended towards the limits of this 'all weather friendship' imagination which had developed in the minds of Pakistan's public during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, when China was ready to intervene on Pakistan's side.

The second chapter looks at China's support to Pakistan's nuclear ambition and the close cooperation between the two nations on this matter. China has played a crucial role in helping Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and missiles by supplying technology, expertise and material. It has, in fact, gone a long way in forging a strong and reliable relationship between them based on understanding and mutual trust. Small correctly notes that "if the military relationship lies at the heart of China Pakistan ties, nuclear weapons lie at the heart of the military relationship" (p. 29).

The third chapter looks at the gradual transition of the Sino-Pakistan relationship from an era of looking at Pakistan as a mere rival's opponent, to an era where China assumes a bigger role in the South Asian region. China acts as a stabilizer, by normalizing Sino-Indian ties and focusing on economic goal, which cannot be realized in an unsecure regional environment. Although China sees any antagonism between India and Pakistan in its own interest, it is however averse to full scale war between these two nations. The Sino-India war has a potential of destabilization and various other negative repercussions in the area to which China cannot remain immune. China tried to diffuse the conflict in cooperation with the US. Despite the changing relations with India, Pakistan's utility as a balanced, potential spoiler, and standing counterpoint to India's ambitions has never gone away (p. 65).

The fourth chapter looks at China's internal security problem in Xinjiang province, where Uighurs, the indigenous inhabitants, have become a

trouble for China's internal security. There are linkages between this region and the extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistani Intelligence Machinery has close ties with extremists of Xinjiang and this has become a bottleneck in the Sino-Pakistan relationship. The attacks by militants on Chinese investments and workers on Pakistani soil have drawn the ire of China on Pakistan. China's trust towards the Pakistani Government's capabilities to tackle such militants and to ensure the safety of Chinese workers and projects is diminishing in the wake of the attacks. This has led China to become more proactive in the domestic affairs of Pakistan. Xinjiang, being an important province of China, has great geopolitical significance owing to its position as a buffer between China and Central Asia. It also has unexplored oil basins and coal reserves, which are vital for addressing China's security concerns. All these factors contribute towards increasing the importance of developing Pakistan as a stable and strong nation. It will ultimately benefit China by means of stabilization in Xinjiang and thus address its internal security concerns as well as realizing its economic goals.

The fifth chapter looks at the trade ties between the two nations and the heavy investments made by China in Pakistan, particularly the construction of the famed Karakoram Highway and the Gwadar Port. Small argues that these projects were successful despite the various obstacles they had to overcome. The projects were dominated by political and military interests, in the absence of any commercial rationale in undertaking such a huge investment by China on foreign soil. These projects will however open new doors for China with access to the Persian Gulf and also enable it to become an important trade conduit between East Asia and the West.

The sixth chapter focuses on Afghanistan, and China's desire to see stability in Afghanistan, even at the cost of the presence of a geostrategic rival. This is owing to the fact that China does not want to see the rise of militancy in Afghanistan, which can spillover to Pakistan. This would in turn lead to negative repercussions on China's internal security by speeding up the momentum of the extremists in Xinjiang province. The seventh chapter looks towards the emergence of China as a balancer and stabilizer in the region. China can reap benefits from both the economic and security points of view, if it stabilizes Pakistan and its neighboring regions, by its 'west ward facing policies'. Moreover, in its endeavors to

stabilize the region, it will not invite any enmity from the US, which also wants to see stability in the region and the curbing of extremism. This is unlike China's proactive role in East Asia, which invites US intolerance and thus risk of military confrontation, owing to strategic competition and various maritime issues.

Small has attempted to focus on the change in the very nature of this relationship from 'India centric approach' to 'westward economic approach' wherein owing to its geostrategic location and significance, Pakistan has got heavy leverage and is thus indispensable for China in the realization of its 'China Dream', of which these westward policies are only a subset. The peculiarity of this relationship is that it is strong and formidable and has withstood the test of time albeit with some moments of downheaval, even in the absence of the mutually obligatory formal alliance. The change of the nature of this relationship from a narrow spectrum 'India centric approach' to a broader spectrum of economic and strategic parameters has in fact strengthened this relationship. There has been a narrowing down of the tolerability of China for Pakistan's destabilizing actions in the region, owing to China's increasing assertiveness in the region as a stabilizer and its realization that the bitter fruits of instability in the region will immediately spill over to its territory. China has realized that any nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan can trigger heavy unrest in the region whose repercussions will be very negative for China's internal security as well as its external interests in the region. China has shifted its foreign policy from non-interference to interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The unconditional support given to Pakistan by China has become conditional and 'only up to a point' (p. 16) owing to the instability in the region. The rise of extremism across the region which John W. Garver called 'extremist cancer' or the 'new generation of extremism', led to more frequent attacks on the interests of China. The support to Pakistan is conditioned by the role of Pakistan to avoid unrest in Xinjiang and stop the use of Pakistani land for the spreading of 'extremist cancer' to the world.

Small has given very narrow space to Japan which is a pivotal nation in determining China's security and external posturing. In spite of any lacunae, which the author can fulfill in a sequel to this book, this book is highly recommended to scholars, politicians and anybody wanting

to get firsthand information about the regions geopolitical matters and atmosphere.

Small's book puts before readers a detailed account and sufficient material to enable them to reach their own conclusions about this relationship. However, the labeling of this relationship as an 'axis' makes one skeptical about the intentions behind the labelling, keeping in view the historically negative connotations of this term, and its having been used for evil powers. However, this might be unintentional and not implying any history of this word for describing relationships between nations.

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Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Is the American Century over?

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In his latest book Joseph Nye answers a question that has been making the rounds in the world of Geopolitics for quite some time now: 'Is the American Century over?' His answer is pretty unequivocal – No. However, he does assert that the continuation of America's legacy will not look the same as it has in the last five decades.

"Americans have a long history of worrying about their decline", says Nye. Staying true to the neo-liberal principles and traditions he co-founded with Robert Keohane, political scientist Joseph Nye, evaluates both the absolute decline of America and the relative decline of the U.S.A with respect to other countries.

Nye maintains that the end is not nigh for the American Empire since there is no competitor that could balance American power on all three fronts – Military, Economic and Soft Power resources. Nye performs a systematic analysis of all of America's supposed challengers as well as their prospects for primacy — The European Union, Japan, Russia, India, Brazil and most extensively, China. Nye also explores all permutations and combinations of alliances that could be built along with their likelihood of emerging.

"Hegemony ain't what it used to be, but then it never was". One of the most important details of Nye's argument is that he asserts that American Hegemony is a myth. He denies the fact that America was ever the all-powerful global hegemon that it is made out to be. So even if America does not seem to be that hegemon anymore, the American century is not over. This contention is made, as there is no consensus on the definition of hegemony; it can mean either getting the outcomes one prefers or setting rules for others or even simply having a preponderance of power resources. Nye argues that in such a situation, no global hegemon has ever existed. This is emphasized by the fact that even though 19th century Britain is widely considered hegemonic, it never had a preponderance of power resources. Even at the height of its reign, it only ranked third in

GDP and third in military expenditure. The point is further emphasized by the fact that right after 1945, what is widely considered as the period of American hegemony, even though America controlled half of the world's economy, it's political and military actions were still constrained by the Soviet Union. Thus, he asserts that America will persist. Not as the perceived omnipotent hegemon, but as one of pre-eminence in terms of a country's disproportionate, measurable, share of all three types of power resources.

Nye unambiguously states that China is the only credible threat to America's pre-eminence, as all the other challengers have serious structural problems, in terms of both soft and hard power, which prevent them from challenging America in any significant way. Even though Europe matches America culturally and militarily, the Greek debt crisis and refugee crisis have tied their hands. Nye insists that Russia stands on an economic house of cards and that Japan has serious demographic problems stemming from stigma against immigrants. India and Brazil cannot be serious contenders due to the great degrees of economic disparity. Thus, none of these five will dethrone America.

China has the power to bring "America to its knees, but at the cost of bringing itself to its ankles." Joseph Nye argues that even though China may be the only serious contender in terms of economic power, it still cannot hope to rival America in preponderance of power resources, even with strategic alliances. There exists a vast disparity between the military prowess of America and China, and attaining enough soft power to challenge America is still a far-away dream. While the heavy-handed methods of the Chinese government do have some effect, Nye points out that they do not realize that American soft power comes from civilians and not the state.

True to his neo-liberal ideals, Joseph Nye chooses to talk about the absolute decline of the American empire, as well as the relative decline. Nye argues that while America does have the edge over most when it comes to soft power, and that American society is not in decline because of a relatively strong economy, the political system has been subject to considerable decay, with political gridlock bringing the entire country to a standstill, leading to the absolute decline of America.

Joseph Nye thus argues that the American century is the extraordinary period of American pre-eminence in military, economic and soft power resources that have made the United States central to the workings of the global balance of power and the provision of global public goods. Even with the relative and absolute decline of the American empire, America will persist in this form, retaining its primacy. Joseph Nye claims that this will be a period of Leadership and not Domination. The American century is not over.

Joseph Nye has been defending the American Empire against naysayers for the past two decades, and it is clear that in this book too was Nye's knight-in-shining-armor routine, rushing to the rescue of the faltering American faith in their country's supremacy. However, as opposed to a biased or one-sided argument exalting his nation, Joseph Nye, true to his duty as an academic and political scientist treated the book like a thesis paper. He outlined the question to the readers, broke up the issue into seven sub-issues. He was very analytical with his approach to the question, made each contention and then substantiated it clearly and in simple language. His methodology is not beyond reproach. There are many loose ends left untied, which are inevitable considering the brevity of the book. His ability to breakdown and encapsulate complex issues into simple terms and logical arguments without using sweeping generalizations, is one that must be commended. The author has excellent conceptual clarity, and all concepts defined clearly without being tedious.

Joseph Nye's worldviews are abundantly clear; he was the co-founder of Neoliberalism. This worldview is reflected in Nye's choices to examine the absolute as well as relative decline of America, when most others would choose to study only the relative decline. However, Nye is not afraid to differ from this worldview. Nye denounces the liberal notion that America is an "empire by invitation". He contends that US hegemony was never global, as some of the largest countries in the world – the Soviet Bloc, China, India – were not part of the American world order. American hegemony was always partial, despite the fact that never before had the world seen such a concentration of military and economic power. American leadership did create liberal institutions, rules and practices that governed the economy, but only for half of the world, leading to the more accurate term of 'half-hegemony'.

The winning feature of this book would have to be the unique concept of “half-hegemony”. Nye boldly asserts that hegemony is a myth, and the world has yet to produce a global hegemon, which is a novel idea. The fact that since 1941, America has retained primacy and not hegemony is a completely new perspective to look at the international world, but has strong logic and evidence to substantiate it. Nye also succeeds in adding the element of humour to his writing, seeing as how he quotes Mark Twain and comedians in order to subtly drive home the point.

However, the book has some glaring drawbacks as well. Nye often slips into economic jargon in order to explain the relative economic power resources of the countries. His language is dry and often leaves you flummoxed at first glance, requiring greater concentration to decipher the implications of the econobabble thrown at the reader. Nye also judiciously borrows from other authors without a clear distinction of which points are in assent or dissent of his previous assertion. There are also many trailing points where the conclusion is unclear and up to the reader’s interpretation. This does not flow with the general theme followed by the book, and causes unnecessary confusion. While Nye chooses to mention that power will shift from the west to the east and be diffused from the state to non-state actors, he does not clearly explain how this power shift would affect the world order. Also, when referring the situation within other countries, China especially, Nye makes sweeping generalizations, as opposed to citing sources that weaken the credibility of his arguments. For example, “Chinese often complain that they produce iPhone jobs, but not Steve Jobs”. One of the most noticeable arguments that was missing from the book was that expanding on Japanese soft power. There is no mention of the proliferation of Japanese media – literature, anime, manga, and video games, which are sold worldwide with large acclaim, or the rapid increase in people speaking the Japanese language in Scandinavia, Western Europe and USA.

‘Is the American Century over’ is a book for the masses, it is a simple read with clearly defined concepts, which will give you a holistic insight into the international situation regarding America and its competitors in the field of international politics.

Tanmayi Sharma¹